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ABSTRACT 
 This study assessed implementation of food defense practices in public schools in 
Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  The first 
phase involved a qualitative multi-site case study: one-day visits were made to five school 
districts in the states of Iowa, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  A principal, district 
foodservice director (FSD), two food production workers, and an emergency responder at each 
site were interviewed about food defense awareness and risk perception.  Meal production and 
service were observed for implementation of food defense practices.  In Phase Two 543 school 
food authorities or FSDs (36% percent of the population from 1,501 districts in seven 
Midwestern states) responded to an Internet-administered survey.  Survey items included 
frequency of implementation of 31 food defense best practices adapted from the work of Yoon 
and Shanklin (2007a) and Yoon (2007).  The survey included ten items assessing risk perception 
using Slovic’s psychometric paradigm (1987).  Items requested information about crisis 
management and food defense planning, food defense training, influence over districts’ security 
policies, as well as operational and demographic characteristics. 
 Four themes emerged from the 25 interviews conducted during the site visit:  low 
awareness, lack of concern, food not considered a potential danger, and how conflicting priorities 
influence security.  Food defense was an unfamiliar concept among most interviewees.  Many 
expressed the belief that food tampering was not likely in their schools because employees were 
trustworthy or location was too insignificant.  Principals expressed concern for physical security 
measures but did not perceive their contribution to food defense.  In most districts, the FSD was 
not included in district emergency response planning activities and communication about food 
defense did not occur between principals, FSD, and emergency responders.  Some of the 
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interviewees had experience with food tampering incidents; seven incidents were reported, of 
which five had occurred in schools.  Employees in a central kitchen facility were suspected in 
two of the school incidents, and three were perpetrated by students, indicating different sources 
of vulnerabilities.   
 Most (67.2%  survey respondents reported district enrollment <2,500 students.  Few 
(14.5%) had implemented a food defense plan; implementation was related to FSD involvement 
in crisis management planning and to FSD receiving food defense training.  Thirteen practices 
were implemented most of the time (mean >4.0 on 5-point scale with 5 = always); most of these 
within control of FSD.  Six practices were implemented less frequently (mean <3.0 on 5-point 
scale with 1 = never); three would require administrative action to implement, and two were 
related to FSD communication with emergency responders. 
 Mean values for “unknown risk” risk perception measures indicated some disagreement 
that intentional food contamination was a new risk for respondents and strong disagreement that 
they personally knew a lot about how terrorists could contaminate the food supply.  The mean 
for the dread risk scale was 1.93 on a 4-point scale with 4 = high, similar to perceived risk of 
common everyday activities reported by Lee, LeMyre, and Krewski (2010).  Compared to 
district administrators, FSDs perceived significantly greater personal control over both terrorism 
and food tampering risks. 
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CHAPTER ONE.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Concern about intentional contamination of food with chemical or biological agents has 
established food defense as an imperative for industries associated with the food supply 
(Jackson, 2009; Khan, Swerdlow, & Juranek, 2001; Sneed & Strohbehn, 2008).  Attacks on the 
global food and water supply increased four-fold from 1970-1979 and 2000-2005 (Mohtadi & 
Murshid, 2009).  The World Health Organization (WHO) has urged its Member States to 
recognize the potential for food to be deliberately contaminated, and therefore strengthen food 
production, processing, and preparation systems (WHO 2008).  Busta (2010) identified 
disgruntled employees, extremist special interest groups, criminals and deviants, and terrorists as 
threats for intentional food contamination.  
 In 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004) issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 9, which established a national policy to defend agriculture and the food 
system against terrorist attacks, disasters, and emergencies.  Schools are one of several entities in 
the food system that have characteristics making them potential targets for those with terrorist 
motives.  The purpose of this study is to investigate preventive measures being used in school 
nutrition programs to defend food against intentional contamination. 
Background 
Defense of the Food Supply in the United States 
 Acts of terrorism involving bombs and explosive devices are common occurrences 
around the world.  Research has identified ways in which terrorism may spread to new targets, 
including the food supply.  After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
government became proactive in thwarting initiatives that would harm its citizens by increasing 
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spending for food defense from $1 million in 2001 to $217 million for  2011  (Franco & Sell, 
2010). 
 Terrorism in any form is a concern.  Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) compiled a database of 
25,594 incidents of terrorism between 1968 and 2006.  After 1993, an increase in severity of 
terrorist acts was noted, with almost all of the events affecting more than 1000 casualties.  These 
researchers also noted a trend away from attacks on airlines, military, and government targets, 
with a move to less protected, “softer” targets.  Many experts consider the U.S. food industry to 
be a soft target, potentially vulnerable to acts of intentional contamination with chemical, 
biological, radiologic, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. 
  Persons with criminal intent may also use the food chain to harm targeted or random 
individuals via food ingredients or water.  Historically, acts of intentional food contamination on 
the food supply by criminals have greatly outnumbered terrorist attacks.  Khan, Swerdlow & 
Juranek (2001) differentiated between a bioterrorist act and a biocrime. A biocrime is an act of 
intentional contamination of food or water carried out by individuals who act alone and are not 
associated with a named group.  Persons who commit biocrimes act on personal motives such as 
revenge or extortion, whereas bioterrorist acts are planned by individuals or groups who want to 
cause fear, weaken government, damage the economy, or make their views known.   Biocrimes 
and terrorist acts may involve chemical agents (including heavy metals), food additives, 
detergents (such as quaternary agents), fat-soluble vitamins, and non-metal ions (such as fluorine 
or iodine).   
 Terrorist groups are motivated by a desire for publicity to promote their political and 
ideological agendas.  Primary motivations of terrorist attacks are to disrupt social life by causing 
physical, psychological, or economic damage (Bruemmer, 2003; Elad, 2005; Sobel, Khan, & 
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Swerdlow, 2002).  The global food system has the ability to quickly move food around the 
world, a characteristic that is a detriment if the food supply is contaminated at an early point in 
the food supply chain.  A CBRN attack that contaminates a large batch of food product could 
affect more people and create greater disruption than could be achieved by destroying the facility 
in which the food was processed. 
United States Food Supply Vulnerabilities 
 The U.S. food industry has characteristics that make it a desirable vehicle to accomplish 
terrorist objectives.  One characteristic has been the trend within the U.S. food system to increase 
the number of very large food processing facilities.  Foods produced in these plants may be 
distributed globally.  If intentional food contamination occurred in such a facility, many 
individuals across a widespread geographical area would be affected.  Khan, Swerdlow, and 
Juranek (2001) described the far reaching effects of  a salmonella outbreak caused by improper 
cleaning of a truck subsequently used to haul ice cream mix; that outbreak affected 224,000 
persons in 41 states.  
 The globalization of the food supply contributes new risks.  It is estimated imports make 
up 10 to 15% of foods and ingredients consumed in the United States (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration [FDA], 2011a).  The majority (79%) 
of fish and shellfish consumed in the United States is imported, as is 32% of the fruit and nuts  
(Jerardo, 2008).  These foods, along with fresh produce, are minimally processed and/or do not 
undergo heat treatment that would kill pathogens.  Adulteration with pathogens is the cause of 
10% of import violations (Unnevehr, 2010).  Food imports from China, India, and Eastern 
Europe are expected to increase faster than those from other parts of the world (FDA, 2011a).  
Food imported from low-income countries had 605 import violations compared to 134 violations 
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from high income countries, with two-thirds of violations from chemical or microbial 
adulterants, filthy or decomposed appearance, or use of unregistered processes for canned food 
(Unnevehr, 2010).  A global food system implies that an act of intentional food contamination 
could cause harm long distances from the source of the contamination and spread across a wide 
geographical area, making it difficult to identify the source of the contaminant.  The Food Safety 
Modernization Act (2011) addressed some of these new risks with increased regulation for 
imported foods. 
 Busta (2010) identified disgruntled employees as a threat for  intentional contamination 
of food.  Food manufacturing jobs have the highest rates of injury and illness among all U.S. 
jobs, particularly in seafood product and dairy manufacturing industries (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2010).  Such jobs require little education and offer few opportunities for advancement.  
These conditions could provide reasons why workers might be careless, angry or vindictive, and 
provide motivations for intentions to commit murder, extortion, revenge, or be open to bribes to 
intentionally sabotage food.  
Global Risk of Intentional Food Contamination 
 Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) acknowledged that the food chain is vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks, but questioned whether that vulnerability translated into risk.  They compiled a data base 
of 448 global CBRN events between 1975 and 2005 and used those past events to estimate the 
risk of future large-scale events.  Their research was based on the assumption that past 
experience with CBRN events is a good predictor of future events.  They employed a statistical 
method called extreme value theory to estimate the probability of terrorist attacks affecting large 
numbers of victims.  Extreme value theory procedures emphasize accurate prediction of values in 
the tails of a normal curve, not the values surrounding the mean.  They observed that catastrophic 
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terrorist events were occurring more frequently and that the time between events was decreasing.  
They also reported major attacks with thousands of casualties were more likely to be caused by 
CBRN weapons rather than conventional weapons.  They identified 448 attacks between 1950 
and 2005 that used CBRN weapons; 12 of these cases involved attacks on food.  The agents used 
in these attacks included Salmonella tymphirium, cyanide, nitric acid, rat poison, nicotine, 
bleach, ammonia, pesticide, and one unknown agent.  China experienced the greatest number of 
attacks on the food supply (n = 5), followed by the United States (n = 3); single attacks occurred 
in Russia, Italy, and two undisclosed locations.  Restaurants (n = 4) and schools (n = 3) were the 
most frequent targets for food-specific attacks.  Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) concluded that by 
2025, a CBRN attack causing 5000 casualties could be expected every 20 months.  The 
probability of an attack directed at the food system specifically could not be determined because  
of the limited data available.  
Reports of Intentional Contamination in the United States 
 To date, only one incident of intentional contamination of food in the UnitedStates has 
been considered an act by a terrorist group.  This incident (Torok & Tauxe, 1997) involved 
intentional contamination with salmonella of self-service bars in restaurants by members of a 
religious sect.  This group’s objective was to influence an election by causing illness among 
likely voters.  The group purchased a live culture of S. tymphirium and used it to contaminate 
coffee cream, salad dressings, and salad bars at ten different restaurants over a one-month period.   
Intentional contamination of the food was initially considered, but dismissed, because no motive 
was determined, no one claimed responsibility, and no disgruntled employees were identified.  
The authors recommended that, in the future, intentional contamination should be considered for 
any large outbreak having an unlikely pattern of contamination.  
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 Ashford, et al. (2003) reviewed the biologic agents in foodborne illness outbreaks 
occurring from 1988 to 1999 using data from reports made by the Epidemic Intelligence Service 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC).  Of 1099 outbreaks reviewed four percent (n = 44) were considered caused by 
Class A agents.  Intentional contamination was considered a likely cause in six of the cases.  In 
41 outbreaks, the infectious agent was unknown.  The authors stated these agents were not 
commonly found in CDC investigations; illness from them, if not deemed an accident, should be 
considered as a case of intentional exposure by those who might be planning a biologic attack. 
 Outbreaks resulting from intentional contamination of food were most likely identified if 
they involved large numbers of people, were associated with commercial restaurants, the 
symptoms of illness manifested shortly after ingestion of food, or serious illness resulted (Batz et 
al., 2005).  An analysis of 453 confirmed incidents of malicious contamination across the globe 
showed the majority occurred in the home or at work, and were perpetrated by relatives, co-
workers, and/or acquaintances of the victims (Dalziel, 2009).  Although the incidents occurring 
in retail foodservice venues were fewer in number (n = 85, or 17% of the 453), the average 
number of casualties (n = 40) per incident was highest in this group.  Dalziel concluded that 
retail foodservice sites were points in the food chain where terrorists or criminals could cause the 
most harm.  Retail foodservices may be classified as either commercial or non-commercial.  
Intentional contamination of food in a commercial foodservice setting, such as a chain restaurant, 
may result in widespread publicity and economic damage.  Intentional contamination in a 
noncommercial foodservice setting, such as a school, could result in physical and psychological 
damage as well as social unrest.  
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 The probability that one will be harmed by intentional food contamination is low, so this 
hazard may not be perceived as a risk by lay people.  However, bioterrorism is a relatively new 
hazard; consequences of a bioterrorist attack are unknown, but it is likely that many people could 
become ill or die.  Bioterrorism may be perceived by lay persons with a sense of dread.  “Dread 
risk” is described by a psychometric paradigm of risk perception (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982).  
Little research has been done to determine whether a perception of dread risk is related to 
preventive action or emergency preparedness. 
Significance of the Study 
 Schools are unique places in communities because they house large numbers of children 
most days and are responsible for the safe return of the children to their families at the end of the 
day (Greene, Barrios, Blair, & Kolbe, 2004).  More than 55 million children, representing more 
than 17% of the total population of the United States, were enrolled in 132,000 kindergarten, 
elementary, middle, and high (K-12) schools across the United States in fall 2010  (U.S. 
Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2011).  School meals 
programs have characteristics that may make them attractive targets for terrorist attacks or 
biocrimes via intentional food contamination.  Young children are at high-risk for foodborne 
illness; their size and physiology would result in more severe reactions if they consumed 
contaminated food (Chung & Shannon, 2005).  Widespread illness among a community’s 
children would certainly cause fear and social disruption and result in increased media attention.  
Most school meals programs in the United States participate in the federal government’s Child 
Nutrition Program; an attack on school meals could lead to distrust of the federal government.  
Some meals are produced in facilities as large as commercial food production facilities, with 
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distribution to numerous school sites.  School meals programs have exacting specifications for 
their menu items, limiting the number of food processors willing to prepare products for that 
market; thus concentration exists in the school meals food system.  Additional concentration 
comes through the use of commodity foods donated to each participant in USDA school meals 
programs.  Schools received $1 billion in commodity foods from USDA in 2005-06 (USDA, 
Food and Nutrition Service [USDA-FNS], 2011).  Half of these commodities, primarily meat, 
poultry, and frozen fruit were reprocessed into cooked meat products and fruit desserts at various 
food manufacturing locations; thus, contamination at the processing level could easily be 
targeted toward school children. 
 School districts have the option to participate in the Child Nutrition Program; this 
federally funded program fully or partially reimburses them for up to three meals per day on days 
school is in session: breakfast, lunch, and after school snack.  The total cost to the federal 
government for all child nutrition programs is $1.375 billion (USDA-FNS, 2011).  The National 
School Lunch Program serves meals to over 31 million children in 101,000 schools each school 
day (USDA-FNS, 2010b) while the school breakfast program serves 11.1 million meals in 
87,000 schools (USDA-FNS, 2010a) and the after school snack program is active at 27,000 sites 
nationally (USDA-FNS, 2010c).  In addition, this food assistance program continues during 
summer months with 133.8 million meals served at 38,500 sites in 2010 (USDA-FNS, 2011). 
 Given the characteristics of a large population of vulnerable children participating in a 
high number of school meal programs, as well as characteristics of child nutrition program 
administration, it is important that best practices be followed to protect food while in the 
district’s custody.  Previous research has assessed food defense practices in place at schools in 
the United States.  The National Food Service Management Institute (NFSMI) and USDA-FNS 
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have developed guidance and training for foodservice personnel (USDA-FNS, 2004).  Yet, it still 
is not clear the extent that best practice has been implemented.  
 Literature of food defense in schools included self-reported data from a sample of the 200 
largest school districts that used a centralized production system or warehouse operation (Story, 
Sneed, Oakley, & Stretch, 2007), a sample of all school districts in the state of Kansas (Yoon & 
Shanklin, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c), and a national sample of districts with more than 7500 students 
(Yoon, 2007).  This research assessed implementation of food defense recommendations 
developed by USDA through the original Biosecurity Checklist for Schools Foodservice 
Operations (USDABC) that contained 17 topics and 102 individual items (USDA-FNS, 2004).  
Condensed versions with fewer items were used by Yoon in the Kansas and national surveys 
(Yoon, 2007; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).  These previous studies showed three 
categories of preparedness to be weak in school districts: communication, facility security, and 
utility security.  In the national survey, Yoon (2007) attempted to determine regional differences 
among the USDA Risk Management Agency (USDA-RMA) Compliance Office regions, but two 
regions, Northern and Central, had small numbers of respondents, making comparisons among 
all regions difficult.  Thus, little is known about implementation of food defense practices in 
districts with lower student enrollments (less than 7,500) or from districts in the Northern and 
Central regions of the United States.  The Northern region includes seven states, three which are 
located along the U.S.– Canadian border (Montana, North Dakota, and Minnesota) and most 
have lower populations, fewer metro centers, and likely, fewer large school districts, than states 
in other USDA regions.  
 The purpose of this two-phase study was to determine the extent to which food defense 
best practices are implemented in U.S. schools.  The study was designed to  describe current 
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food defense practices of school meal programs in small, medium, large, and extremely large 
size school districts in the northern United States; identify perceived barriers to implementing 
food defense best practices in their schools; and describe stakeholders’ perceptions of the risk of 
intentional food contamination. 
 The first phase used a qualitative approach with a multiple case study design of school 
districts in the USDA-RMA Northern Compliance region. A case study approach is appropriate 
for research questions with a “how” or “why” focus (Yin, 2008).  The purpose of this phase of 
the study is to:  
 Assess how selected school foodservice operators in districts with varying characteristics 
located in the USDA-RMA Northern Compliance Office region are currently 
implementing food defense practices related to physical security and communication. 
 Investigate why communication and physical security aspects of food defense are 
implemented to a low degree in school foodservice operations. 
 In the second phase of the study, a national survey (modified with permission by Yoon, 
2007) will be electronically distributed to the population of school food authorities in the USDA-
RMA-Northern region.  Because no data from a national or regional sample has been collected 
since 2005, it is important to know whether school districts are making progress toward food 
defense, or whether the issue has taken a back seat to other priorities. 
Research Questions 
1.  What recommended food defense practices are currently implemented by U.S. school districts 
participating in the National School Lunch Program in the USDA-RMA Northern Compliance 
Region? 
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2.  What is awareness of risk regarding intentional food contamination held by district 
stakeholders: principals, emergency responders, foodservice directors, and production workers?  
3.  What is the relationship of demographic and operational characteristics to crisis management 
and food defense planning by public school districts? 
4.  What is the prevalence and the characteristics of food defense training activities among 
school district personnel? 
Definitions 
Biocrime: Intentional use or threat of use of a biological or chemical agent for revenge, 
extortion, or personal gain (Khan et al., 2001). 
 
Bioterrorism: The intentional use of biological or chemical agents for the purpose of causing 
harm (USDA-FNS, 2004). 
 
CBRN event: Any incident involving the deliberate use or possession of chemical, biological, or 
radio nuclear material, with intent to do harm, as well as any attack that poses a threat to the 
containment of these substances (Mohtadi & Murshid, 2009). 
 
Centralized foodservice system: A food production facility in which food is produced for service 
off site in receiving kitchens, often a large production facility.  No food is served onsite. Also 
known as a commissary foodservice system (NFSMI and USDA-FNS, 2002).  
 
Food biosecurity: The protection of food from bioterrorism  (USDA-FNS, 2004).  This term is 
obsolete and has been replaced with ‘food defense”. 
 
Food defense: activities associated with protecting food from intentional acts of contamination or 
tampering (FDA, 2011c). 
 
On-site kitchen: a food production operation where food is prepared and served at the same site 
(NFSMI and USDA-FNS, 2002). 
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CHAPTER TWO.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 This chapter includes four major topics.  The first is a characterization of the risk of 
intentional food contamination in a foodservice operation with discussion of past and potential 
agents, methods, targets, and perpetrators.  A discussion of risk management recommendations 
follows.  The third section reviews the research about current food defense practices in 
restaurants, country clubs, healthcare facilities and school foodservice operations.  The final 
section describes the use of the psychometric paradigm to measure risk perception and reports 
research about risk perception and bioterrorism. 
Risk of Intentional Food Contamination 
 Risk assessment of intentional food contamination should consider the characteristics of 
different microorganisms, food products, and the flow of food items from “stable-to-fork” (Elad, 
2005).  Radosavljevic and Belojevic (2009) proposed a model for analyzing the risk of 
bioterrorism attacks that included four components: perpetrators, agents, means and media of 
delivery, and target.   
Perpetrators 
 The model for terrorist attacks proposed by Radosavljevic and Belojevic (2009) 
differentiated between types of perpetrators: government-supported perpetrators, terrorist groups, 
and individuals.  The authors defined various levels of sophistication and motivation among 
these groups.  Highly sophisticated terrorists were defined as those who would try to attack well-
defended targets, would want to remain unknown, and would not have suicidal intent, whereas 
highly motivated, but poor or fanatical terrorists would be more likely to attack less-prepared 
venues, often referred to as soft targets (Radosavljevic & Belojevic, 2009). 
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 Historically, the majority of incidents of intentional food contamination targeted specific 
individuals.  Table 1 lists all confirmed incidents between 1950 and 2005 that occurred in 
schools or universities worldwide (Dalziel, 2009).  The perpetrators of these incidents were 
diverse and included students, teachers, vendors, and foodservice workers.  The dates indicate 
that more events occurred between 2000 and 2005 than in earlier decades.  
 Three confirmed incidents of intentional food contamination in the United States were 
committed by students (Dalziel, 2009).  The ages of the students ranged from elementary school 
through high school.  The targets included a teacher, the general student body, and a classmate.  
Two of the attacks involved a beverage and the third involved a dish served on the cafeteria line.  
The contaminants were mercury taken from a thermometer, acetone (found in nail polish 
remover), and rat poison.  An incident in the Philippines also involved students, who stole a 
chemical from the school science lab and added it to the beverage of a classmate (Dalziel, 2009).  
Worldwide, three incidents have involved school employees, one by a teacher, one by a 
maintenance worker, and one by foodservice employees (Dalziel, 2009).  None of these occurred 
in the United States. 
 A recent survey of 926 restaurant managers in South Carolina found that the managers 
reported 29 alleged food tampering incidents in their restaurants (Xirasagar, Kanwat, Smith, et 
al., 2010).  Managers believed dissatisfied employees were the perpetrators of 11 of the 
incidents.  Other employee-related reasons given were terminated employee (5 responses), recent 
hire (3 responses), and easy employee access to food storage areas (3 responses).   
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Table 1  
 
Perpetrators, Agents, Media, and Location of Intentional Food Contamination Incidents  
Year Location Type of 
School 
Perpetrator(s) Agent Media 
1979 USA Elementary 
school 
Angry students Mercury from 
a thermometer 
One teacher’s mug 
of coffee 
 
1992 China University Student who 
had been 
expelled 
 
Arsenic Flour stored in the 
foodservice kitchen 
1998 United 
Kingdom 
University Maintenance 
worker 
Mercury Employees’ tea 
kettle 
 
2000 USA Elementary 
school 
Unknown Rat Poison Pot of thawing hot 
dogs 
 
2000 USA Middle 
school 
Two 7
th
 grade 
students 
Rat Poison Salsa served with 
school lunch 
 
2002 China School Two 
foodservice 
workers 
 
Tetramine (rat 
poison) 
Food served for 
school breakfast 
2002 China Kindergarten Owner of a rival 
kindergarten 
Unknown Corn porridge served 
for school lunch 
 
2003 China Primary 
school 
Unknown Tetramine Baking powder 
stored in the school 
kitchen 
 
2004 Thailand Kindergarten Teacher Insecticide Chocolate drink 
served to children 
 
2004 USA School Student Acetone Beverage of a 
classmate 
 
2005 Philippines High School Two students Mercurial 
nitrate stolen 
from science 
lab 
Water bottle of a 
classmate 
Note:  From Dalziel (2009). 
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 Vendors have also been identified as perpetrators of intentional food contamination. 
(Xirasagar, Kanwat, Smith, et al., 2010) reported that restaurant managers attributed a problem 
with a vendor as the reason behind nine instances of suspected or confirmed food tampering.  
Whether these particular incidents were suspected or confirmed was not explained.   
 Intentional contamination of food with a biological or chemical agent would achieve 
terrorist objectives to cause mass illness or injury and create fear and panic (WHO, 2008).  As 
recently as 2010, Al Qaeda announced a strategy of smaller attacks involving fewer operators, 
less expense, and less planning time (Shane, 2010).  In December 2010 CBS news reported a 
credible threat of multiple attacks on food in hotels and restaurants as a manifestation of this new 
strategy (Keteyian, 2010).  
 The only documented case of intentional food contamination in the United States 
perpetrated by a group with terrorist intent occurred in 1984 and is documented by Torok et al. 
(1997) and Carus (2009).  The perpetrators were members of a religious cult, called the 
Rajneeshees, that established a large community outside The Dalles, Oregon.  The cult attempted 
to gain control of the county court in the November 1984 election by poisoning local citizens so 
that they would be ill and unable to vote.  The cult produced its own supply of Salmonella 
tymphirium.  At least eight members participated in pouring vials of the culture into exposed 
food items at 10 restaurants.  Both customers and restaurant workers were included in the group 
of 751 persons who became ill from eating food from salad bars in the restaurants.  At the time, 
the food infections were not considered to be a result of intentional contamination.  More than a 
year passed before the outbreak was related to the cult. 
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Agents 
 Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) studied the use of CBRN weapons in terrorist attacks 
documented in unclassified sources.  It has been noted that a tactical advantage of biological 
weapons is that an attack can go unnoticed while the bacteria incubates in the victims, infecting 
many before symptoms occur, making it difficult to identify and track the attack (Lesho, Dorsey, 
& Bunner, 1998).  Another advantage for perpetrators is biological weapons cause casualties 
without destroying equipment or infrastructure (Lesho et al., 1998). 
 Graham and Talent (2009) noted that, unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons 
present the  opportunity to limit the effects of an attack after it has been initiated.  Preparedness 
may lead to identification of an attack soon after it occurs, reducing illness and deaths.  Biologic 
agents are inexpensive, compared to conventional weapons.  The cost of producing mass 
casualties, in dollars per square kilometer was estimated at $1 for biological agents, $800 for 
nuclear weapons, and $2000 for conventional weapons (Lesho et al., 1998). 
 The CDC initiated lists of biological agents grouped into three categories: A, B, and C 
(Rotz, Khan, Lillibridge, Ostroff, & Hughes, 2002).  Biological agents were categorized 
according to potential to affect public health, ability to be produced in large amounts, ease of 
dissemination, ability to spread through person-to-person contact, ability to cause fear in the 
public, and the need for public health officials to make new preparations to diagnose and monitor 
outbreaks.  The effects of agents on a civilian population having a diversity of ages and states of 
health was used to categorize the agents (Rotz et al., 2002).  
 Microorganisms or toxins are biological agents that may be used to contaminate food. 
Analysis of past bioterrorism events revealed that  agents were obtained from legitimate 
commercial culture collections, self-manufactured, stolen from laboratories, or were acquired 
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from natural reservoirs (Carus, 2009).  Mixtures of soil and rotting vegetables, dead animals, and 
feces have been used by those with no technical knowledge (Dalziel, 2009).   
 Elad (2005) described the difficulties associated with producing biologic agents. 
Accidental death or injuries from production of the weapons may draw attention to the 
perpetrators and lead to their discovery.  The effectiveness of biological agents is influenced by 
virulence, ability to multiply once released, and degree of contagiousness.  Once disseminated, 
changes in the appearance, taste, or smell of the food may lead to detection and rejection by the 
intended targets. 
 The highest CDC priority, Category A, includes six biological agents rarely seen in the 
United States and unlikely to be familiar to public health officials.  Of these six, the one that 
could be spread through food is botulism toxin (Sobel et al., 2002).  The next level of agents, 
Category B, includes foodborne pathogens such as Salmonella, Shigella spp, E. coli 0157:H7, 
and toxins from Clostridium perfringens and Staphylococcus.  These agents cause illness, but 
rarely death if medical care is available (Rotz et al., 2002).  Radosavljevic and Belojevic (2009) 
suggested that highly sophisticated perpetrators will use sophisticated Class A agents whereas 
more common Class B agents would  likely be used by terrorist groups that are highly motivated 
and/or have fewer resources. 
 Botulism toxin is considered the most toxic biochemical compound.  Arnon et al. (2001) 
suggested that intentional use of botulism toxin be considered with any botulism outbreak, 
especially those with a large number of cases, an unusual toxin type, or multiple simultaneous 
outbreaks.  
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Means and Medium of Delivery   
 Food is a difficult vector for causing mass injuries because it may undergo several 
cleaning, trimming, washing, and heating processes from harvest to consumer, all which dilute 
any contaminant added early on in the farm-to-fork journey (Mara & McGrath, 2009).  Water 
can be easily contaminated.  Category A agents, including anthrax, plague, tularemia, and 
botulism toxin can be distributed in water supplies.  They are stable in water from 8 days to 2 
years, depending on the organism (Burrows & Renner, 1999).  Category B agents also pose 
threats to water supplies, specifically Brucella, cholera, Salmonella, Shigella, cryptosporidium, 
ricin toxin, and enteric viruses.  All are definite or probable threats to water supplies and are 
stable in water (Burrows & Renner, 1999).  Although bacterial cells such as Vibrio cholerae, 
Salmonella, Shigella, and tularemia are inactivated by chlorine, other agents are resistant 
(Clostridium perfringens, cryptosporidia) or the response to chlorine is unknown (Burrows & 
Renner, 1999).   
 Toxins vary in threat presented to the water supply.  Botulism, a Category A agent, is 
inactivated by chlorine, air, and sunlight.  Burrows and Renner(1999) reported it to be 
impractical for use in poisoning a water supply.  Ricin and staphylococcal enterotoxin B are 
category B agents.  Of these, ricin is most dangerous when inhaled and not reported as a threat to 
water supplies.  In contrast, staphylococcal enterotoxin can persist in water and cause illness if 
consumed.  Charcoal filters are effective in removing the toxin from water, but the effects of 
chlorine on the toxin are unknown (Burrows & Renner, 1999). 
 Enteric viruses, such as rotavirus, are threats to water supplies.  Individuals who consume 
as few as 6 particles in one day have a 25% risk of becoming ill with vomiting and diarrhea 
(Burrows & Renner, 1999).  
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 The FDA (n.d.) identified four foodservice practices that increase the potential for harm 
to large human populations if food is contaminated.  They relate to the risk presented by large 
batches of food which, if contaminated, would expose large numbers of consumers to the 
contaminant.  The practices are: preparation or holding of food in a large batch size; uniform 
mixing of large batches of food; and ease of access to the food while it is held in large batches.  
A fourth practice is common to all conventional foodservice production systems: rapid 
consumption of the product after preparation.  A short time period between production and 
consumption of food allows little time to discover any contamination of the food before many 
individuals have been exposed to it. 
 Schools using a commissary quantity food production system exhibit all of these factors.  
In such a system food is prepared in large batches at a single site, then divided and transported to 
multiple serving sites, where it is served shortly after delivery.  Large batches are a concern 
because a pathogen or toxicant introduced into a large batch has the potential to harm many 
people at multiple sites.  One small action could lead to injury in all parts of a community. 
Commissary food production systems may be attractive targets to terrorist groups because their 
goals include causing fear and social disruption, which would be achieved by contaminating a 
batch of food that reached most of the children in a school district.  For example, the Jefferson 
County school district located in Kentucky prepares up to 60,000 meals per day that are 
distributed to 140 satellite units; this production scope is similar to that of a small processing 
facility (NFSMI, 2002). 
Targets 
 Radosavljevic and Belojevic (2009) described targets as direct or indirect.  The direct 
targets are those killed or injured.  The indirect targets were defined as political or economic.  
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Attacks might weaken trust in government (political) or cause changes in food buying if a brand 
or commodity was found to be contaminated (economic).  Stinson’s (2010) econometric model 
of the effects of a major food terrorism event in the United States predicted a loss of $190 billion 
in real gross domestic product over the five-year post-attack period. 
 One school-related event of possible intentional contamination in North Dakota 
illustrated both political and economic consequences (Steinberg et al., 2006).  The illness caused 
so many children at the elementary school to vomit that the local fire department was called to 
hose off the playground.  The contaminant was traced to flour tortillas, but never identified.  
After this outbreak, some parents lost confidence in the program and some reportedly feared that 
the government was poisoning their children.  Participation in the school meals program dropped 
and food donations by the schools to the local food pantry were discouraged. 
 Targets were described by (Radosavljevic & Belojevic, 2009) as hard or soft depending 
on the level of sophistication needed to breach the target.  Hard targets are well-known venues 
that house important people and are well protected.  Soft targets are public places occupied by 
ordinary citizens.  Food defense practices were designed to make targets less soft. 
 Schools have unique characteristics that make them different from other soft public 
settings (Greene et al., 2004).  They are places where all of a community’s children are 
concentrated in a few readily identifiable locations on scheduled days of the year.  Attacks on 
schools would cause fear because parents trust schools to keep their children safe during the 
school day.  A large percentage of families in a community would be affected by an attack on a 
school, which could cause great disruption. 
 Intentionally contaminated food served to children presents a greater risk than food 
served to adults because children are more vulnerable to toxic agents.  Chung and Shannon 
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(2005) elaborated on several factors that make children especially susceptible to toxin agents; 
they breathe more frequently each minute and are closer to the ground than adults, giving them 
more exposure to biologic or chemical agents carried in the air.  In addition, children are 
susceptible to dehydration from diarrhea or vomiting that might occur after exposure to a 
foodborne agent.  Children also have more skin surface relative to body size than adults and 
would sustain more damage from dermal exposure.  They are more susceptible to hypothermia 
from decontamination processes.  Vaccines and antibiotics that are available to adults for many 
of the CDC Class A agents have not been tested on children and the doses are not standardized. 
 Table 1 lists instances of intentional food contamination occurring in schools or 
universities between 1950 and 2005, as identified by Dalziel (2009).  Dalziel included only those 
cases documented by two reliable sources.  Newspaper reports were used only if they reported 
criminal charges or confirmed cases.  Most incidents occurred in China or the United States and 
involved kindergartens, elementary, middle, and high schools, and universities.  In seven of the 
11 cases, school meals or snacks were the media by which the poison was transmitted to 
children; however other students were more frequent perpetrators than foodservice employees.  
When the attacks were targeted toward an individual, the agent was added to a serving of 
beverage.  In the other cases the agent was mixed into dry powders or batches of cooked cereal, 
broth, or salsa and led to many more illnesses. 
 Many schools use commissary food production systems where food is prepared in bulk in 
one location and transported to multiple serving sites.  In a nationwide sample of 353 school 
districts, 14.2 % prepared all food in a central kitchen, with no service onsite.  An additional 
40.5% of districts had a central kitchen, but onsite food production in some of their schools 
(NFSMI, 2004).   
22 
 
 Commissary production systems require trucks and vans to deliver food to school service 
sites.  Food is vulnerable to intentional contamination during transportation because it may be 
left unguarded if interruptions occur during the loading or unloading process.  The greatest risk 
occurs if food is transported in bulk instead of individually sealed portions.  If food is not 
secured during transit, bulk food in containers could be intentionally contaminated or swapped 
with counterfeit or adulterated substitutes.  In the NFSMI (2004) study, districts with a single 
central kitchen had a maximum of 80 delivery sites, with 1-5 sites the most frequent response.  
For facilities that used a combination of both central and onsite kitchens, almost all made daily 
deliveries to their satellite sites, which numbered from 1 to 200 sites (NFSMI, 2004). 
 An advantage of a commissary kitchen is food can be prepared in bulk using the 
operation’s preferred recipes and ingredients.  Labor efficiency is maximized with bulk 
production; however bulk ingredients held in storage are vulnerable to contamination.  Liquids, 
powders, or granular products are of particular concern because an undetected contaminant could 
uniformly be distributed throughout.  Two incidents reported in Table 1 involved contamination 
of dry powders held in storage: baking powder and flour. 
 Food production processes in large commissary kitchens are more likely to be automated 
than in onsite or smaller centralized operations.  Fewer workers are required, leaving fewer 
individuals to observe the food at all stages of production, which could present opportunities for 
intruders or other employees to contaminate food. 
Risk Management Recommendations 
Key Principles of Food Defense 
 In 2002, the Fifty-Fifth World Health Assembly adopted a resolution that recognized the 
threat of CBRN weapons against civilians (World Health Organization [WHO], 2008).  The 
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group identified food as a likely vector for such weapons and asked the Director-General to 
provide technical assistance to policy makers in Member States to strengthen protection of their 
food supplies.  WHO published Food Safety Issues: Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for 
Establishing and Strengthening Prevention and Response Systems in 2002 and noted it was one 
of their most- requested publications.  This document was revised in 2008 based on changes in 
the International Health Regulations (WHO, 2008).  The changes denoted a philosophy that 
protection of the food supply was an international concern requiring collaboration in 
surveillance, preparedness and open sharing of knowledge and technology between nations. 
 Terrorist Threats to Food emphasized the food industry is in the best position to prevent 
intentional contamination of food; governments should provide the support and guidance for 
industry to adopt food defense practices.  Although the document was designed for government 
officials who guide policy decisions, it included an appendix with 118 food defense measures 
under 11 topics: risk awareness, general security, emergency procedures, hazardous materials, 
employees, access, suppliers, raw and packaging materials, storage and warehouses, processing 
areas, and transport of ingredients and processed products. 
  Key principles for schools. The first set of food defense guidelines prepared specifically 
for school nutrition programs entitled  A Biosecurity Checklist for School Foodservice 
Programs: Developing a Biosecurity Management Plan  (USDABC) was published by the 
USDA-FNS (2004). The publication identified the topic of bioterrorism as a threat to schools, 
provided checklists listing food defense practices, and offered guidance to schools in developing 
a foodservice biosecurity management plan.  The guide included checklists related to 17 topics 
(listed in Table 2) with a total of 102 security measures identified.  For example, Topic A, 
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Communication, included eight practices, such as “Compile team member information” and 
“Establish a relationship with local authorities in relation to biosecurity”. 
 The NFSMI collaborated with USDA to develop a Food Defense Teaching Resource for 
school child nutrition programs (Stretch, T., personal communication, October 13, 2011).  The 
resource included a 12-minute video and a CD-ROM with the checklist in both PDF and digital 
formats ( http://foodbiosecurity.nfsmi.org/index.php).  The modifiable format permits programs 
to individualize the checklists to their needs.  This resource was mailed in 2006 to 20,000 school 
districts across the nation.  Components were also added to emergency preparedness training 
materials prepared by NFSMI.  The original USDA publication is available to the public on the 
USDA-FNS website and the NFSMI website at www.nfsmi-
web01.nfsmi.olemiss.edu/ResourceOverview.aspx?ID=69. 
 The FDA published Guidance for Industry: Retail Food Stores and Food Service 
Establishments: Food Security Preventive Measures in 2003 with revisions made in 2007 (FDA, 
2007).  This publication included 92 security measures under 22 subheadings in five general 
topic categories: Management, Human Element-Staff, Human Element-Public, Facility, and 
Operations.  The more recent FDA guidelines showed greater emphasis on risks associated with 
people: employees, customers, and visitors providing services to the business.  The guidelines 
included a 5-page Food Defense Assessment Tool for Retail Food Stores and Food Service 
Establishments with space to assess each of the 92 recommendations.  Topics from this guide, 
developed for all types of retail stores and foodservices are shown in Table 2; they are compared 
to USDA-FNS topics targeted specifically to schools, and the WHO publication for policy 
makers.  The guidelines for food defense put forth by WHO, USDA, and FDA are not 
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Table 2. 
Topics related to Food Defense Actions identified in Food Defense publications 
WHO USDA-FNS FDA 
Risk awareness 
General security 
Emergency procedures 
Hazardous materials 
Employees 
Access 
Suppliers 
Raw and packaging 
materials 
Storage areas and 
warehouses 
Processing areas 
Transport of ingredients     
and processed products 
Communication 
Handling a Crisis 
Choosing Suppliers 
Receiving/Inspection 
Storage Areas 
Storing Food 
Hazardous Chemicals 
Foodservice Equipment 
Foodservice Personnel 
Foodservice/Food Preparation 
Areas 
Outside the School Building 
Water and Ice Supply 
General Security 
Handling Mail 
Training 
Plan Maintenance 
Management 
Preparing for the Possibility of   Tampering or 
other Malicious, Criminal or Terrorist Actions 
Investigation of Suspicious Activity 
Evaluation Program 
Human Element – Staff 
Screening (pre-hiring, at hiring, post-hiring) 
Daily Work Assignments 
Identification 
Restricted Access 
Personal Items 
Training in Food Security Procedures 
Unusual Behavior 
Staff Health 
Human Element- Public 
Customers 
Visitors 
Facility Physical Security 
Storage and Use of Poisonous and Toxic 
Chemicals 
Operations 
Incoming products 
Storage 
Food Service and Retail Display 
Security of Water and Utilities 
Mail Packages 
Access to Computer Systems 
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mandatory, although each agency strongly urges one or more parts of the food chain to develop 
plans for implementing food defense. 
 Xirasagar, Kanwat, Smith  et al., (2010) assessed food defense practices in restaurants 
and restaurant managers’ awareness of risks of intentional food contamination.  The survey used 
was based on the New York State Food Security Survey and adapted with input from focus 
groups of restaurant managers and owners.  The resulting 3-page survey had 41 food defense 
items, 11 questions about restaurant characteristics, and six demographic questions.  The authors 
noted several ways in which the survey was modified from the original New York State Food 
Security Survey to make it more user-friendly to restaurant managers.  For example, the wording 
was changed from an enforcement tone to a collegial tone, and practices universally 
implemented by restaurants were removed from the survey.  Only practices feasible for 
restaurant implementation were included, such as “Are customer self-service open-top ice bins 
monitored?” and “Is there good lighting in the parking areas and the back of the restaurant?” 
(Xirasagar, Kanwat, Qu, et al., 2010). 
 An internet search in 2011 using the phrase food defense checklist yielded downloadable 
checklists for retail and foodservice establishments published by the Massachusetts Department 
of Public Health (2009), the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Service (2009), the 
Ohio Department of Agriculture (2005), and the Defense Logistics Agency (2011).  In addition, 
Iowa State University Extension and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 2007 jointly 
prepared a food defense checklist for retail foodservice operations; dissemination of the 
information is included in food safety trainings and available upon request (Strohbehn, Sneed, 
Paez, & Beattie, 2007). 
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 U.S. federal legislation. The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 was enacted to increase security 
of the U.S. food supply against terrorist attacks.  The law had four main thrusts: registration of 
food businesses, prior notification of delivery of imported food, the right of FDA to hold food in 
administrative detention, and a requirement for record-keeping and retention of records that can 
be used to trace foods back to their origins.  These requirements applied to businesses or 
individuals that manufacture, process, pack, transport, distribute, receive, hold or import food.  
The law required companies that process, manufacture, or hold food items to register with the 
FDA to facilitate tracing a contaminated product through the food system (FDA, 2003).  
Importers of food are required to notify FDA of the planned arrival of shipments (FDA, 2011).  
The law gave FDA the right to hold food in detention if there was evidence of a threat to the 
health of humans or animals (FDA, 2004b). 
 Restaurants, retail food businesses and non-profit food establishments were excluded 
from the above requirements, but subject to aspects of the record-keeping requirements.  Under 
the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, all retail food businesses, including school foodservice operations, 
were required to retain invoices for food received.  The length of time to retain invoices 
depended on the shelf life of food products with ranges from 6 months to 2 years (FDA, 2004a). 
 The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010 included measures to improve safety of 
imported foods.  Under the law, the FDA has authority to require food importers to verify food 
safety controls used by their suppliers.  FDA has power to establish a third-party agency to 
certify that imports have been produced under standards equal to those of the United States.  The 
agency may stop shipments from facilities or countries that refuse inspection by U.S. officials 
(FDA, 2011b). 
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Current Food Defense Status in U.S. Food Services. 
Military 
 The U.S. military recognized the risks intentional food contamination presented to armed 
forces, especially overseas.  Mara and McGrath (2009) made five recommendations for food 
defense including using mobile tracking technology on military food shipments, decontaminating 
fresh produce using ozonated water, using military personnel in foodservice operations rather 
than contracted employees, implementing rapid testing technology for microorganisms in 
suspicious food samples, and increasing funding for the development of contamination 
biosensors in foods. 
 Hall, Herbold, and England (2001) analyzed the flow of food at three military 
deployment sites with the intention of identifying critical points for preventing intentional 
contamination.  They found contractual agreements required receiving personnel to accept orders 
of low quality; some supplies were from countries hostile to the United States; and during 
transportation, access to foodstuffs was controlled by the truck driver.  Based on results of this 
case study, the authors recommended that food be purchased only from approved sources, 
foodservice sites have the authority to reject deliveries not meeting specifications, trucks be 
sealed when transporting food, storage areas be kept locked, and that employees be closely 
monitored as they prepared and served food and cleaned up.  Hall, Herbold, and England (2001) 
also recommended persons handling foods be required to eat foods served as a means of 
reducing the likelihood of intentional contamination.  Meals brought in from the outside could 
carry contaminants.  
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School Foodservice 
  Three studies of school foodservice food defense practices were found in the literature.  
Story, Sneed, Oakley, and Stretch (2007) conducted a survey of 200 foodservice directors in the 
largest U.S. school districts having central kitchens or warehouse distribution centers.  The 
survey included questions about district procedures, facilities, and staffing.  Respondents rated 
seven potential barriers to implementing food defense practices, and reported the history and 
perceived importance of training in 18 areas.  Seventy-eight directors responded, for a response 
rate of 39%.  Fewer than half of respondents had written procedures for:  
 preventing intentional food tampering 
 requiring vendors to do criminal background checks of delivery personnel 
 including plans for communicating with food vendors in the district emergency 
preparedness plan 
 securing the facilities with guards or video cameras during off hours 
 asking delivery persons to show photo ID 
 posting delivery schedules 
 including emergency preparedness in employee orientation 
 maintaining access to staff lockers, or 
 scheduling new employees on a day shift where they could be observed. 
 The authors concluded that many large centralized school foodservice operations did not 
have written plans for preventing food defense violations.  Money was rated the greatest barrier 
to implementing emergency preparedness policies and procedures, followed by lack of 
equipment.  Time was ranked the third highest barrier.  Staff perceptions and communication 
with outside departments were also identified as barriers, but had lower ratings. 
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School and Healthcare Foodservices  
 Yoon and Shanklin surveyed 782 FSDs in schools, hospitals, and long-term care 
facilities, all in the U.S. state of Kansas (2007a; 2007b; 2007c).  They achieved a 24.7% 
response rate (n = 190), including 123 school FSDs.  The results revealed that 10.6% of school 
FSDs had attended a seminar or other training about food defense (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a).  
More schools had an employee in charge of monitoring food safety (71.5%) than had an 
employee in charge of monitoring food defense (26%).  Formal crisis management plans were 
held by 35.8% of programs and 36.6% of schools reported presence of a food defense plan. 
While the characteristics of all combined FSDs in this study explained 12% of the variance in 
frequency of practice of food defense measures, it was training in food defense that affected 
practice frequency (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007c).  Demographics, educational level, and 
foodservice career length did not affect practice frequency.   
 Food defense implementation.  School foodservice directors rated employee 
management, utility security, facility security, and communication as less important than 
directors in healthcare.  Mean practice frequency ratings for communication (3.8 vs. 4.1 on a 5-
point scale, p<.01) and utility security (4.0 vs. 4.34,  p=.03) practices were significantly lower 
for school foodservice directors than for health care foodservice directors.  The difference in 
mean ratings for facility security was not significant (3.9 vs. 4.2, p = .06). 
 Yoon (2007) also conducted a national survey of a random sample of 1100 school FSDs 
in districts with enrollments of 7,500 students or greater.  This survey also included a random 
sample of 1,100 healthcare foodservice directors.  The response rate from the school FSDs was 
23% (n = 254) and 18 % (n = 195) from the healthcare foodservice directors.  More of the 
healthcare foodservice directors (57.4%) were Registered Dietitians, compared to 31.9% of 
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school FSDs.  School foodservice operations served more meals per day than healthcare 
foodservice operations, with the smallest school serving 67.5 times the number of meals 
compared to the smallest healthcare facility (Yoon, 2007). 
 Yoon’s 2007 survey (2007) showed improvements in food defense awareness and 
planning compared to the survey conducted by Yoon and Shanklin (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) in 
2005.  Yoon’s survey showed that more than twice the number of foodservice directors (23.2%) 
had attended training related to food defense compared to a similar study conducted two years 
earlier.  The proportion of operations with an employee responsible for food defense rose from 
26.3% to 31.0%.  Most (81.5%) operations had a crisis management plan; healthcare operations 
were more likely to have a well-documented plan than schools.  Although planning was in place, 
76.8% of operations did not conduct an audit of actual practices. 
 Yoon (2007) selected 12 food defense practices and asked FSDs to rate the degree to 
which they were implemented using a 7-point Likert type scale.  The mean ratings for five 
measures were above 6 (6 = most of the time): purchase of food from reputable suppliers, making 
security checks of employees prior to hiring, storage and use of chemicals, assigning one person 
to verify and receive shipments, and inspecting packages for evidence of tampering.  Clear 
identification of personnel, control of access to storage and production areas, and accounting for 
former employees’ badges, uniforms, had mean ratings equal to a rating of many times.  The 
practices with the lowest mean ratings were restriction of access to air and utility systems, 
controlling access to the foodservice facility with alarms, cameras, and physical barriers, and 
maintaining an updated contact list of local authorities.  The mean rating of employing training 
about the food defense management plan was equivalent to not very frequently. 
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  Regional differences.  Responses were divided by USDA-RMA compliance regions.  
Only one item was significantly different between the six regions.  Means for the statement “I 
want to reduce a food terrorism risk as much as possible” were higher for the Southern and 
Central regions, compared to the Western region.  Food defense practices were more frequently 
performed in the Southern region compared to other regions for four practices: accounting for 
keys, uniforms and badges of former employees, controlling access to the foodservice facility, 
monitoring and physically securing the foodservice facility, and maintaining an up-to-date 
contact list.   
 Respondents from the Eastern region were m likely to have participated in food defense 
training.  More respondents were Registered Dietitians in the Southern and Central regions.  
School FSDs were more likely to have been trained by a government agency and healthcare 
directors were more likely to be trained by professional associations. 
 Directors’ attitudes about food defense. Yoon and Shanklin (2007b) analyzed the gap 
between perceptions of importance and frequency of actual practice of food defense measures 
among the directors.  They used cluster analysis to divide the directors into two groups:  a 
smaller gap group (SGG) and a larger gap group (LGG).  The SGG was larger (n = 121) and had 
a smaller gap between importance and practice ratings compared to the group comprised of the 
remaining 69 respondents.  The SGG was significantly more likely to have an employee 
responsible for food defense and to have a food defense management plan.  That group had a 
much higher proportion of directors who had attended training about food defense compared to 
the larger gap group (13.2% vs. 1.4%).  Higher percentages of director in hospitals (80%) and 
long-term care facilities (70%) placed in the SGG, with only 43% of school FSDS placing in that 
group.  
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 The groups differed in their responses to the statement “Our operation is well-secured 
against any type of food biosecurity hazard/threat” in that the SGG disagreed significantly more 
strongly than the LGG (p <.001).  This group also disagreed significantly more strongly than the 
LGG to the statements “Our operation does not need a food biosecurity management plan 
because the operation is not at risk for tampering or other malicious criminal or terrorist actions” 
(p = 0.02) and “the managers and supervisors know exactly what to do if our operation receives a 
food biosecurity threat” (p <.001) (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007b, p. 17). 
Commercial Foodservice Operations 
 Managers of commercial operations were surveyed in two recent regional studies.  Olds 
(2010) modified the survey instrument developed by Yoon and Shanklin (2007) and used it to 
assess food defense practices in a national sample of managers of private country clubs in 
Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, and Missouri.  The sample of country club managers interviewed by 
Olds (2010) was predominantly male.  Olds also conducted onsite observations and interviews at 
25 private country clubs.  The most frequent practices at the country clubs were those related to 
chemical use and storage, food handling, and employee management.  As found in the studies of 
food defense in schools and healthcare facilities, utility security and facility security were among 
the weakest areas.  The majority of club managers did not consider their club at risk for acts of 
intentional food contamination, nor did they have written disaster management plans. 
 The club managers identified cost as the primary barrier to implementing food defense, as 
was the case in one study of school FSDs (Story et al., 2007).  Apathy, staff resistance and lack 
of need were also cited as barriers.  Olds recommended that risk perceptions be explored in 
future research about food defense practices.  He compared the odds of any individual being a 
victim of a terrorist attack to the odds of being struck by lightning.  He reasoned that because 
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country clubs with swimming pools and golf courses find it feasible to have procedures to 
prevent injuries from lightning strikes, they could also find it feasible to implement procedures to 
prevent injuries from intentional food contamination.  
 Xirasagar, Kanwat, Smith et al. (2010) surveyed one manager or owner from a sample of 
926 restaurants in South Carolina.  Half of the restaurants represented in the survey were casual 
dining, and 22% were fast food restaurants.  Chemical storage, an area that proved to be strong in 
schools and healthcare, was the weakest area for restaurants, with only 27.2% of managers 
reporting chemicals were kept in locked storage.  An equally small percentage of restaurants 
(27.3%) reported making criminal background checks of new hires.   
 South Carolina restaurant managers reported that their operations frequently engaged in 
most of the practices in the survey.  For 21 of the 32 practices, 75% or more of restaurants 
reported performing them.  The practices performed by fewer than 75% of the restaurants were: 
employees wear ID badges/uniforms (65%); hourly staff were trained to look for food tampering 
(66%); hourly staff were trained in food safety beyond state minimum requirements (73.7%); 
verification of the ID of delivery personnel (58%); self-service area monitored by security 
camera (71.5%); security cameras in food preparation and/or storage areas (38.9%); policies to 
prevent deliberate food tampering (61.2%); and guests not allowed to take photographs of the 
back of the house (72.4%).  This survey was more recent than the surveys of schools and 
healthcare facilities.  
 The strengths with chemical storage and employee management differed from the results 
found with country clubs (Olds, 2010).  These results may be due to the different geographical 
regions, differences in perceived risk of intentional food contamination in each industry, or could 
be influenced by the different methodologies, survey vs. onsite visit.  The higher degree of food 
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defense practiced by restaurant operators could reflect a growing awareness of the risk of 
intentional food contamination, could reflect a greater perception of risk of intentional food 
contamination held by restaurant operators, or could be a result related to geographic location.  A 
small percentage (3.1%, n = 29) of respondents either suspected or had experience with 
confirmed incidents of food tampering.  The surveys of foodservice directors in healthcare and 
schools did not ask that question.  Most of the restaurant managers surveyed were male and the 
majority of school and healthcare foodservice directors were female; it’s possible that men and 
women perceive the risk of intentional food contamination differently. 
Attitudes Toward Bioterrorism 
Threat Appraisal 
 Yoon (2007) used Protection Motivation Theory to assess the threat appraisal, coping 
appraisal, and motivation and intention of foodservice directors regarding food defense.  Threat 
appraisal was measured using statements to assess perception of severity, vulnerability, and fear 
that foodservice directors perceived related to intentional food contamination.  Mean scores for 
measures of fear were higher than those for severity, but both were above six on a 7-point Likert 
scale (7 = strongly agree).  Mean scores for vulnerability were lower, ranging between 3.31 and 
5.57.  The lowest value was in response to the statement “It is likely that someone will attack my 
operation”.  Healthcare and school FSDs responded similarly to all items, but differed 
significantly in their agreement to the statement “If someone intentionally contaminates food in 
my operation it will take years for my operation to recover from the attack”, with schools 
perceiving higher severity. 
 Coping appraisal involved statements regarding response efficacy, response cost, self- 
efficacy, and operational efficacy.  Both healthcare and school foodservice directors somewhat 
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agreed (M = 5.7 on a 7-point scale) that a food defense management plan would improve 
effectiveness in handling an event of intentional food contamination.  School FSDs were more 
likely to perceive that implementing a food defense plan would be expensive and disruptive.  
Scores for self-efficacy showed that FSDs were somewhat in agreement that they would be able 
to implement a food defense plan, and somewhat disagreed that such a plan would be difficult 
and expensive.   
 Motivation and intention is the third aspect of the protection motivation theory.  FSDs 
agreed that they wanted to protect their operations, employees, and customers from harmful 
events and also agreed that they wanted to avoid food terrorism in their operations.  They agreed 
they would like to know more about food defense management plans, somewhat agreed that they 
were willing to participate in food defense training, and somewhat agreed that they intended to 
implement a food defense management plan in their operations.  The means for these statements 
were significantly higher for healthcare directors than for school directors. 
Risk Perception 
 Risk assessors define “risk” as the probability of exposure to a hazard times the 
probability that harm will occur as a result of exposure to the hazard.  The discipline of risk 
assessment uses scientific data fit into mathematical models to predict harm that may come from 
different exposures to the hazard.  Models can be made to predict the probability that a 
hazardous event will occur.  Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) and Radosavljevic and Belojevic 
(2009) used risk assessment methods to model the probability of future terrorist events.  The 
probability of a terrorist attack on the food supply is low, but the consequences include illness 
and/or death to large numbers of people should it occur.  Such events engender emotional 
responses and visceral feelings of risk named “dread risk” (Fischhoff et al., 1978).  Risk 
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perception is a psychological construct that seeks to explain how individuals view the risk 
associated with hazards.  To perceive risk one must recognize a hazard and then feel likelihood 
that they will be exposed to the hazard and that it will cause harm.  Individuals’ risk perceptions 
often do not match risk assessors’ results.  For example, risk assessors have determined that 
flying is a safer mode of travel than driving.  Yet many people fear flying because they perceive 
a high risk that the plane might crash.  They perceive that driving is safer.  After the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, many people increased their perception that flying 
was risky and chose to drive long trips instead.  As a result the number of traffic deaths increased 
and people died who might have lived had they chosen their mode of transport based on science 
and not perception (Gigerenzer, 2004).  
 To better understand why risk perception of a hazard held by laypeople differs from the 
risk predicted by experts, psychologists initiated the study of risk perception.  One purpose for 
this research was to develop a theory of risk perception that would predict the way that lay 
people would respond to new hazards and suggest strategies to manage the risk (Slovic et al., 
1982).  Initially, nine factors were hypothesized to influence risk: voluntariness of risk, 
immediacy of effect, individual’s knowledge about risk, control over risk, newness, number of 
people killed at one time, whether the risk was common or dreaded, and the severity of the 
consequences (Fischhoff et al., 1978).  Factor analysis showed that many of these were 
correlated and could be reduced to a two-factor model with dread risk on the horizontal axis and 
unknown risk on the vertical axis.  A high rating on the dread risk axis incorporates lack of 
control, visceral feelings of dread, catastrophic potential and fatal consequence.  High ratings on 
the unknown risk axis represent new risks that have delayed results and about which little is 
known.  The dread risk score is more influential than the unknown score; as dread risk increases 
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people demand more actions to reduce the risk (Slovic, 1987).  Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein (1982) concluded that the psychometric paradigm is a reliable and quantitative 
method for measuring risk perception and appropriate to use for comparing risk perceptions 
among different groups.   
 The psychometric paradigm has been used to describe consumers’ perceptions of  food 
hazards (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2006).  Bacterial contamination, botulism, BSE, and 
salmonella placed highest among 24 food hazards for dread risk, but did not have high scores for 
unknown risk.  Genetically modified animals and plants showed the highest scores for unknown 
risk, but did not have high scores for dread risk.  Given that botulinum toxin has been identified 
as a potential biological agent, and that salmonella has already been used in an attack on food, 
one may predict that acts of intentional contamination of food will create perceptions of dread 
risk.  Bioterrorism has many characteristics associated with the psychometric paradigm: the 
hazard is relatively new and unknown, the consequences for many of the possible agents are 
delayed, and an event would be catastrophic for large numbers of people. 
 Several studies have used the psychometric paradigm to describe the perceived risk of 
terrorism in general.  Lee, LeMyre and Krewksi (2010) surveyed 1502 Canadians in a national 
telephone survey about risk perceptions.  Perceptions about terrorism risk were compared to 
those held for motor vehicle, climate change, recreational physical activity, and cell phones.  
Four questions derived from the psychometric paradigm of risk perception were used to assess 
perceived threat, perceived uncertainty, perceived control, and worry.  Relative to cell phones, 
climate change, and motor vehicles, the respondents perceived the threat of terrorism as 
significantly lower.  Women had higher scores than men for worry for all hazards.  Perceived 
uncertainty was higher and perceived control was lower for terrorism compared to the other 
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threats.  High scores for perception of control were associated with lower levels of worry, except 
for terrorism.  Respondents who reported the highest perceived control were likely to have 
higher scores for worry.  The authors reported surprise that personal feelings of control over the 
risk of terrorism were not protective, but unfavorable. 
 Perception of the risk of terrorism was assessed in two studies by asking “what is the 
probability/percent chance of being hurt in a terrorist attack?” (Blum, 2011; Fischhoff, Gonzalez, 
Small & Lerner, 2003).  Blum (2011) compared measures of  risk perception of future terrorism 
and their association with negative or violent prior life experiences.  He found that individuals 
who had been victims of violent events in the past had perceptions of higher risk of terrorism 
compared to those with no violent life experience.  Blum also found that, as the memory of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks became more distant, that perceptions of risk of future terrorism 
events decreased over a three year period.  
  Location has been related to the perception of risk from terrorism.  Woods, Ten Eyck, 
Kaplowitz, and Shlapentokh (2008) discovered that respondents who lived within 5 miles of a 
potential terrorist targets in Michigan (major city, nuclear power plant, the state capital building, 
and a major chemical company) perceived a higher likelihood of a terrorist attack in their 
community in the next 12 months than those living more than 5 miles away.  The relationship 
was stronger for women than for men and stronger for those at lower incomes.  Estimates of the 
likelihood of a terrorist attack in the state or in the nation were not influenced by location.  In 
November 2001 a national survey revealed that Americans living within 100 miles of the World 
Trade Center reported a higher probability they would be hurt in a terror attack than those who 
lived in other parts of the country (Fischhoff et al., 2003). 
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 The studies reported above have described the risk perception of terrorism in 
heterogeneous populations, but have not attempted to use risk perception theory to predict the 
actions that individuals or groups will take to mitigate the risk.  One exception is a study by 
Turvey, Onyango, Cuite, and Hallman (2010) that predicted consumer’s response, and the 
economic impact, to the perceived risk of contamination of a food that was very important to 
them.  A national sample of more than 1000 subjects was asked 16 questions that assessed 
elements of the psychometric paradigm (dread, lack of control, amount of knowledge of the 
hazard, newness, severity, immediacy of harmful effects, number of people affected).  
Respondents were grouped into three categories based on cluster analysis of their responses.  
Respondents in the three categories (“optimist”, “cautious” and ‘fearful”) differed in their 
responses about their anticipated consumption of a favorite food product should there be 
deliberate contamination of the food by a terrorist group.  The optimist group showed the least 
anticipated reduction in consumption and the fearful group the most reduction.  Fearfulness 
decreased as income and level of education increased.  Women were more fearful of a terrorist 
attack than men, which fit a consistent pattern in risk perception studies. 
 In summary, the psychometric paradigm has been a useful tool for assessing risk 
perception toward terrorism in general and food terrorism in particular.  The paradigm presents a 
way to quantify risk perception in a reliable manner.  Most studies using the paradigm were 
designed to describe risk perception or to compare perceived risk among various hazards.  
Although seminal works about the psychometric paradigm suggest its use to predict the response 
of lay people to a hazard, and to suggest strategies for risk management, little research having 
those goals has been published. 
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CHAPTER THREE.  METHODOLOGY 
 
 This study used a mixed methods approach with two phases of data collection.  Phase 
One used a multisite case study design with the school district as the unit of analysis.  An 
embedded approach was used, where data from interviews, observations, and document reviews 
were included within each unit of analysis.  In Phase Two, the link to an internet administered 
survey was emailed to the school food authority (SFA) or the FSD in all public school districts in 
seven states: Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, and 
Wisconsin.  The Institutional Review Board of the Office of Responsible Research at Iowa State 
University approved both phases of the study.  Phase One underwent a full review; Phase Two 
was granted exemption from full review (Appendix A).   
Phase One: Multisite Case Study 
Sample 
  A convenience sample of five school districts from the USDA-RMA Northern 
Compliance Region was included in the study.  School districts were recruited for maximum 
variation of student enrollment (small, with fewer than 2,500 students; medium-sized (MS) 
districts with 2,500 to 7,500 students; large districts with more than 7,500 students; and a very 
large (VL) district from one of the top 200 in the United States having a district enrollment 
greater than 28,000); type of production system (onsite, centralized, or commissary); location 
(urban, suburban, or rural location); and credentials of the foodservice director.  Selection 
included school districts from four of seven states in the Northern Region: South Dakota, 
Minnesota (two districts), Iowa, and Wisconsin.  These states were chosen because states in the 
Northern region include metro, suburban and rural centers, United States border states, and could 
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be reached by the primary investigator within a one-day drive.  The sampling frame to assure 
maximum variation is found in Appendix B.   
 A one-day site visit to each district was made to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
food defense readiness.  The schedule for each visit included observations of breakfast and lunch 
production and service.  Five individuals holding four different positions within the district were 
interviewed at each site.  Interviews were scheduled with the Food Service Director (FSD) and 
two foodservice production workers, a school administrator, and an individual representing an 
agency that would be called in the event of a crisis.  In all cases, the administrator was a 
principal.  In schools where more than two production workers were employed, an attempt was 
made to interview both the newest and most long-term employee.   Four school districts were 
recruited from professional contacts of the author (Appendix C).  One director was recruited by 
emailing a request to Major City Director members of the School Nutrition Association (SNA) 
listed in the association’s directory for that state.  The first contact was made to FSDs in four of 
the districts and the remaining site was recruited through the district superintendent, who 
arranged all remaining interviews for that site.  In the remaining districts, after the director 
agreed to participate in the study, then the name of the appropriate school administrator was 
requested.  Emergency response officials were recruited by the FSD or the administrator; 
position titles varied by district and included a city fire chief, a county coroner/EMT, two 
security management officials and a School Resource (police) Officer 
Data Collection  
 Data collection was guided by three principles outlined by Yin in his book about case 
study research methods (2008).  Creswell (2007) recommended this book as a reference for case 
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study research; the book is also referenced in Merriam (2009).  These are: use multiple sources 
of evidence, create a case study database, and maintain a chain of evidence.   
 Multiple sources of evidence.  The data collected included observations of 
implementation of the food defense checklist items, interviews with key stakeholders, and 
documents as made available by the site.  A standardized, written case study protocol guided the 
investigation at each site with the purpose of answering these research questions (Appendix D). 
 Which aspects of the Biosecurity Checklist for  School Food Service items in sections A 
(Communication), B (Handling a Crisis), J (Foodservice/Food Preparation Areas), and L 
(Water and Ice Supply) are implemented?  
 Who in the school district has the responsibility and authority to implement these? 
 What are perceptions of school nutrition program stakeholders (district administrators, 
district FSDs, production workers, and emergency responders) as to the importance of 
implementing food defense practices?  
 Observations.  Observation of two meal production and service periods was planned for 
each district.  Food defense practices were assessed using the checklist developed jointly by 
Iowa State University Extension and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (Appendix E).  The 
checklist included 32 items divided into five categories.   
  Interviews.  The purpose of the interviews was to obtain qualitative research data.  Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2009) explained that qualitative data is a product of social interaction during the 
interview and that rigid adherence to a procedure or method may not result in optimal data.  
Interviewing skill and knowledge of the interview subject are needed for the interviewer to pose 
follow-up questions leading to a fuller understanding of the topic (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) . 
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  All interviewees completed informed consent forms before being interviewed (Appendix 
F).  An interview guide was developed for each stakeholder group based on four USDABC 
sections: Communication, Handling a Crisis, Foodservice/Food Preparation Areas, and Water 
and Ice Supply (Appendix G).  Merriam (2009) recommended an interview guide be used by 
new researchers as a tool to provide structure until confidence is gained.  A semi-structured 
approach, using a combination of survey questions, closed-ended questions, and open-ended 
questions was planned.   Questions about risk perception were worded identically to items in the 
Phase Two survey.  Each interview was audio-recorded with permission.  The interview 
materials are found in Appendix H. 
 Document review.  The foodservice director was asked to make available for review the 
food defense plan, if one was in place.   
 Create study data base. Yin’s (2008) second identified principle for data collection is to 
create a case study data base.  Reliability of case studies is enhanced with the use of a written 
protocol and development of a case study data base (Yin, 2008).  The data collected for each 
school site was imported into NVivo® version 10.0 by QSR.  Digital copies of documents, scans 
of completed observation checklists, interview transcripts, and receipts documenting 
transcription service and travel were included in the data base.  
 Chain of evidence. Yin (2008) proposed that the reliability of case study data is assured 
by a third principle: maintain a chain of evidence.  All documents were coded for location and, in 
the case of interviews, individuals by group of stakeholder and interview item.  
Data Analysis 
 Interview data.  Digitial recordings of the interviews were transcribed by an individual 
with IRB training and previous experience transcribing research interviews.  Open-ended 
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questions in the interview guides for all stakeholders were designed to get information about 
these themes: vulnerability of the foodservice operation, personal experiences with food 
tampering, barriers to food defense, importance of food defense, and communication about food 
defense.  Reviewers were instructed to read the transcripts and identify content that reflected 
these themes and to identify new themes that emerged from the interview data.  Two researchers 
with expertise in food defense identified emerging themes from the transcripts.  
 Transcripts from the first three site visits were reviewed in summer 2012, with each 
reviewer suggesting themes.  Proposed themes were discussed via telephone conversation; six 
themes and 10 sub-themes were agreed upon.  Transcripts from the final two site visits were 
reviewed in late fall 2012.  No new themes emerged from interviews at these site visits.  
Wording and organization of themes and subthemes continued to be discussed by the reviewers 
until a list of four themes and 11 subthemes was finalized in February 2013.  
 Procedures outlined by Maykut and Morehouse (1994) were used to code transcript data.   
Maykut and Morehouse recommended that transcripts literally be cut into chunks representing 
“units of meaning” that could stand alone without explanation, then pasted on index cards for 
arrangement into larger units of meaning, or themes.  NVivo® version 10.0 by QSR facilitated 
this process with digital technology.  Interview transcripts were uploaded into the program and 
units of meaning highlighted.  Highlighted text was coded according to subthemes and copied 
into individual reports for each subtheme.   
 Maykut and Morehouse (1994) recommended writing rules for inclusion before coding 
data.  Rules for inclusion, i.e. statements that describe the proposed meaning represented by the 
theme, were developed for proposed themes and subthemes as the coding process progressed and 
were used to guide assignment of units of meaning to subthemes.  Nvivo® reports that displayed 
46 
all units of meaning coded to each subtheme were printed and units of meaning were evaluated a 
second time to assure that they fit with the rules of inclusion.  Rules of inclusion are shown in 
Appendix I. 
 Observation data.  The Food Defense Checklist for Retail Foodservice Operations, 
developed by the extension services of Iowa State University and the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, was used to guide observation periods at each site.  Because only two to three hours of 
observation were possible at each school, not all checklist items could be observed.  For those 
items not actually observed, the kitchen manager or foodservice director was asked about 
practices.  Details from the interview transcripts were also used to document checklist items. 
Observational data were tallied and summarized.  
Phase Two: Regional Survey 
Population 
 The survey population was all school districts in the USDA-RMA Northern Compliance 
Region (N = 1,531).  District FSDs were the preferred representative for each school district, but 
due to the rural nature of several of the states in the population, not all districts had an 
administrator whose responsibilities were centered on the foodservice operation.  The names and 
email addresses of districts’ FSDs and/or the SFA (the person responsible within each district for 
administration of the Child Nutrition Program,) were requested from each of the seven state 
agencies which oversaw administration of the federal program.  State agency directors varied in 
the kind and amount of information they were willing to share.  When addresses for foodservice 
directors were not provided, the survey was sent to the SFA.  In small school districts, the SFA 
may be a district administrator and not the individual who directs the foodservice operation.  To 
ensure as accurate representation from school foodservice directors as possible, the survey cover 
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letter requested the survey be forwarded to the individual responsible for day to day direction of 
the district’s child nutrition program.  A detailed description of the process used to create the 
sample for each state is described in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
Adjustments Made to Email Lists Provided by the Child Nutrition Director for each State 
State Adjustments made 
IA List of both FSDs and SFAs received.  Private schools, residential facilities, and 
correctional facilities were removed.  Only the addresses for foodservice directors 
were included in the sample.  If no email address was available for the foodservice 
director, then the survey was sent to the SFA. 
 
MN State agency provided a list of FSDs with the SFA listed if the district did not have 
a foodservice director.  Four directors did not have email addresses and they were 
omitted from the sample. 
 
MT The office of public instruction specified use of the directory of Montana schools 
published on their website.  No information about SFAs or FSDs was included in 
guide.  A search of all school websites was made for email addresses of 
foodservice directors, kitchen managers, head cooks and included in sample (n = 
46).  All others were sent to the contact email address identified for each district if 
it matched with the address of the superintendent or district clerk.  If no contact 
email address was specified, then the superintendent’s email address was used. 
Finally, the list was compared to the SNA directory of Directors.  SNA member 
directors’ email addresses were substituted for other administrators’ when found. 
 
ND Emails for public districts’ SFA were supplied by state office.  This list was 
compared to the SNA directory of Directors. All SNA director members but one 
was already listed as the SFA.  For this one district the SNA member was 
substituted for the SFA. 
 
SD State office supplied email addresses for foodservice directors.  A small number (n 
= 6) of directors had no email addresses and were omitted from the sample. 
 
WY Survey sent to districts’ FSDs or their surrogates as listed in online directory 
provided by the state agency. 
 
WI Survey sent to list of SFAs.   
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Survey Instrument   
 The survey had four sections: Risk Perception; Food Defense Planning; Current Food 
Defense Practices; and Demographic Information (Appendix J).  The Risk Perception section of 
the survey assessed respondents’ perceptions of the risk of food tampering and of terrorist 
attacks.  These items were adapted with permission from surveys by Lee et al. (2010) and Turvey 
et al. (2010) (Appendix K).  The original questions from the survey by Lee et al (2010) asked 
members of a general population of Canadian citizens about the threat of terrorism to their 
personal health, their personal control over terrorism risk, the amount of uncertainty associated 
with terrorism risk, and their worry about terrorism risk.  These items were adapted to replace 
“personal health” with “your foodservice operation”.  The four items were then repeated with 
references to terrorism replacing references to food tampering.  “Food tampering” is commonly 
used by the general public and was the term used in this study’s survey and interviews rather 
than “intentional food contamination”.  
 Lee et al. (2010) questioned the validity of her survey item phrased as “What level of 
uncertainty do you think there is, in general, about terrorism risks?” because that question had a 
higher percentage of don’t know responses than other risk perception questions.  For that reason, 
only four of five questions assessing “unknown risk” were adapted from the national survey 
created by Turvey, et al. (2010).  That survey was used to assess risk perceptions of intentional 
food contamination held by a national sample of 1,000 persons in the United States. 
 Surveys have been developed to assess food defense implementation in schools (Story et 
al., 2007; Yoon, 2007; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c), country clubs (Olds, 2010) , and 
retail establishments (Strohbehn et al., 2007; Xirasagar, Kanwat, Qu, et al., 2010).  The surveys 
used with schools and country clubs were derived from the USDABC instrument containing 102 
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items.  The survey used in this study included 31 items that focused on topics found to have low 
frequency of implementation in previous studies (Story et al., 2007; Yoon & Shanklin, 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c).  These topics were employee management, facility security, utility security, and 
communication practices and were adapted, with permission (Appendix K), from the survey used 
by Yoon and Shanklin (2007a).  These sections of the USDABC are included in Appendix G. 
 The Food Defense Practices section asked respondents to rate the frequency with which 
31 food defense practices were implemented in their districts.  A 5- point Likert-type rating scale 
was used with additional options don’t know and not under my authority.  Questions were 
removed from the general food defense section if they also appeared in the facility security, 
utility security, or communication sections.  Questions from Yoon’s (2007) survey that measured 
more than one construct were separated into multiple items.  For example “Our operation 
controls, monitors, and secures all access points into the foodservice facility, including all food 
product, food ingredient, and chemical storage areas with alarms, cameras, lock, fences, or other 
security hardware that meet national and local fire and safety codes” was made into three items, 
one that assessed control of access to the foodservice facility, one about control of access to 
storage areas, and one about security of chemical storage areas.   
 The final two sections of the survey asked about food defense planning and requested 
demographic information.  Many of these items were adapted with permission (Appendix K) 
from the surveys by Yoon (2007) and Olds (2010).  Response options to questions about number 
and types of production facilities were patterned after those used by NFSMI (2004) in a study 
about the prevalence of various forms of food production systems in schools.   
 The survey was reviewed for content validity and clarity by nine FSDs  and two unit 
managers in Midwestern states not included in the study population.  Unit managers were asked 
50 
to provide feedback because SFAs in very small districts might forward the survey to a head 
cook or kitchen manager.  District enrollments of the reviewers were representative of the size 
categories specified in the sampling frame for Phase One of this study (fewer than 7,500 
students, 7,500-10,000 students, 10,000-20,000 students, >20,000 students).  Respondents were 
asked to take the survey and give feedback about the clarity and appropriateness of the survey 
items on a feedback form (Appendix L).  Reviewers were asked to return only the feedback 
form; responses to the survey items were not requested.  Minor modifications based on feedback 
were incorporated into the final survey.  The survey was coded into SurveyGizmo
®
 by the Office 
of Distance Education and Education Technology at Iowa State University.   
Data Collection 
 The Institutional Review Board at Iowa State University exempted the study from full 
review in December, 2012.  The survey was deployed January and February 2013.  Personalized 
emails were sent out in groups by state and mailed on different days to prevent a glut of 
immediate responses from slowing the server and frustrating respondents.  Emails were sent in 
the evening so that they would be available to respondents when they first opened their email in 
the morning.  Dillman, Smythe, and Christian, (2009) reported response rates to be best when 
emails were received at the beginning of the work day compared to the afternoon. 
 An email giving prior notification of the survey was not used, as Dillman, Smyth, and 
Christian (2009) reported omitting this practice for internet surveys.  All potential respondents, 
as public employees with email addresses assigned by their school districts, could be expected to 
have the skills needed to access the survey.  The initial message explained the purpose of the 
survey, and included a link to the survey (Appendix M).  Respondents were advised that by 
clicking the link to the survey they were giving their consent to participate in the study.  Emails 
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returned as undeliverable were first checked for errors against original source, and then checked 
against the school district website.  If no solution for the undeliverable email was found from 
these two checks, the school district was classified as having no data and no further messages 
were sent.  Two mailings were sent: the initial invitation and a follow-up message one week 
later.  After the reminder message, the directors of the child nutrition programs in each state were 
sent a message asking them to express support for the survey to their SFAs and FSDs.  The 
actions of the state directors likely contributed to the high response rates of some states in this 
study.   
 A prize drawing for one $50 gift certificate per state was offered as an incentive for 
participation.  Bosnjak and Tuten (2003) found that prize drawings increased survey completion 
rates for internet-administered surveys compared to pre-paid incentives.  To maintain 
confidentiality of respondents, the prize drawing was formatted as a separate survey 
administered at the end of the main survey. 
Statistical Analysis   
 Stata ®version 11.0 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas) was used to analyze the survey 
results.   Descriptive statistics, t tests, chi-square tests of independence, and one way ANOVA 
with a Bonferroni correction, and Fisher’s Exact test were used.  Because of the variety of 
position titles reported by respondents, the 12 title options were grouped by level of authority 
into unit manager, district FSD, and district administrator categories.  ANOVA was used to 
identify relationships between position title and dependent variables measuring risk perception.  
A t test was used to compare means for worry, perceived extent of risk, and personal control 
between terrorism and food tampering.  An overall mean for the six dread risk perception 
measures was computed using reverse coding for two items rating perception of personal control 
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over terrorism and over food tampering.  ANOVA was used to identify relationships between 
position title and reported influence over foodservice department policies and influence over 
school board level building security and utility security policies.  Descriptive statistics were 
computed for demographic characteristics and categorical operational characteristics.  
Frequencies for food defense and crisis management activities and training were reported.  Chi-
square analysis was used to find relationships between categorical operational and demographic 
school district characteristics of school districts.  School enrollments, which were grouped into 6 
categories on the survey, were regrouped for the chi-square analysis into districts with 
enrollments ≤7,500 and 7,501 or greater.   
 Ratings of food defense practices were given numerical values (5= always, 4= most of the 
time, 3= sometimes, 2= rarely, 1= never).  Don’t know and not under my authority were coded as 
different missing values.  Frequencies of these responses were determined but they were not 
included in computing means and standard deviations.  The mean ratings for the 31 food defense 
practices were totaled and the mean determined.  The overall mean ratings for each of the four 
categories (general food defense, utility security, facility security, communication) were 
determined.  One negatively phrased practice, “Our district allows the foodservice production 
area to be used for special events by outside groups” was reverse coded when the overall mean 
for facility security practices was computed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Phase One: Multi-site Case Study 
Description of Sample 
 Five school districts in four states were visited between May and November 2012.  
Districts were recruited through the personal network of the investigator and through cold 
contacts with members of SNA whose contact information was included in SNA directories.  
The districts were chosen to match a sampling frame that assured maximum variation within the 
sample (Appendix A).  District enrollments ranged from 2,000 to 43,000 students.  One district 
used a central production kitchen with no onsite service and the remaining districts used 
combinations of conventional and commissary production systems.  All foodservice operations 
were self-operated.  Four districts had central warehouse facilities. 
 Five persons were interviewed at each study site: a school principal, the district FSD, two 
production workers, and an individual with district or community security responsibilities.  
These individuals (as a group referred to as “emergency responders” in this paper) included a 
city fire chief, a School Resource Officer, a private health /safety consultant, a security manager, 
and an individual who served as county coroner and EMT while also holding a full-time position 
as Human Resource Director in the school district.  Demographics for each site are shown in 
Table 4. 
 Each site visit was conducted during a single day and included observation of breakfast 
and lunch production and service.  Observations were made in three public middle schools, one  
public elementary school, one private K-12 charter school that obtained food from the central 
kitchen in a public school district, one central kitchen operation and one dining facility housed 
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Table 4  
 
Demographics of Case Study Sites 
Parameter Site 515 
small 
district, 
rural area 
Site 715  
MS district, 
suburban area 
Site 315 
MS district, 
urban area 
 Site 815 
 MS district, 
metropolitan 
area 
Site 615 
 VL district, 
metropolitan 
area 
Student 
enrollment
a
 2,000 5,000 7,000 9,000 43,000 
Primary production 
system on-site on-site on-site commissary central 
Storage system 
central 
warehouse 
central 
warehouse 
 
 
onsite 
central 
warehouse 
central 
warehouse 
Population
b 
10,000 22,000 50,000 57,000 285,000 
 
Credentials of FSD Some 
college 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree, RD 
Graduate 
Degree, RD, 
SNS 
Bachelor’s 
Degree, RD 
Average number of 
breakfasts served 
daily
a
 
950 300 2,100 1,000 18,000 
Average number of 
lunches served 
daily
a
 
1,700 3,000 3,800 5,000 31,000 
Approximate ADP 
(lunch) 77% 64.5% 56% 54% 72% 
Population below 
poverty level 48% 6% 23% 5% 22% 
Note. MS = medium size, VL = very large; RD = Registered Dietitian, SNS = School Nutrition 
Specialist; FSD = Foodservice Director; ADP = average daily participation. 
a
Rounded to protect 
identity. 
b
Obtained from 2010 Census; population rounded to protect district identity 
 
in its own building on the same city block as a high school, middle school, and elementary 
school.  This dining facility served students from K-12 and was rented during the school day 
from a federal agency.  It was also used to serve food to 100 children who lived in a dormitory 
during the week so that they could attend school.  Elementary and middle/high school students 
walked outside from their school buildings to the dining facility for their meals. 
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Observation Checklist Results 
 Current levels of implementation of food defense best practices were observed at seven 
production sites in five districts.  Each of the five district visits began with observation of 
breakfast production and service.  The time between breakfast and lunch service was used to 
observe lunch production, to conduct interviews, and to travel to other sites; these activities 
varied by location.  Lunch service was observed at four sites. The author was given permission to 
independently explore four of the onsite kitchen operations.  A guided tour was provided at the 
central production facility, a private school served by the central facility, and one onsite 
production facility.  The Food Defense Checklist for Retail Foodservice Operations, developed 
by the extension services of Iowa State University and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, was 
used to guide the observation periods at each site.  The time required for interviews and travel to 
multiple sites to conduct interviews allowed only two to three hours of observation at each 
school; not all checklist items could be observed.  For those items not actually observed, the 
kitchen manager or FSD were asked about practices.  Details from the interview transcripts were 
also used to document checklist items. 
 One district had a food defense plan and a team responsible for food defense.  Emergency 
contact information was posted in the kitchen at one site, in the custodian’s work space at one 
site, in the binder holding the food safety plan at another site, and was not observed at three sites.  
One FSD explained that emergency contact information was not given to employees because 
they were expected to contact a unit manager in an emergency.  Two sites were visited during 
early morning darkness and observed to be adequately lighted.  Primary entrances were locked at 
one school, monitored at one school and unlocked at all other locations.  Outside air intake 
equipment was fenced and locked at three locations; four others were not observed.   Entrances 
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to receiving areas were observed unlocked and unattended at six of seven sites.  Exterior 
entrances to production areas were observed to be unlocked in three locations.  Of these, one was 
in the midst of a construction project; an exterior door adjacent to the kitchen was kept unlocked 
to allow workers access to materials stored outside.    
 Interior entrances to three kitchens doubled as entrances to the serving line and stood 
open all day while production staff were present.  The unit manager for one of these (who 
reported receiving training about food defense) placed proofing cabinets to act as barrier to entry 
in passageways leading from the serving line to the production area.  In one school a custodian 
was observed behind the serving line with his lunch tray; in two other schools delivery persons 
were observed to deliver milk and bread during lunch production.  Other than these incidents no 
unauthorized persons were observed to enter any of the seven production areas. 
 Employees in all seven production sites had photo ID badges, but they were not worn in 
one of the kitchens visited.  Lockers for storage of personal belongings were available to 
employees at three production sites; at one site production workers kept personal belongings in 
an office because their lockers were in a distant location; at two sites personal items were stored 
in the manager’s office, and in one site personal items were kept in the food storage area.     
 All self-service bars and serving lines were monitored by foodservice employees during 
meal service periods.  Storage areas in the central production facility and its satellite school were 
locked.  Food storage areas in four onsite kitchens were found unlocked; the area was not 
observed at one site.  In one school the primary researcher was challenged by a production 
worker when she was found exploring the food storage room.  Two of the unlocked food storage 
areas were accessible from public areas.  Chemicals used by the nutrition program were stored 
away from food and kept in locked cabinets or storage rooms at only one site; chemical agents 
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used by the foodservice program were stored away from food, but not in locked cabinets at five 
sites, and not observed at one site.  
Qualitative Data Analysis 
 All but one of the 25 interviews was digitally recorded and transcribed.  The digital 
recorder malfunctioned at the time of the interview with a production worker in the small rural 
school district.  Notes were taken during the interview and summarized in a typed document.  
 Interview themes.  The transcripts were reviewed to identify emerging themes, and then 
coded into units of data that were categorized into themes and subthemes.  Four themes emerged:  
 Lack of Awareness 
 Lack of Concern 
 Food is not Considered as a Potential Danger 
 Conflicting Priorities and Expectations Influence Food Defense 
A total of 247 sections were identified to be “units of meaning” as defined by Maykut and  
Morehouse (1994).  The number of units of meaning or interview statements assigned to each 
subtheme is shown in Appendix N.  Also shown in Appendix N is the number of units of 
meaning contributed by each of the stakeholder groups: principals, FSDs, emergency responders, 
and production workers. 
 Theme one: Lack of awareness.  Most interviewees were not familiar with the term 
food defense, but when it was defined for them they acknowledged awareness of the potential for 
intentional contamination of food.  Seven of ten production workers could identify vulnerable 
aspects of the foodservice operation, such as location of an unlocked storage cabinet in a public 
hallway or that fresh produce was more vulnerable to contamination than canned produce.  Of 
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the 25 interviewees, six (24%) related experiences of intentional food contamination, with six of 
these incidents occurring in schools.  The theme of Awareness was divided into three sub-
themes: 
 Food defense is an unfamiliar term, but the concept is not. 
 Experience with food tampering was uncommon, but not unheard of. 
 Different stakeholders perceive different areas of vulnerability. 
 Food defense is an unfamiliar term, but the concept is not.  Principals, production 
workers, and emergency responders were asked if they were familiar with the concept of food 
defense.  The question was not asked of FSDs.  One principal, one responder, and five 
production workers indicated they had heard of the term.  The five production workers 
represented four of the five districts that were part of Phase One.  The only district where both 
production workers interviewed reported knowledge about food defense was the district with the 
smallest student enrollment.  Production workers in that district had received one week of 
training from the state education office and food defense was included as a topic.  Only the FSD 
with the central kitchen facility had attended training sessions on food defense issues and she had 
attended multiple training events.   
 Other administrators were not familiar with the term but expressed familiarity with the 
concept.  One principal said, “I hadn’t heard that term, I just know what you are talking about.”  
Another said, “I’m aware of food contamination issues but I have not heard specifically ‘food 
defense’.”  One principal at first indicated unfamiliarity with the term, but then remembered 
hearing about it through the media.  Although these three principals indicated they understood 
the concept of food defense, as the interviews progressed, it became apparent there was 
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confusion with food defense and other safety issues. Two principals considered food defense as a 
concept related to shelter-in-place.  One gave as an example, 
 And we would be self-sufficient here with the food and the water that we have in the 
building.  No one would come in and nobody would go out.  So it would be important to 
make sure that our food supply was safe.  
It was concluded that these principals interpreted food defense as a way to supply food to 
students in a non-food-related emergency. 
 One emergency responder indicated familiarity with the term food defense, and one other 
was aware of intentional food contamination and recognized how schools could be vulnerable.  
Another emergency responder who worked as a School Resource Officer and was a member of 
the local police force said, “I would say that I’ve thought about it before but not in relationship to 
the school and I guess to our community as a whole.”  A city fire chief who served as an 
emergency responder found intentional food contamination to be a reasonable concern for 
schools: “I think it’s a very, very trusting society and I think it would be easy, if somebody 
wanted to get into a school and probably find a way to do that.”  Two production workers had 
heard of food tampering, and three were familiar with the term food defense specifically.  One 
cook said the term “was not used in everyday language” but that she had seen or heard about it.  
A kitchen supervisor in the VL metropolitan district said she had heard of food defense  “‘Cause 
it’s in the news.  Everybody’s aware of the contamination and things like that.”  Several food 
production workers confused food defense with food safety.  One cook posited that food 
tampering could occur in the kitchen from workers with contaminated hands, “I think it could be 
any of us because she’s got gals working with her, I’ve got gals working with me.  Anybody 
could not wash their hands or whatever.” Another cook associated intentional food 
contamination with illness caused by time and temperature abuse: “I went to a lot of classes 
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about poisoning, about the temperature.  Not the terrorism, I don’t know.”  When asked if she 
had ever received training about food defense, one worker responded, “For what to look for? 
Ya.”  Another worker responded to the question about food defense training:  
not specifically about terrorism type contamination, it’s more about natural 
contamination.  You know, cross contamination between like chicken and vegetables, 
you know, that kind of food tampering.  But not so much about food defense if it’s 
actually about people trying to do something to the food.  I haven’t had much training in 
that. 
  Food defense has been included in recent editions of the National Restaurant Association 
Education Foundation’s ServeSafe® curriculum, expanding to one-and-a-half pages in the sixth 
edition (National Restaurant Association, 2012).  The association of food defense with food 
safety could be a result of ServeSafe® or other food safety training.  
  After food defense was defined in the interviews, food production workers were able to 
give examples of how food tampering could occur.  As one cook explained 
because basically, don’t you read that if I wanted to, I could go in the freezer and sprinkle 
something on whatever and, I’m thinking like when you asked me the question, things 
that are not, you’re not able to see with the eye but it would still be very toxic to you.  So 
am I wrong in thinking . . . that we’re easy? 
When asked if the foodservice had one or more persons responsible for food defense one 
production worker offered an example of what food defense involved, “Yes. Such as dating and 
making sure seals are shut.  Things like that, yes.  We’re all responsible for that and to report 
anything unusual.”   
 Principals, emergency responders and FSDs were asked if they had heard of the USDA 
Biosecurity Checklist for School Food Service (USDABC).  Two principals and three FSDs had 
knowledge of the publication.  One principal had learned of the USDABC through news or 
professional media.  Another principal had heard of the USDABC and said she was aware of the 
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concept, but not the term food defense.  No emergency responders were familiar with the 
USDABC.  Of the three FSDs familiar with the USDABC only one had a food defense plan.  
When asked to see the food defense plan, this FSD produced a completed USDA Biosecurity 
Checklist.  This was the only district with a food defense plan and it was the district with the 
central kitchen facility.   
 A FSD who had previously worked in hospital administration had learned about the risk 
of food tampering in that setting, “I’ve known that it’s out there. That they can access and do this 
through the hospitals.  It became something we were concerned with.”  She described 
participating in tabletop emergency preparedness training exercises.  This finding supports 
research by Yoon (2007) who found that foodservice operations in healthcare settings were more 
likely than schools to have well-documented crisis management plans. 
 Experience with food tampering was uncommon, but not unheard of.  All participants 
were asked if they had experienced an incident of food tampering at work or in their personal 
lives.  Four FSDs and two emergency responders reported experiences of food tampering, with 
two reporting two incidents.  One emergency responder knew of an incident in her district but 
had not been involved.  One emergency responder said that he had worked on cases involving 
intentional poisoning and another remembered a case where “something bad” had been added to 
a punch bowl at a wedding and 10 guests were sent to the hospital after consuming the punch.  
These incidents did not occur in schools.  The incidents recalled by FSDs occurred in schools, 
although one of the incidents happened in a district where the director had previously worked.  
Four of the incidents occurring in the case schools were perpetrated by students:  BB pellets were 
added to a batch of mashed potatoes, a used condom was placed in a container of ranch salad 
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dressing, urine was found on and around a salad bar, and a worm was placed on a pan of corn in 
the serving line.  
 The only incidents involving employees occurred in the VL district with the central 
kitchen facility.  A foodservice production employee was suspected when plastic bandages were 
found in batches of cooked noodles on more than one occasion.  The final school incident 
involved an “irritated” employee who knowingly performed an incomplete cleaning of a machine 
that had been used to process raw ground beef.  
 Different stakeholders are aware of different areas of vulnerability.  Interviewees gave 
a variety of answers when asked what area of the school would be most vulnerable to attacks on 
the food.  The nature of the responses was related to the position of the interviewee.  The 
responses of the principals reflected their concern with protection against intruders.  Three of 
five principals were most concerned with the security of exterior doors, one stated that the 
cafeteria was the most vulnerable area and one thought the food was most vulnerable in the 
central kitchen.  FSDs saw food as most vulnerable outside of the food production areas.  One 
FSD mentioned the serving line; two mentioned deliveries/loading dock and two of the FSDs 
believed the food was most vulnerable in the supply chain before it was delivered to the district. 
 Production workers identified vulnerabilities in their workplaces: delivery, the serving 
line, a large steam-jacketed kettle in the production area, and unlocked storage areas as being 
vulnerable.  Another cook was concerned that identification badges weren’t being worn by 
school staff.  Three workers were unable to identify a vulnerable area and expressed confidence 
that their kitchens were safe. 
 These responses give insights into the concerns of the different groups of stakeholders; 
these could be used to develop training materials and activities addressed to specific needs of the 
63 
groups.  The data suggest that training about food defense should focus on the immediate work 
environment when targeting production workers.  Administrators may be receptive to knowledge 
about food defense if they are made aware of the shared goal of preventing intruders.  FSDs may 
respond to information that helps them protect food when it is not under their direct control, such 
as when the food is in transit.  
 Theme two: Lack of concern.  A strong theme that emerged from the interviewees was 
that food tampering or terrorism would not happen at their school or in their particular locations.  
Three subthemes were identified in this theme: timing of food contamination; trustworthiness of 
school employees; and sense that nothing bad could happen here.  Interviewees were fairly 
consistent in stating any food contamination would almost certainly occur before the food 
arrived in the district, with some specifically identifying the vulnerability of imported food.  
Confidence was also expressed that coworkers and other school employees were trustworthy.  
This theme was grouped into three subthemes:  
 Food is most vulnerable to contamination before it arrives to the site.  
 Food is safe because co-workers are trustworthy. 
 No one would want to attack our school. 
Food is most vulnerable to contamination before it arrives to the site.  This view was 
expressed by principals, FSDs and production workers.  A kitchen manager stated, “It would 
have to be before it came to this building.  Everything we have is locked.”  Another principal 
stated that there was “no risk” from foodservice or other district employees.  A production 
worker made a similar claim,  
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Attacking the food not the people? Once it’s in our kitchen it would be pretty tough 
because you have to be authorized to be in the kitchen so it would have to be someone 
who is already working there.  So I think [the risk] is slight.   
One school administrator explained,  
We have no control from where it comes from until the time it gets to us. But for here, 
everybody is conscious of what goes on with the food here but before it gets to us we 
have no idea. 
 The idea that fresh produce items, especially imported produce, were most likely to be 
the kind of food that would be contaminated in the supply chain was repeated several times by 
production workers.  One worker said: 
Or apples or oranges, [food tampering] could be done. If things like that really want to 
take out the U.S., that’s how they would probably do it.  Importing foods from different 
countries, that’s how I think they would do it. 
 According to the psychometric paradigm, risk perception can be measured using two 
factors, dread risk and unknown risk (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982).  Lack of control 
over a risk increases the perception of risk because uncontrollability contributes to the dread risk 
factor (Slovic, 1987).  Principals, FSDs, and production workers expressed confidence in the 
protection of food once it was in their building and it was under their control.  Control is 
perceived to be least with imported foods, making those foods seem riskiest.  However, 
children’s exposure to imported food is lower in school than in other venues because federal 
guidelines require that USDA-funded Child Nutrition Programs purchase domestically produced 
food to the “maximum extent practicable” (USDA-FNS, 2006). 
 Co-workers are trustworthy.  Knowledge about a risk reduces the unknown factor of risk 
perception whereas “newness” of the risk makes it seem riskier (Slovic, 1987).  Six of the ten 
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production workers expressed confidence that their coworkers, who were known to them, and 
with whom they interacted on a daily basis, could be trusted not to tamper with the food.  One 
worker said, “I never thought of tampering before, you know.  It’s just kind of a family here.  
You just trust everyone.”  Another claimed, “I think it’s pretty much safe.  Not 100% but pretty 
much.”  This trust among production workers is evidenced by the way in which their personal 
items were kept in unlocked lockers while they were at work.  Employee lockers were kept 
unlocked in all sites visited except for the central kitchen facility. 
 When employees prove to be untrustworthy, other employees may not feel comfortable to 
report the questionable actions that they observe.  The FSD for the VL central kitchen had 
experienced a situation where production workers could not be relied on to report the 
misbehavior of another employee: 
I found out that there were at least four employees who were aware that this employee, 
on purpose, did not clean the machine and left raw meat in it.  So that really made me 
aware of people will not report things because they’re afraid of what will happen in the 
work place.  There’s a lot of peer pressure. 
 
 The sense of being “family” may not have applied to the central kitchen facility.  One of 
the four production workers not heard to make some kind of statement showing trust in co-
workers was the worker from the central production facility.  Working in a central kitchen 
facility is more like working in a factory than in a school.  Workers have no contact with the 
children who benefit from the meals, which may reduce the sense that the work involves serving 
children.   Central kitchens tend to be located in very large school districts so that employees 
may not live in the community they serve and may feel a lack of connection to its children.  
Central kitchen operations have production characteristics that make them at risk for acts of 
intentional contamination, but the relationships among co-workers and between workers and 
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managers have not been discussed as risk factors.  It is possible that workers in central kitchens 
feel differently towards their work compared to workers in school settings.  This is an issue that 
should be addressed in future research. 
 All districts in this study sought to hire trustworthy employees by requiring criminal 
background checks on all new hires.  Reliance on criminal background checks alone may not be 
sufficient for this purpose.  As a police officer, the School Resource Officer had experience with 
criminal background checks that challenged the idea that this hiring procedure would assure 
trustworthy employees, “Some stuff slips through the cracks.  Because I found out stuff about 
people that they [administration] weren’t aware of after the fact.”  Reference checks and careful 
observation of new employees are needed for strong food defense. 
 The experiences of interviewees in this study provide evidence that attacks on food may 
be more likely from internal sources than from outsiders.  A principal acknowledged that it was 
not unusual for security breaches to be made by individuals with ties to the district:  “I can’t 
think of a time we’ve had an intruder that wasn’t either a student or a parent.” 
 No one would want to attack our school.  When asked about the risk of food tampering 
or terrorist attacks on food in their foodservice operations, four interviewees asserted that such 
things could happen in other places, but were unlike to happen “here”.  For instance one 
production worker from a MS district said, “The only time I really thought about terrorists was 
when I was in Mall of America, but I never really thought about food tampering or anything.”  A 
production worker from the small rural district said “. . . I always think it happens on the east 
coast because they’re right there.  They’re more at risk than we would be.”  These interviewees 
perceive that only iconic locations or locations in the “east” where the attacks of September 11, 
2001 occurred are vulnerable.  This supports results by Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Small, & Lerner 
67 
(2003) that showed for men the perception of risk from terrorism was significantly lower for 
individuals living more than 100 miles from the site of the World Trade Center. 
 Those living in small towns or locations far from major urban areas may believe that their 
place is too insignificant to be a target.  The county coroner from the rural district said the risk of 
terrorist acts was “almost none in our area.  I think in the nation it’s different.  But I think in our 
area almost none.”  The coroner’s impression was that terrorism was unlikely because of the 
perceived insignificance of their location on a national scale:  
 
 Interviewer:  So, [you believe, the risk of terrorism is low] out here.  Because of  
 your remoteness . 
 Principal:  Pretty much. Maybe a chance in [name of city] but we’re so rural, I   don’t see 
 it.  It couldn’t impact the whole country. 
 
 In contrast, the Fire Chief from a large metropolitan area disagreed that small towns were 
immune from terrorism: 
I always said, after 9 – 11, if a terrorist really wanted to hit the heart of the United States 
to a point that just instilled fear across the, absolutely, completely disrupt the nation, it’s 
easy to separate ourselves from New York City, but to hit a couple of schools in the 
Midwest, and that would send an absolute, ripple, whether it was a bomb, or food stuff.  
They’re incredibly vulnerable if they wanted to send a shock wave that would be the way 
to do it. 
 Torok & Tauxe (1997) reported that an attack on restaurants in The Dalles Oregon in 
1984 was considered by the FB1 to be the only attack on food in the U.S. by a terrorist group.  
The Dalles, with a 2010 population of 13,620, was not a major, iconic landmark, and in fact is 
smaller than all but one of the cities in this study.  Size and geographic location may not predict 
the occurrence of intentional food contamination. 
 Theme three: Food is not considered a potential danger.  A third theme that emerged 
from the data is that food issues were viewed as being separate from school operations and that 
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those issues were the responsibility of the FSD.  As a result, only one of five districts had a food 
related issue included in their crisis management plan.  Three subthemes were identified:  
 The foodservice operation is perceived as separate from school operations. 
 
 The foodservice is responsible for food defense and the administration is  responsible for 
security. 
 
 Crisis management planning does not address food hazards.  
 
 The foodservice operation is perceived as separate from school operations.  School 
foodservice operations that participate in the federal child nutrition programs are required to 
have independent budgets; these are separate from the school districts’ general funds.  Each child 
nutrition program is expected to be self- sufficient; revenues received from the sale of food must 
cover expenses, including labor.  This independence can lead to a sense of autonomy and 
separation of the foodservice department not possible for other school district entities.  As the 
health and safety consultant for one MS district described 
They have their own budget and operate out of it so [FSD] doesn’t have to go through 
any hoops to get stuff.  Now if I’m trying to get a head end vent on an air conditioner . . .  
I have to jump through hoops to get a budget and [have] more people to deal with.  . . .  
[FSD] put a new freezer in this year.  First she came to me to get capital money and I’m 
sitting there all our capital money is used.  Well then she goes back to her own budget.  
So then she went and did it.  There is a separation. 
The security manager for the largest school district studied expressed the same idea, “Yes, ‘cause 
generally food service is dealt with separately, they have their own budget.”  
 The five emergency responders (a fire chief, health and safety consultant, School 
Resource Officer, a security manager and a county coroner) interacted with the FSDs in their 
districts in limited ways.  In the VL metropolitan district, the emergency responder was a 
security manager who reported frequent meetings with the FSD.  In the MS suburban district the 
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emergency responder was also a security manager and indicated conversations were held with 
the FSD about capital purchases and health and safety training.  The School Resource Officer 
from the MS urban district admitted, “… we make a lot of small talk and joke around and stuff 
like that but we haven’t had a lot of serious conversations about the security of the kitchen or 
food that’s coming in.”  The fire chief had communicated with the MS metropolitan school 
district FSD one time when an unfamiliar white powder was found in packages of cheese.  This 
situation illustrated a reactive rather than proactive stance.  The county coroner and EMT from 
the small rural district was also the school district’s Human Resources officer.  She had 
interacted with the FSD regarding hiring and criminal background checks, but had no contact 
relating to her emergency responder roles.  
 Previous research by Yoon (2007), Yoon and Shanklin (2007a, 2007b), and Story, Sneed, 
Oakley, & Stretch (2007) showed that communication was an aspect of food defense 
infrequently implemented.  They used the USDABC as the standard for food defense best 
practices.  The practices listed under communication include establishing a relationship with 
local authorities regarding food biosecurity and determining which authority should be contacted 
in different types of food-related emergencies.  In the present study administrators reported 
engaging in emergency planning with local authorities, but the two FSDs reporting contacts with 
authorities had done so only in response to an incident.  
 The foodservice is responsible for food defense. Administration is responsible for 
security.  Principals considered issues involving food defense to be the purview of the FSDs and 
expressed confidence in their abilities.  Although the principal has ultimate responsibility for 
building security, every student and employee is expected to do their part.  To the contrary, 
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protection of food was seen as the sole responsibility of the foodservice operation, as illustrated 
by this interchange: 
  Interviewer:  Who’s responsible for food defense in your school? 
  Principal: It would be the district nutrition person and then directly in our building    
 would be the kitchen manager. 
  Interviewer: Who’s responsible for building security? 
  Principal:  Everyone. 
Each principal identified at least one member of the foodservice staff (head cook, FSD, 
foodservice employees) as being responsible for food defense.  Two principals also included 
themselves as responsible, and one of these also included the custodial staff as having some 
responsibility.  The principal of the private charter school contracted food services from the VL 
metropolitan district.  He identified the public school district’s central kitchen FSDs as 
responsible for food defense, but explained his school had responsibility for following the central 
kitchen’s protocol for receiving the food. 
   Four of the five FSDs listed more than one individual as responsible for the HACCP 
safety plan.  The FSD for the MS metropolitan school had a team of employees responsible for 
HACCP.  Food defense was included under the HACCP plan for this district.  
 Interviewer: Do you have a team that is responsible for food defense? 
 FSD: No it’s all under HACCP.  That’s where we put it. 
 Interviewer: Have you ever addressed food defense on your HACCP team? 
 FSD:  As food defense, calling it food defense, probably not. I was trying to think.  We  
 probably talk more about it as HACCP.  The topics that I think fall under food defense 
 probably are just falling under general topics of HACCP. 
 
The VL metropolitan district with the central kitchen had a team consisting of the FSD, assistant 
director, central kitchen manager, and quality control manager.  This FSD combined HACCP 
and her food defense plan that was based on the USDABC.  She said, “they go hand in hand”.   
The FSD for the small rural district stated that she had ten employees responsible for HACCP—
her ten kitchen managers.  In the two remaining districts, both MS districts, the FSDs stated they 
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themselves were responsible.  In the three districts where HACCP and food defense were not 
combined, the small rural district had no one responsible, and in the two remaining MS districts 
the FSDs said that they were responsible.  In six of ten cases, production workers identified 
persons having position authority as responsible for HACCP.  Three production workers viewed 
all the production workers as responsible and one didn’t specify who was responsible.  However, 
when production workers were asked if one or more foodservice employees was responsible for 
food defense (described as protecting food from food tampering) 70% (n = 7) said “we all are”, 
or words to that effect:   
   Interviewer: Do you have anybody here who’s responsible for making sure nobody 
 contaminates the food? 
 Production worker:  I think that’s what we do.  I think that’s our job. 
 
This sense of responsibility is limited by a lack of training and an incomplete understanding of  
what food defense entails.  Production workers understood that it was important to check 
products for signs of tampering and to keep non-foodservice employees out of the kitchen but 
showed a misunderstanding of how food defense differs from food safety.   
  
Crisis management planning does not address food threats.   
 
 Requirements and planning process.  In this study “crisis management” was used to 
describe to  any kind of planning for emergencies.  The principal from the MS suburban school 
described crisis management planning at his school: 
I met with [name], the fire chief, and the police chief, and HAZMAT was also there.  So 
we talked through every scenario involving the school and the city, we talked about 
issues with trains coming through.  Issues, since we’re next to an Interstate, semis turning 
over, [gas station] that has petroleum that could cause a problem.  So we talked about 
every scenario we could think of, gas leaks and what we would do in the building, how 
we would evacuate, if we would evacuate.  
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When asked if the crisis management plan addressed crises involving food, the same principal 
responded, “so the notion of possibly doing one on food safety and food contamination, 
purposeful contamination would be intriguing.  I never thought of that.”  Food defense planning 
was assumed to be the sole responsibility of the FSD by one principal, who trusted that it was 
being done in his district: 
 Interviewer:  Has this district implemented a written plan to address food defense? 
 Principal: I’m sure we have but I’m not aware. 
 Interviewer: Actually [FSD interview indicated] they haven’t. 
 Principal: It would surprise me if they haven’t. 
 
 The on-line interactive version of the USDABC checklist lists the first step in food 
defense planning as creating a planning team (National Food Service Management Institute, 
2007).  The recommendation is to use the emergency response planning team already in 
operation at the school.  It is recommended that the team include a custodian, school nurse, 
parent, and science expert (e.g. a science teacher), as well as experts from the wider community.  
The first checklist presented is the Communication checklist, an indication of its importance.  
This resource can be used to communicate to principals and emergency responders what is 
needed for food defense.  Because no emergency responders had heard of the USDABC and only 
two of five principals were even vaguely aware of it, FSDs need to be encouraged to initiate the 
discussion. 
 Response to an incident is site-specific. The USDABC recommends keeping an updated 
emergency contact list, but in practice individual school districts had their own procedures for 
handling emergencies and most did not include directly calling emergency contacts.  The chain 
of communication for reporting emergencies varied from district to district.  The VL 
metropolitan school district had an emergency communications center to which all events were 
reported; this office then decided what the next step should be.  Employees in that district’s 
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central kitchen facility were not given emergency contact numbers because all incidents were to 
be reported to a manager.   
 The FSD in the MS urban district said that the appropriate contact would be influenced 
by whether the perpetrator was an external or internal person.  The School Resource Office from 
that district said that if food tampering was suspected in his district: 
 The response is to notify law enforcement and it will work its way up to the chain of 
command to work with the school administration at [school administrative center] to 
investigate where it happened to protect the children and to [inaudible ] staff. 
He went on to clarify that because he was a law enforcement officer, administration often called 
him before calling 911.  The fire chief from the MS metropolitan district said that for 
emergencies 911 should be called, but acknowledged that such a call might be difficult to make 
if an emergency was only suspected. 
There’s another piece to it that I respect and that is, if it’s a situation where they’re just 
not sure, nobody likes to have three fire trucks and two police cars showing up, there are 
calls where they’re just not sure and they want more of a consultation.  In those 
situations, it’s perfectly fine to call a non-emergency number.  You know, if they have a 
relationship [italics added] and somebody’s cell phone number and say you know, we 
really don’t think this is anything but there’s just something about it.  
When incidents involve children, law enforcement officials want to be involved.  The fire chief 
imagined a scenario that would attract police to the scene: 
. . . if all of a sudden they started out with “we’ve got one sick kid”.  It’s the middle of the 
afternoon and we have one kid puking.  Pretty soon two more come in and that’s weird.  
All of a sudden there’s three more.  There’s six people puking?  Then they start, this isn’t 
right, they should be calling 911.  Particularly when it’s a school, no matter what the call, 
the police will always respond just because it’s kids and they want to make sure there’s 
nothing funky going on. 
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 The principal of the private charter school stated he would contact authorities in an emergency, 
but relied on the judgment of the school nurse in determining if a food-related emergency were 
occurring.  The principal of the elementary school in the small rural district would call tribal 
police in case of an emergency because almost all children were tribal members and not under 
the jurisdiction of the county or city authorities.  It is evident that even in this small convenience 
sample of five districts the complexity of jurisdictions and spheres of authority make food 
defense planning a very district-specific matter.   
 When specific questions were asked, such as “who would you call when food tampering 
was suspected?”, “how would you identify whether children had an illness due to contamination 
of the food?”, or “when do you bring in external authorities and when can a food tampering 
incident remain internal?”, the responses were often not definitive, because of the complexity of 
the systems.  This is an indication of lack of knowledge about how their respective districts are 
“plugged into” community resources.   
 In the case of the charter school that contracted all food services from the VL 
metropolitan district, the foodservice employees were not school employees.  The food 
production supervisor was accountable to both the school principal and her employer, begging 
the question, “who has the ultimate authority for food defense?”  Although the central kitchen 
facility had an active food defense plan, it was designed to protect the food through delivery to 
the service kitchen, but it was unclear which agency was responsible from that point.  
 The situation is further complicated by the reliance of the charter school principal on the 
school nurse to identify occurrences of food related illnesses among students.  Inclusion of 
training related to food safety or the consequences of intentional food tampering is not typical of 
health care provider preparation.  The differences between a common viral illness and a bacterial 
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illness are typically the severity of the symptoms.  The number of persons experiencing 
symptoms would also provide an indication of food related problems.  If the nurse at the charter 
school had no contact with nurses in the public district it would delay identification of a 
widespread pattern of illness caused by food from the central kitchen.  Without policy and 
procedural guidance on how to respond, those in the front lines may not have adequate 
knowledge, training or expertise on what to do.   
 Even when everyone working in a school is employed by the same entity, without 
planning and communication between school nurses, foodservice managers, and emergency 
responders, identification of a food-related illness could be delayed, resulting in severe 
consequences.  As the principal of the MS urban district explained:  
I think you need awareness.  You need a conversation of what could potentially happen.  
What level of alarm should be.  That would be second.  Three would be to get the right 
people in coordination with each other.  That wouldn’t be difficult because we have the 
people for other emergencies in place. 
 In one district elementary school children had to walk to a different building for their 
school meals.  In this situation school principals were not able to provide oversight of the 
students, staff, or the facilities due to physical location and different employers.  As the 
elementary school principal explained,  
. . . the high school and [our school] share this [site] over here; for every other principal 
food service is in their building.  They have a lot more input into how things are locked 
up and who goes in and who doesn’t and everything so I would say that other people in 
this district feel that they have more control than I do.  
  Theme four: Conflicting priorities and expectations influence security.  School 
security was a high priority issue among participants of this study.  School security is a key 
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concern for maintaining food defense, but school administrators in this study had not made than 
connection.  Often food defense was compromised due to conflicting priorities.  This theme of 
conflicting priorities and expectations was divided into two sub-themes:  
 Security is designed to protect children, not food. 
 Community expectations can impede food defense.  
 Goal of security is to protect children, not food.  Four of the five administrators clearly 
identified that they were responsible for school security and the other stated that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs held that responsibility.  Three of the five included “everyone” as responsible for 
building security, recognizing that administrators alone cannot assure school security. 
 In all five districts, security practices and use of technology were targeted to locations 
where students could be found throughout the day.  One of the six school buildings visited had 
video surveillance.  Cameras were located in corridors, and in places where the exterior of the 
building could be monitored.  Three cameras were placed in the cafeteria area, where students 
were present during the school day, but no cameras were in the food production or loading dock 
areas.  The purposes of the cameras were deterrence or to provide evidence in the case of wrong 
doing.  The camera data was not reviewed or monitored unless an event had already happened.  
As the principal explained: 
First of all, the cameras are more meant for after the fact.  And it’s meant for security and 
it’s also, in the middle school, it’s used for student issues so there is nobody monitoring 
the cameras until there is an incident, then they go back and look at the tape.  So another 
way to do that is 24/7, monitor the cameras.  
 All school districts had policies that all exterior doors should be kept locked with the 
exception of a single entrance that was unlocked for all or part of the day.  The restrictions on the 
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main entrances varied widely among the five districts, with five of the seven buildings having no 
restrictions on entry during the school day, except for signs indicating all visitors must check in 
at the office.  The MS metropolitan district allowed the main entrance to be unlocked only at the 
beginning and end of the school day.  Between times the entrance was locked and visitors used 
an intercom system to alert the main office and request to be buzzed in.  Although security 
measures to prevent intruders were very tight at this school, areas necessary for food defense, 
such as the dry storeroom (including a chemical storage area), and the boiler room/ mechanical 
area were unlocked.  These areas were along a hallway leading out of the cafeteria.  They were 
accessible and not monitored by cameras or staff.  The MS suburban district had an employee 
assigned to a check-in station who issued badges to visitors during the entire school day.  
However, at the back of the building exterior doors near the kitchen and in the central warehouse 
area were unlocked at the time of the visit.  Both the principal and the health and safety 
consultant for this district acknowledged that this was a vulnerable area and plans were 
underway to tighten security in these areas.  
 Yet, the two foodservice operations in this study that were not attached to schools were in 
some ways less protected than the school buildings.  The kitchen manager of the freestanding 
dining/production facility stated that the main entrance doors to the dining area of the facility 
were unlocked during the day and she had no authority to lock them.  The principal of the 
elementary students who ate lunch in the dining facility expressed a need for restricted entry into 
the building:   
I think over here we have some kids who don’t go to school but probably eat lunch. 
They’ll cut class for the day, come back and eat lunch and then leave again.  . . . . So right 
now anybody can enter that building during lunch hour.  Now I think they lock it when 
there’s not supposed to be anybody over there eating. But the rest of time from 11 to 1 for 
sure, it’s unlocked and anyone can enter. 
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 Other security measures followed this pattern of protecting the students, but not the food 
that was served to them, although in the charter school served by the VL district’s central 
kitchen, a food defense measure also achieved a school security need.  Food was delivered from 
the central kitchen for service to the 750 students in the private school in two unlocked rolling 
cabinets.  The central kitchen had set a strict protocol for delivery of the cabinets: 
 Principal: The protocol is there’re supposed to unload what they’re going to bring in 
outside of the door and then shut the truck, open the door and bring that in and it’s all 
right within 10 feet of each other.  So when you think about simplicity standpoint.  This 
isn’t the simplest say but it’s the safety way.  Unload what you’re going to be bringing in, 
shut the truck, open the door and we’re all right here.  In a small space like this in terms 
of, here’s the back end of the truck, the doors are right here, open the doors, bring your 
shipment in, shut the doors. Bring it down. 
 
Interviewer:  So if there’re two carts, is one cart left unattended briefly while the other… 
 
Principal: We’d have to ask [name] on that but I would imagine so but you gotta, for me 
that wouldn’t concern me because now you’ve got it in the school. Unless somebody got 
into the school because people didn’t do their job.  That’s the only time I’d be concerned.  
 A third example demonstrates how spending for security measures is allocated away from 
buildings that do not house children during the day.  The central kitchen facility operated by the 
VL school district shared their building with two other departments and the central food and 
supply warehouse.  Loading docks at the front of the building served the central warehouse.  The 
area was fenced and the gate locked and deliveries had to be identified to be admitted.  In 
contrast, the central kitchen had a receiving area on the opposite side of the building with no 
fence surrounding it.  Although the need for better security in that area was identified, the 
funding for it was on hold because of security needs in school buildings.  The central kitchen 
facility was a lower priority because no children were there.  The FSD explained:  
School security is more important for students.  So what we can do is monitor, keep an 
eye on, do labs [microbiological tests], and do the best that we can.  Ultimately, when 
you think about it, the funding needs to go to the students in the individual schools.  
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 In one case the need to protect students was in direct conflict with the need to protect 
food and water supplies.  The school (MS district) with the greatest access control also had good 
control over access to the kitchen.  Other critical areas were less protected. The doors to the 
kitchen were kept closed at all times, which allowed the production workers to monitor that 
entry.  But the dry food storage area located across a hallway from these closed doors, was 
observed to be open and unlocked, most likely to allow convenient access.  The hallway began at 
the cafeteria, went past kitchen and store room, past the boiler room, the head custodian’s office 
and to the loading dock.  This hallway had three critical areas for maintaining food defense 
located along it; none of these areas was behind locked doors.  When asked why the doors from 
the cafeteria were not locked to limit access to the areas along the hallway, the principal 
explained that the hallway was one of five emergency exits.  In the event of a threat to children 
in the cafeteria area, the children were instructed to run to safety through this hallway, or one of 
the other four. 
 Community expectations play a part.  Because public schools are partially funded by 
local tax dollars, community stakeholders have influence over the use of school property.  As 
taxpayers, community groups may expect the right to use school kitchens for auxiliary purposes 
when school is not in session.  A FSD explained, “I think, overall, we’re doing the best that we 
can as a school district given that’s it’s a public facility and that our buildings are used by outside 
organizations too.”  When outside groups use kitchen facilities, the potential exists for 
intentional and unintentional contamination of the food stored in the kitchen and storerooms.  
Even though groups bring their own food into the kitchen, group leaders unfamiliar with the risks 
may allow opportunities for food tampering to occur.  Three of the five districts studied had 
board-level policies about the use of kitchen facilities by community groups, and one had a 
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department policy.  In one of the MS districts with such a policy, the requirement to have a 
foodservice employee present did not apply during the summer months.  The kitchen in one 
school district was used by the YMCA to feed children attending their summer youth programs:  
These programs were not under the oversight of the School Nutrition Program: 
 Interviewer: So they’ll have access to your kitchen in the summer. 
 Production worker:  Morning, noon, and night. So who’s going to be aware, if this is run     
 by the YMCA or something?  So it’s a very open door. 
 
The FSD in the small, rural district reported that school kitchens were used for funeral wakes.  
Even the central kitchen in the largest district was used for non-food production uses: the FSD 
explained that student groups were allowed on tours. 
 Community values can complicate efforts to maintain food defense.  In one medium size 
district, the FSD stated her belief that the community would be opposed to protecting food 
through the use of containers and packaging needed to wrap individual portions for service 
because of the waste that would be generated: 
Well the barrier is just ecology.  Ecology and cost.  So there’s a cost to all the disposable 
items we would use and there’s a huge concern for the community and the citizens in this 
area that we behave responsibility for the environment, so we try to be environmentally 
friendly and that means using the least disposable products. 
 Finally, the need for food defense may not fit with community’s self-identity.  
Community members may resist changes that improve building security.  As the security 
manager for a school in MS suburban district explained: 
 It’s actually been kind of a push to get this level of security to this point because we 
 suggested it in the past, again there’s financial things and that’s not how we operate 
 attitude. You know, small town and so just getting the outside door secured is a big step.  
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Risk Perception 
   All interviews included a series of 10 defined-answer items adapted from previous 
research on the psychometric paradigm of risk perception.  Items were adapted from studies of 
terrorism risk by Lee, Lemyre, & Krewski (2010) and Turvey, Onyango, Cuite, & Hallman 
(2010).  These studies included items that measured “dread risk” and “unknown risk”, the two 
axes in the psychometric paradigm of risk perception presented by Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein (1978).  An eleventh item was dropped from the interview guide after the first data 
collection site because all interviewees expressed confusion about the question’s meaning.  The 
item, “What level of uncertainty do you think there is, in general, about terrorism risks?” was the 
question that the authors (Lee, LeMyre, & Krewski, 2010) had recommended be interpreted with 
caution because responses to the item on their previously administered survey showed a high 
proportion of don’t know answers. 
 Table 5 shows the agreement to statements that contribute to unknown risk.  The majority 
of interviewees (76%) agreed that scientists were knowledgeable about intentional food  
contamination but disagreed that they personally knew a lot (64%).  The mean for the statement 
“when a food is deliberately contaminated safety inspectors can visibly see that it should not be 
consumed” was 1.5 indicating strong disagreement to the statement.  This result suggests the 
inability to see contaminants contributes to unknown risk.  
 Measures of the other axis of the psychometric  paradigm of risk perception, dread risk, 
are shown in Table 6.  Feelings of personal control over a risk reduce dread risk perception.  A 
low level of worry about a threat reduces dread risk; dread risk is also reduced if the threat or 
extent of risk is low. 
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Table 5 
 
Level of Agreement with Statements Measuring “Unknown Risk” Perception of Food Tampering 
and Terrorist Acts by School Principals (n = 5), FSDs (n = 5), Emergency Responders (n = 5), 
and Production Workers (n = 10) 
Measures of unknown risk n 
Strongly 
Disagree 
n (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
n (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
n (%) 
Strongly 
Agree 
n (%) 
 
M
a
 
(SD) 
Scientists know a lot about 
how terrorists could 
contaminate the food supply. 
23 0 (0%) 4 (16%) 11 (44%) 8 (32%) 
 
3.2 
(0.7) 
Food being contaminated is a 
new type of risk for me. 
24 7 (28%) - 7 (28%) 10 (44%) 
 
2.8 
(1.3) 
I know a lot about how 
terrorists could contaminate 
the food supply. 
24 7 (28%) 9 (36%) 6 (24%) 2 (8%) 
 
2.1 
(1.0) 
When a food is deliberately 
contaminated, safety 
inspectors can visibly see 
that it should not be 
consumed. 
25 18 (72%) 4 (16%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 
 
1.5 
(0.9) 
a
Rating scale: 1= strongly disagree , 2= somewhat disagree,  3= somewhat agree,  4=strongly 
agree. 
 
 The mean for personal control over food tampering (M  = 2.4) was greater than the means 
for worry or extent of risk, falling between slight and moderate.  The distribution of responses 
showed two modes with none and moderate each having 32% of the responses.  A breakdown of 
responses by position showed that a number of FSDs and production workers reported high 
personal control over food tampering, but no principals indicated higher than slight control over 
food tampering (Figure 1).  A breakdown by position showed that only those involved with the 
foodservice operation,  the production workers and FSDs, perceived a “high” risk of food 
tampering (Figure 2).  These results suggest that foodservice employees perceive a higher threat 
of food tampering than other respondents, but also feel more empowered to control the risk.   
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Table 6 
 
Level of Perceived Risk, Worry, and Personal Control in Relation to Food Tampering and 
Terrorist Acts Against the Food Supply of School Principals (n = 5), FSDs (n = 5), Emergency 
Responders (n = 5), and Production Workers (n =10) 
Measures of dread risk N 
Almost 
none 
 n (%) 
 
Slight 
n (%) 
 
Moderate 
n (%) 
 
High 
  n (%) 
 
M
a
 
(SD) 
How much personal control do you 
feel you have over food tampering? 
25 8 (32%) 4 (16%) 8 (32%) 5 (20%) 2.4 
(1.5) 
To what extent is food tampering a 
risk to your school foodservice 
operation? 
24 9 (36%) 9 (36%) 4 (16%) 2 (8%) 2.0 
(1.0) 
How much do you worry about food 
tampering? 
25 11 (44%) 7 (28%) 6 (24%) 1 (4%) 1.9 
(0.9) 
How much personal control do you 
feel you have over terrorism risks? 
25 12 (48%) 8 (32%) 4 (16%) 1 (4%) 1.8 
(0.9) 
How much do you worry about 
terrorism risks? 
25 11 (44%) 12 (48%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 1.7 
(0.8) 
To what extent is terrorism a risk to 
your school foodservice? 
22 11  (44%) 8 (32%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 1.7 
(0.8) 
Note.
. 
 Don’t  know responses were not included in analysis. a Rating scale: 1 = almost none, 2 = 
slight, 3 = moderate, 4 = high.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Level of Personal Control Over Food Tampering Perceived by School District 
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Figure 2. Level of Risk of Food Tampering Perceived by School District Personnel and 
Emergency Responders 
 
Phase Two: Regional Survey 
Description of Sample 
 An email message with a link to the survey was sent to the population of 1,531 school 
districts that participate in the federal Child Nutrition Program located in the seven states of the 
USDA Risk Management Agency’s Northern Compliance Region: Montana, Wyoming, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin.  Thirty messages were undeliverable 
and correct addresses could not be found, leaving a sample of 1,501 potential districts.  A total of 
556 responses was received, for a return rate of 37.0%.  Surveys were excluded from the sample 
if they included responses to one or zero items (n = 13), resulting in 543 usable surveys (36%).  
Table 7 shows numbers of surveys sent, returned surveys and response rates for each state in the 
region.   
 Of the 543 usable responses, 59 (10.9%) did not indicate a state.  Although state was not 
provided, responses were made to other survey items and included in reports and analyses of 
those data.  All of the 59 reported their title and data from this group were included in all 
analyses using position as a variable.  Almost all responded to the first (n = 53) and last (n = 58) 
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Table 7 
Number and Percentage Response Rates of Survey Responses by States in USDA-RMA Northern 
Compliance Region  
 
 
 
State 
 
 
 
Sent 
 
 
 
Rejected by district mail server 
 
 
Potential 
responses 
Responses    Response 
  received          rate 
n % 
Iowa 278 1 277 137 49.4 
Wisconsin 413 19 394 116 29.4 
Minnesota 324 6 318 86 27.0 
South Dakota 139 0 139 81 58.3 
Montana 160 2 158 29 18.4 
Wyoming 
North Dakota 
46 
171 
1 
1 
45 
170 
18 
17 
40.0 
10.0 
No state 
reported 
   59  
Unusable 
surveys 
   13  
Total 1,531 30 1,501 556 37 
Note. USDA-RMA = United States Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency 
in the series of risk perception questions and the data were included in results for these items.  
Almost all (n = 51, 86%) in the no-state group responded to the statement about implementing a 
food defense plan; of these eight (15.7%) indicated they had implemented a plan, a percentage 
slightly higher than the 14.5% reported by those also reporting a state.  Responses from the no-
state group fell in frequency for the 31 food defense practices, with 25 responses for the first of 
the series falling to eight responses for the last practice in the series.  Only one response from the 
no-state group was received for all operational and demographic items, suggesting that those 
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who did not indicate a state were reluctant to share other district characteristics.  Therefore, 
respondents who chose not to reveal their state were underrepresented in data about food defense 
practice implementation and analyses involving operational or demographic characteristics.  
 The majority of surveys came from the three most populous states in this seven-state 
sample: Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  While the greatest number of surveys received was 
from Iowa, the response rate from South Dakota was highest at 58.3%.  The overall response rate 
and individual state response rates for this survey were greater than those from previous surveys 
of FSDs researching food defense (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007; Yoon, 2007).  As part of a national 
study, Yoon (2007) mailed paper surveys to a sample of 50 FSDs from the population in the 
current study and received 16 responses; no responses were received from North Dakota, South 
Dakota, or Montana.  Therefore findings from this study will begin to fill a gap in knowledge 
about food defense practices in U.S. schools, particularly in rural districts and from states that 
border other countries.  Because almost 90% of responses (n = 481) were from individuals in the 
district FSD or unit manager categories, there is confidence that results of this study represent 
actual practices in public school districts’ school meals programs. 
 Demographics of the survey respondents are shown in Table 8.  Position title was one of 
the first items on the survey.  Because of the diversity of sizes of the school districts in this 
population, respondents were given a choice of eleven titles: district foodservice director, district 
foodservice manager, head cook, cook manager/kitchen manager, business manager, 
superintendent, principal, health coordinator, curriculum coordinator, administrative assistant, 
foodservice supervisor, and other.  Survey invitations requested that SFAs forward the survey to 
the individual in the district with day-to-day oversight of the school meals program.  Smaller 
districts might use a management model in which the SFA is the superintendent or another  
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Table 8 
Demographics of Survey Respondents (N = 543) 
Demographic n % 
State  
  Iowa 
  Wisconsin 
  Minnesota 
  South Dakota 
  Montana 
  Wyoming 
  North Dakota 
  Not reported 
 
137 
116 
86 
81 
29 
18 
17 
59 
 
25.2 
21.4 
15.8 
14.9 
5.3 
3.3 
3.1 
10.9 
Reported title 
    District  foodservice director 
    District administrator 
    Unit manager  
    Other/missing 
 
382 
46 
99 
16 
 
70.4 
8.5 
18.2 
3.0 
Reported Certified district 
enrollment, 2012 academic year 
       
      <2,500 
      2,501-5,000 
      5,001-7,500 
      7,501-10,000 
      10,001-20,000 
      >20,000 
      Not reported 
 
 
 
368 
50 
21 
10 
12 
12 
70 
 
 
 
67.8 
9.2 
3.9 
1.8 
2.2 
2.2 
13.4 
Child Nutrition Program 
administration 
  Self-operated 
  Outside contractor  
  Not reported 
 
 
439 
38 
66 
 
 
80.8 
7.0 
12.2 
Type of production system 
    Onsite kitchen 
    Centralized/commissary 
    Combination 
    Not reported 
 
295 
8 
179 
61 
 
54.3 
1.5 
33.0 
11.2 
Operated central warehouse 
facility  
    Yes 
     No 
     Not reported 
 
 
206 
266 
71 
 
 
37.9 
49.0 
13.1 
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administrator, with actual day to day operational supervisory responsibilities delegated to a 
production staff member.  It appears this model of child nutrition program administration is 
prevalent because 88.6% (n = 481) of respondents selected district foodservice director, district 
foodservice manager, head cook, or cook manager/kitchen manager.   
 To streamline presentation of the data, titles were grouped into three categories based on 
scope of authority.  District foodservice director and district foodservice manager were grouped 
together and labeled “district FSDs” (n = 382).  Superintendent, business manager, and principal 
were combined and termed “district administrator” (n = 46).  Cook manager/kitchen manager 
and head cook were combined and called “unit manager with production responsibilities” ( n = 
99).  “Other” included 14 titles in small quantities that did not fit these categories (e.g. Principal, 
Adminstrative Assistant, or Curriculum Coordinator; they were included with missing values (n 
= 2) for position title.  Only two respondents indicated title as Foodservice Supervisor.  Because 
it was unclear whether they were district-level or unit-level managers and the number was very  
small, they were included in the Other category.  Data from the Other category was included in 
all analyses except those that differentiated responses by title. 
 The majority (n = 368, 67.8%) of respondents were from school districts with 
enrollments of less than 2,500 students (Table 8).  Previous studies of food defense practices 
conducted with multi-state populations had sampled larger school districts: the 200 largest school 
districts in the U.S. with central kitchen operations (Story, Sneed, Oakley, & Stretch, 2007) and 
districts with enrollments over 7,500 (Yoon, 2007).  The current study included 34 responses 
(6.3%) from districts with enrollments greater than 7,500 students.  Thus, the results of this study 
give an indication of food defense attitudes and practices from school districts of all sizes, 
including some with enrollments among the lowest in the nation, and allow for comparisons 
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between smaller and larger districts’ food defense planning.  In addition, the sample in this study 
included districts in three states with national borders: North Dakota, Montana, and Minnesota.   
 The majority of responses were from self-operated child nutrition programs (80.8%, n = 
439).  Eight districts reported using only a centralized production system, while the majority of 
respondents indicated onsite kitchens were used (54.3%, n = 295).  Use of a central warehouse 
was reported by 206 districts (37.9% of all districts).  As with data regarding location by state, 
many respondents chose not to report district enrollment (13.4%, n = 70), program 
administration (12.2%, n = 66), type of operation (11.2%, n = 61), or use of a central warehouse 
(13.1%, n = 71).  It may be that respondents were fatigued by the time they reached the 
demographic items at the end of the survey.  The item requesting the demographic of title was 
one of the first items in the survey and was reported on all but 16 (3%) of the usable responses.  
Another possible reason for missing information related to school characteristics was a 
reluctance to share demographic information because of the sensitivity of the topic. 
 The median reported daily average number of reimbursable lunches was 600, with a 
median of 150 breakfast meals served; indicating that the sample included many programs in 
small districts.  The range of district sizes in this sample is illustrated in Table 9, with the 
smallest breakfast program serving an average of four students for breakfast and five students for 
lunch.  Although the minimum breakfast and lunch counts seem very small, it should be noted 
state agency offices confirmed these low numbers did exist in some districts.  Indeed, 10% of 
programs profiled in this study served an average of 30 or fewer breakfasts and there were five 
districts that reported serving an average of 25 students or less in the lunch program.   
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for Average Daily Reimbursable Meal Counts for Districts Reporting 
Participation 
 
State 
Lunch Breakfast 
n Median Min Max n Median Min Max 
Iowa 125 550 18 7,500 128 150 0 3,000 
Minnesota 82 850 110 30,000 82 250 0 20,000 
Montana 29 270 22 3,400 28 86 0 1,000 
North 
Dakota  
15 200 5 6,500 15 60 0 1,700 
South 
Dakota 
72 250 47 15,000 68 70 0 2,500 
Wisconsin 108 813 98 13,000 103 200 0 5,500 
Wyoming 18 575 155 7,000 18 125 0 2,000 
Meal 
counts not 
reported  
35    42    
State not 
reported 
59    59    
Total 543    543    
  
 By contrast, the largest program served 20,000 students for breakfast and 30,000 students 
for lunch.  Of the 449 districts that reported daily average lunch meals, there were only five 
districts that reported serving more than 10,000 reimbursable lunches per day; the 95
th
 percentile 
for average daily lunches served was 5,000 lunches.   
 The majority (54.3%, n = 295) of districts reported an onsite kitchen production system, 
defined in the survey as “all meals prepared and served in the same location”.  The next most 
frequently reported system was a combination  onsite/central /commissary system, defined for 
91 
respondents as “both centralized and onsite production systems are in place in the district where 
food is prepared and served in one location and meals or food items in bulk are sent to other 
locations for service”.  Eight districts reported a central production facility, defined as “a 
production facility that prepares food for service only at other sites; no meals or food is served 
onsite”.  Of these, five were districts with certified enrollments below 7,500 students, two were 
in large districts (7,500-20,000 students) and one was in a very large district with more than 
20,000 enrolled students.   
 Of the districts using onsite production (n = 295 ), 161 (55.3%) had one production 
kitchen, whereas 90% of districts had four or fewer kitchens (Table 10).  Eight districts had more 
than eight onsite kitchens; the greatest number of kitchens was 27.  Seven districts had more than 
eight combination production sites; the greatest number of production sites was 20.  A 
comparison of mean numbers of kitchens (excluding numbers >8) showed a significantly higher 
mean number of kitchen sites in combination districts compared to those with onsite systems; 
2.51 versus 2.13 respectively, t (467) = 2.00, p = .0458).  These findings illustrate potential threat 
to protection of food when food is prepared at one site and transported to another as an additional 
food chain link, delivery of prepared food, is introduced. 
 A small number of responding districts (n = 8) used a central/commissary system.  This 
group was 1.5% of the sample but provided 5.2% (30,332) of the average total 583,308 lunches 
reported as served by all respondents each day.  These central/commissary districts had a range 
of service sites from one to between 12 and 48 (Table 11).  Service sites include those as part of 
districts’ school nutrition programs and sites not part of the district programs, such as day care 
centers.  Interestingly, the greatest number of in-district service sites (n = 65) was reported by a 
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district using a combination production system.  Central/commissary production was used in 
both the smallest and the largest districts responding to the survey.   
Table 10 
Reported Number of Production Kitchens by Districts with Onsite and Combination Production 
Systems 
 
Number of 
kitchens 
Onsite Districts 
 
Combination Districts 
 
n % n % 
     
1 161 54.6 74 41.8 
2 55 18.6 45 25.4 
3 31 10.5 24 13.6 
4 17 5.8 8 4.5 
5 7 2.4 8 4.5 
6 6 2.0 5 2.8 
7 3 1.0 4 2.3 
8 3 1.0 2 1.1 
>8 8 2.7 7 4.0 
Not reported 4 1.4 2 1.1 
     
Total 295 100.0 179 100.0 
M (SD) 2.13 (1.85)    2.51* (2.06)  
*p = .0458 
 Vulnerability to intentional contamination of food increases when food is transported to 
sites away from the place of production, which occurs with a central or commissary production 
system.  The impact of an act of food tampering is greatest when food is prepared in bulk and 
then divided or portioned and sent to district or community sites for service.  Of those districts 
using a combination production system, 25.2% sent food out for service to six or more sites 
within the school district (Table 11).  In addition, districts of all production types (onsite, 
combination, and central/commissary) made use of production capacity to provide meals to 
clients of community agencies such as children at day care or senior citizens at congregate meal 
dining sites, expanding the potential impact of food contamination (Table 12).   
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Table 11 
 
Enrollment Levels of School Districts According to Type of Production System Employed and 
Type of Service Sites Reported 
 
 
Production system 
Onsite 
 
Central/commissary 
 
Combination 
 
n %
a
 n %
 a
 n %
 a
 
Enrollment 
<2,500 
 
256 
 
86.8 
 
3 
 
37.5 
 
106 
 
59.2 
2,501-5,000 15 5.1 1 12.5 34 19.0 
5,001-7,500 4 1.4 1 12.5 16 8.9 
7,501-10,000 3 1.0 2 25.0 5 2.8 
10,001-20,000 3 1.0 0 - 9 5.0 
>20,000 7 2.4 1 12.5 4 2.2 
Not reported 7 2.4 0 - 5 2.8 
Total 295 100.0 8 100.0 179 100.0 
       
Number of service sites       
In-district       
1   2 25.0 30 16.8 
2 
3 
  1 
0 
12.5 
- 
43 
25 
24.0 
14.0 
4   0 - 18 10.1 
5   0 - 13 7.3 
6-8 
9-12 
  1 
2 
12.5 
25.0 
27 
8 
15.1 
4.5 
12-48   2 25.0 10 5.6 
65   0 - 1 <1.0 
Not reported   0 - 4 10.1 
Total   8 100.0 170 100.0 
       
Non-district   n % n % 
1   2 25.0 45 25.1 
2   0  14 7.8 
3   0  6 3.4 
4   1 12.5 2 1.1 
5   0  3 1.7 
>8   2 25.0 19 10.7 
Not reported   3 37.5 90 50.3 
Total   8 100.0 179 100.0 
Note. Type of production system was not reported by 61 respondents. 
a
 Percent shown is percent of respondents reporting type of production system 
 
94 
Table 12 
Number of Respondents Reporting Types of Non-District Sites Served by Child Nutrition 
Programs Using Different Production Systems (n= 156) 
 
 Table 13 presents data from three survey items pertaining to crisis management planning. 
Within the past decade, crisis management planning by school districts has increased in 
importance.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 published on February 28, 2003, 
mandated implementation of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to establish a 
“single, comprehensive approach” for responding to all manner of emergencies and disasters 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003).  All K-12 districts that received federal grants to 
improve emergency preparedness were required to implement NIMS, with all others encouraged 
to do so.  Preparing an all-hazard emergency operations plan is a key activity in implementing 
NIMS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.).  Planning for NIMS has increased in scope 
and detail since 2003.  In 2010 the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of 
Education published the Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan defining 
expectations for K-12 and higher education schools in emergency management (U.S. Department 
 Onsite  Central  Combination  
Day care centers 
 
20 2 33 
Special schools 
 
15 2 25 
Community centers 
 
2 1 1 
Preschools 
 
9 0 11 
Senior citizen dining sites 
 
3 0 1 
Private schools 
 
3 0 5 
Other public schools 
 
4 1 1 
Total 56 6 77 
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of Homeland Security & U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  This report identified an all-
hazards comprehensive emergency management plan as the most important risk mitigation 
activity for these sectors.  All survey respondents in the current study were asked whether their 
districts had a crisis management plan.  Many of the respondents, such as head cooks and kitchen 
managers, may have limited authority within their districts and thus are not involved in 
developing crisis management plans; responses were indicative of how well the plans have been 
communicated throughout districts, particularly to child nutrition program staff. 
 Table 13 shows that more than half (59.2%, n = 226) of all district FSDs and 78.3% (n = 
36) of district administrators believed their districts had crisis management plans.  Few district 
FSDs (4.2%, n = 16) responded their districts did not have plans; many more didn’t know or 
chose not to answer the question (36.6%, n = 140).  A small percentage of district FSDs (10.2%, 
n = 39) reported inclusion of a food tampering incident in their district’s crisis management plan, 
but curiously, only one (2.2%) district administrator did so.  Half (50.5%) of district FSDs did 
not know if food tampering was included in the plan, compared to 8.7% (n = 4) of district 
administrators.  District FSDs most frequently reported they were not included in crisis 
management planning (41.4%, n = 158).  Results from this regional survey support findings from 
a key theme identified in Phase One of this study (the qualitative phase), that the foodservice 
department is considered separate from other district operational units and frequently not 
included in emergency response planning.   
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Table 13 
District FSDs’ and Administrators’ Reported Involvement in District Crisis Management 
Planning and Security Policy Development  
 
 
 
Survey item 
District FSDs District Administrators
a
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Don’t 
know 
Not 
reported 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Don’t 
know 
Not 
reported 
Does your district have a crisis 
management plan?  
226 
(59.2) 
16 
(4.2) 
104 
(27.2) 
36 
(9.4) 
36 
(78.3) 
2 
(4.4) 
0 
- 
8 
(17.4) 
 Is a food tampering scenario 
included in the crisis 
management plan? 
  
39 
(10.2) 
107 
(28.0) 
193 
(50.5) 
43 
(11.3) 
1 
(2.2) 
33 
(71.7) 
4 
(8.7) 
8 
(17.4) 
Were any school foodservice 
managers included in district 
crisis management planning?  
60 
(15.7) 
158 
(41.4) 
112 
(29.3) 
52 
(13.6) 
10 
(21.7) 
18 
(39.1) 
9 
(19.6) 
9 
(19.6) 
Note. Percentages shown in parentheses.
. a 
Includes 32 superintendents and 14 business 
managers. 
 Table 14 shows that most, but not all, district FSDs (those with titles of District 
Foodservice Director [n = 322] or District Foodservice Manager [n = 60]) reported ability to 
influence foodservice department policies regarding building (75.1%, n = 287) and utility 
security (61.8%, n = 236).  Influence over board level policies was significantly lower than for 
foodservice department policies (p < .001 for both utility and security policies).  More district 
FSDs reported influence regarding changes in district (board level) building security policy than 
district utility security policies (44.8% compared to 34.2%; p = .003).  
 District administrators (superintendents and business managers) reported a greater 
frequency of influence over board level building and utility security policies.  Surprisingly, they 
also reported a greater frequency of influence over foodservice department utility policies than 
reported by the district FSDs (73.9% compared to 61.8%, p = .006).  These findings supported 
the span of control by district FSDs as limited to food production activities.  These findings 
suggest that both district FSDs and district administrators may perceive that responsibility 
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Table 14 
Reported Influence of District-Level Administrators on Policies Related to Building and Utility 
Security  
 
 
In your position can you influence 
changes in: 
District  FSDs 
(N = 382) 
District administrators 
(N = 46) 
Yes No 
 
Not 
reported 
Yes No Not 
reported 
Foodservice department policy regarding 
building security? 
287 
(75.1) 
53 
(13.9) 
42 
(11.0) 
33 
(71.7) 
4 
(8.7) 
9 
(20.0) 
District policy (board level) regarding 
building security? 
 
171 
(44.8) 
162 
(42.4) 
49 
(12.8) 
35 
(76.1) 
2 
(4.4) 
9 
(20.0) 
Foodservice department policy regarding 
utility security? 
 
236 
(61.8) 
97 
(25.4) 
49 
(12.8) 
34 
(73.9) 
3 
(6.5) 
9 
(20.0) 
District policy (board level) regarding 
utility security? 
131 
(34.2) 
197 
(51.6) 
54 
(14.1) 
34 
(74.0) 
4 
(8.7) 
8 
(17.4) 
Note. Percentages shown in parentheses. 
for utility security is not related to the foodservice operation.  Authority over utility security 
policies in the foodservice operation in some school districts may be poorly defined.  While 
district security policies may have been implemented to protect students from harm when in 
attendance at school, many of the measures will also protect from intentional food contamination 
if they are enforced at times when students are not present.  
 Findings from this study reflect a need for district administrators and district foodservice 
administrators to discuss and clarify security steps and responsibilities to protect students from 
physical harm from direct and indirect threats.  The vision statement for the Education Facilities 
Sector-Specific Plan of 2010 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security & U.S. Department of 
Education, 2010) included developing, practicing, and updating plans in collaboration with first 
responders, community members, and pertinent state and local partners.  Although foodservice 
administrators were not specified in this list of stakeholders the vision statement specified the 
need for a food defense plan that includes prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
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recovery for all food preparation, storage, and delivery facilities.  It is important that district 
FSDs be aware of this vision and request to be involved in planning as a means to ensure student 
protection.  The segregation of child nutrition programs from district security planning is a 
concern. An integrative approach to prevention controls for all threats presented to students is 
needed, regardless of whether programs within the district have local, state, or federal oversight.   
 In this study, food defense plans were reported to be implemented in 79 (14.5%) of 543 
responding districts.  Of these, 26.5% (n = 21) had implemented the plan more than 5 years ago, 
60.8% (n = 48) within the past 2-5 years, and 13% (n = 10) within the last year.  Laws passed 
shortly after the terrorist acts of 9-11-01 led to new requirements and a new awareness of the 
need to protect the food supply.  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act (2002) made resources available for food defense, although most were directed 
toward imported foods and domestic producers, packers, and processors.  Child Nutrition 
Program procurement rules (Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act, 2004)) require the 
use of domestic foods to the extent possible; exceptions are allowed for foods not produced in 
the United States, such as bananas.  Thus, there are some controls inherent in the program as part 
of food procurement.   
 The Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act (2004) required school nutrition 
programs to adopt a hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) approach to food safety.  
Although food defense is not explicitly included as part of HACCP, the fundamental step of 
identification of physical, biological, and chemical hazards to food does invite inclusion of 
action steps to thwart intentional food sabotage.  Existing food defense plans were reported to 
have been updated within the last year in 40.5% (n = 32) of the 79 districts.  The small percent of 
districts acknowledging the presence of a food defense plan, even one embedded within a district 
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food safety HACCP plan or a district crisis management plan, is a concern.  However, while it is 
possible food defense controls are woven into the district’s HACCP plan, findings from this 
study suggest further training is needed within districts to allow for full integration of action 
steps to mitigate all types of threats.  
  A test of independence using Fisher’s Exact Test  showed that frequency of 
implementation of a food defense plan did not differ between states (n = 477, p = .804).  
Location, in a state that shared a border with Canada, also showed no relation to reported 
implementation of a food defense plan Χ2 (1, n = 477) = .586, p = .444).  School districts in 
border states were not more likely to have food defense plans than those in states in the interior 
United States (Table 15). 
 Chi-squared test of independence were performed to examine where relationships existed 
between operational and demographic variables and implementation of a food defense plan 
(Table 15).  Although large enrollments mean larger numbers of students might be affected by a 
food tampering incident, districts with enrollment >7,500 students were not more likely to 
implement a food defense plan (p = .887).  Transportation of food between production and 
service sites may potentially introduce opportunities for food tampering, but districts using a 
central kitchen or a combination onsite/commissary production system had no difference in 
frequency of implementation of a food defense plan compared to districts using an onsite 
production system (p = .135).  Use of a central warehouse system where large quantitites of food 
are held also introduces opportunities for food tampering, but school districts having a central 
warehouse were not more likely to have a food defense plan (p = .897).  Finally, FSDs who 
reported influence on district-level building security or utility policies were not more likely to  
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Table 15 
Reported percentage of districts implementing  a Food Defense Plan by Reported 
Characteristics of School District Foodservice Operations  
 
Variable 
 
food 
defense 
plan, 
% 
no 
food 
defense 
plan, 
% 
N df X
2
 p 
District located in a border state (Minnesota, 
North Dakota, or Montana) 
 
16.9 83.1 477 1 .5861 .444 
District enrollment  >7,500 students 15.5 84.9 468 1 .0202 .887 
Use of central or commissary production 
system 
 
18.0 82.0 475 1 2.2291 .135 
Operation of a central warehouse facility 14.8 85.2 466 1 .0167 .897 
District FSD involved in district crisis 
management planning 
 
36.7 63.3 298 1 18.1334 <.001 
District crisis management plan reported to 
include a food tampering scenario 
 
45.1 54.9 213 1 28.825 <.001 
District FSD received training about food 
defense 
 
31.3 68.7 335 1 20.347 <.001 
District FSD  reported influence on district 
building security policies 
 
17.3 82.7 328 1 .3095 .578 
District FSD reported  influence on district 
utility policies 
17.2 82.8 451 1 .1064 .744 
Note. A total of 79 respondents reported having a food defense plan.   Don’t know responses 
were not included in analysis. p < .05 denotes a statistically significant relationship between 
variables 
 
implement a food defense plan (p = .578 and p = .744, respectively).  These results suggest that 
districts in which food tampering would affect the largest number of children do not have a 
greater frequency of implementing a food defense plan compared to counterpart districts. 
 Reports of food defense plan implementation were more likely when the FSD reported 
involvement in district crisis management planning (p <.001), and when the crisis management 
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plan included a food tampering scenario (p  <.001).  The communication between FSD, 
administrators, and emergency responders required during the planning processes may reduce 
barriers to food defense planning.  Alternately, FSDs concerned about food defense may ask to 
be involved in broader risk management activities.   
 Finally, food defense plan implementation was more likely if the district FSD reported 
having received training about food defense (p <.001).  This result suggests that an increase in 
food defense training may lead to implementation of food defense plans by more districts. 
Characteristics of successful training programs are a topic for future research.  
 Each respondent was asked to rate level of agreement to the statement “I plan to develop 
and implement a food defense plan in my foodservice operation.”  The results, by reported title, 
are shown in Table 16.  District FSDs reported a mean of 3.0 (somewhat agree) on a 4-point 
Likert scale with 4 = strongly agree, compared to district administrators’ reported mean of 2.6 
(between disagree and somewhat agree), suggesting greater awareness for foodservice 
administration about the need for such a plan.  Unit managers, who are likely to have less 
responsibility for policy planning, had a lower mean than that of FSDs, but greater than levels of 
agreement by district administrators.   
 This survey was implemented in the middle of the 2012-2013 school year, during a time 
when SFAs were adjusting to major changes in regulations resulting from the Healthy Hunger-
free Kids Act of 2010.  Enthusiasm for a new initiative may have been low, contributing to the 
results.  These results suggest that district administrators are less likely to initiate food defense 
planning than are FSDs, supporting a theme found in Phase One that foodservice operations 
appear to be a “silo” entity within district operations and anything pertaining to foodservice is 
directly handled by FSDs.  Yoon (2007) included this item in her survey of FSDs from districts 
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with >7,500 students and found a mean between somewhat agree and agree (M = 5.44 on a 7-
point scale).  Her study did not report the number of respondents who already had a food defense 
plan and it is unclear whether those who had a plan responded to the statement. 
Table 16 
 
Levels of Agreement to the Statement “I will develop and implement a food defense management 
plan in my operation.” by Reported Title of Survey Respondents (n =527)  
 
 
Title 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Agree 
somewhat 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Not 
reported
a
 
M
b
 
(SD) 
District  FSDs 
(n = 382) 
 
3 
(<1.0) 
50 
(13.1) 
156 
(40.8) 
42 
(11.0) 
3 
(<1.0) 
128 
(33.5) 
3.03 
(0.68) 
District 
administrators 
(n= 46) 
 
0 
(-) 
4 
(8.7) 
17 
(37.0) 
12 
(26.1) 
3 
(6.5) 
10 
(21.7) 
2.61 
(0.80) 
Unit 
managers 
(n= 99) 
2 
(2.0) 
11 
(11.1) 
30 
(30.3) 
21 
(21.1) 
1 
(1.0) 
34 
(34.4) 
2.87 
(0.82) 
Note: Two respondents did not report a title and 14 respondents reported a title not 
corresponding to these catergories; their responses are not included.  Percentages shown in 
parentheses.  
a
 Not included in computing the mean.  
b
Rating scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = 
disagree, 3 = agree somewhat, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
 
Risk Perception 
 Slovic’s (1987) psychometric paradigm for risk perception consisted of four quadrants 
centered on two factors: unknown risk and dread risk.  Table 17 shows responses to four items 
measuring unknown risk.  The internal consistency of these items, as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha, was low (=.1806), indicating these items may not be an effective measure of this 
construct (Table 17).  Alpha values were not reported in the study from which the items were 
adapted (Lee, Lemyre, & Krewski, 2010).   
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Table 17 
Frequencies of Level of Agreement to Statements Measuring “Unknown Risk” Perception of 
Food Tampering and Terrorist Acts by Survey Respondents (N=543) 
 
Measures of unknown 
risk 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
Some-
what 
disagree 
 
Some-
what 
agree 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Don’t 
know
a
 
 
 
Not 
Reported 
 
 
M
a
 
(SD) 
Scientists know a lot about 
how terrorists could 
contaminate the food supply  
 
16 
(2.95) 
56 
(10.31) 
258 
(47.51) 
129 
(23.76) 
75 
(13.8) 
9 
(1.66) 
3.08 
(0.73) 
Food being contaminated is 
a new type of risk for me
b
  
 
60 
(11.05) 
90 
(16.57) 
197 
(36.28) 
166 
(30.57) 
25 
(4.6) 
5 
(<1.0) 
2.91 
(0.98) 
I know a lot about how 
terrorists could contaminate 
the food supply  
 
217 
(39.96) 
131 
(24.13) 
98 
(18.05) 
12 
(2.21) 
78 
(14.4) 
7 
(1.29) 
1.79 
(0.91) 
When a food is deliberately 
contaminated, safety 
inspectors can visibly see 
that it should not be 
consumed
 .
 
366 
(67.40) 
70 
(12.89) 
30 
(5.52) 
39 
(7.18) 
31 
(5.7) 
7 
(1.29) 
1.49 
(0.91) 
 
Note.
  Don’t know responses were not included when computing means and standard deviations.  Percentages shown 
in parentheses.  
a
Rating scale:
 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = strongly 
agree. 
 
The small number of items also may have contributed to the low alpha value.  Given these 
limitations, mean ratings of agreement (Table 17) for the items show strong disagreement (M = 
1.49 on a 4-point scale) that food contaminants can be visibly detected, but some agreement that 
intentional food contamination is a new risk to the respondent (M = 2.91).  There was some 
agreement (M = 3.08) that scientists know a lot about intentional contamination, but some 
disagreement that the respondents themselves knew a lot about the topic (M = 1.79).  These 
results suggest that the inability to see that food is contaminated is the greatest contributor to 
unknown risk. 
 When results for unknown risk items were analyzed by position title, there were no 
significant differences between responses of district FSDs, district administrators, or unit 
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managers for three of the four items (Table 18).  The mean for district FSDs’ level of agreement 
to the statement “I know a lot about how terrorists could contaminate the food supply” was 
significantly different from that of district administrators, F(2, 442) = 5.99, p  = .003).   
Table 18 
 
Comparisons of Measures of Unknown Risk of Terrorism and Food Tampering Among District 
Administrators, District FSDs, and Unit Managers. 
 
Measure of unknown risk 
 
District  FSDs 
(N = 382) 
District 
administrators 
(N = 46) 
 
Unit managers 
(N = 99) 
n M
b
 SD n M SD n M SD 
Scientists know a lot about how terrorists 
could contaminate the food supply  
332 3.07 0.75 34 3.21 0.73 80 3.08 0.71 
Food being contaminated is a new type of 
risk for me
a 
363 2.93 0.95 33 2.66 1.17 93 2.88 1.01 
I know a lot about how terrorists could 
contaminate the food supply 
329 1.88a 0.89 33 1.42a 0.75 83 1.63 0.76 
When a food is deliberately contaminated, 
safety inspectors can visibly see that it 
should not be consumed
  
361 1.43 0.86 38 1.45 0.89 92 1.68 1.06 
Note:  Don’t know responses were not used when computing mean and standard deviation. 
  
a
 Statistically different at p<.05.  
b
Rating scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 
= somewhat agree, 4 = strongly agree. 
 
 Measures of the second risk perception factor, dread risk, are shown in Table 19.  
Nunnally recommended a minimum alpha of 0.70 for early stages of research (cited in Streiner, 
2003).  The six items measuring dread risk exceeded this level (α=.7508), suggesting an 
acceptable degree of reliability for these items for initial research.  The six dread risk items were 
adapted from a study about risk perception by Lee, LeMyre, and Krewski (2010) with “food 
tampering” and “terrorism” replacing the risks of climate change, cell phones, and recreational 
activity specified in their study.  Reverse coding was used to compute means for two items 
measuring perception of personal control over terrorism and food tampering because a high 
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value for personal control would decrease risk perception whereas a high value for worry or 
risk(threat) would increase overall risk perception.   
Table 19 
 
Respondents’ Reported Level of Perceived Risk, Worry, and Personal Control in Relation to 
Food Tampering and Terrorism  
 
Measures of dread risk 
Almost 
none
a
 
 
 
Slight 
 
 
Moderate 
 
 
High 
 
Don’t 
know
a
 
 
No 
response 
 
M
a 
(SD) 
To what extent is terrorism a 
risk to your school 
foodservice? 
 
218 
(40.15) 
187 
(34.44) 
43 
(7.92) 
14 
(2.58) 
78 
(14.36) 
3 
(<1.0) 
1.68 
(0.77) 
To what extent is food 
tampering a risk to your 
school foodservice 
operation?  
 
245 
(45.12) 
198 
(36.46) 
54 
(9.94) 
16 
(2.95) 
28 
(5.16) 
2 
(<1.0) 
1.69 
(0.78) 
How much do you worry 
about terrorism risks?  
277 
(51.01) 
179 
(32.97) 
56 
(10.31) 
12 
(2.21) 
16 
(2.95) 
3 
(<1.0) 
1.62 
(0.77) 
How much do you worry 
about food tampering?  
 
249 
(45.86) 
183 
(33.70) 
84 
(15.47) 
9 
(1.66) 
9 
(1.66) 
9 
(1.66) 
1.72 
(0.79) 
How much personal control 
do you feel you have over 
terrorism risks? 
 
134 
(24.68) 
128 
(23.68) 
173 
(31.86) 
54 
(9.94) 
50 
(9.21) 
4 
(<1.0) 
2.30 
(1.00) 
How much personal control 
do you feel you have over 
food tampering? 
 
53 
(9.76) 
109 
(20.07) 
240 
(44.20) 
122 
(22.47) 
18 
(3.31) 
1 
(<1.0) 
2.82 
(0.90) 
Overall       1.93 
(0.58) 
Note. Percentages are shown in parentheses.  Don’t know responses were not used when computing mean and 
standard deviation.  
b
 Reverse coding used to compute the overall mean. 
a
 Rating scale: 1 = almost none, 2 = slight, 3 
= moderate, 4 = high.   
  
 An overall mean of 1.93 was found for the six items related to dread risk with items 
negatively expressed reverse coded (Table 19).  Level of worry about food tampering was 
significantly higher than worry about terrorism (p = .046), but means for both were between 
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almost none and slight, ratings of 1 and 2 on the 4-point scale with 4 = high.  The items assessing 
feelings of personal control over terrorism (M = 2.30) and feelings of personal control over food 
tampering (M = 2.82 had the highest mean values among the dread risk items, between slight and 
moderate.  Because these items were worded negatively compared to the others, the higher 
means contribute to lower levels of dread risk.   
 Respondents perceived significantly more personal control over food tampering than over 
terrorism (p < .001).  The means for risk of terrorism (M = 1.68) or food tampering (M = 1.69) to 
the operation were not significantly different (p = .286) and represented ratings between almost 
none and slight, ratings of 1 and 2 on the 4-point scale.   
 An analysis of variance showed that position title had significant effects on measures of 
dread risk (Table 20).  District FSDs reported greater worry about food tampering than unit 
managers, F(2, 506) = 23.58, p  < .001.  Perceived extent of threat of food tampering was higher 
for district FSDs than for unit managers, F(2, 495) = 17.98, p < .001).  Means for worry about 
terrorism and perceived extent of risk about terrorism followed the same pattern F (2, 445) = 
17.09, p < .001) and F(2, 445) = 15.93, p  < .001), respectively.  District FSDs also had 
significantly higher means for worry and perceived extent of risk of both food tampering and 
terrorism than district administrators, F (2, 506) = 23.58, p < .001) and F (2, 506) = 23.58, p < 
.001, respectively.  District FSDs reported greater personal control over food tampering 
compared to district administrators, F (2,523) = 12.43, p <.001.  District FSDs had a higher mean 
for personal control over terrorism than district administrators, but it was not different from the 
mean for unit managers F (2,520) = 3.54, p = .030.  These results indicate that district FSDs 
perceive more dread risk associated with food tampering and terrorism compared to district 
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administrators and unit managers, suggesting that they are in the best position to promote the 
cause of food defense in their districts. 
Table 20 
Comparisons of Measures of Dread Risk of Terrorism and Food Tampering Among District 
Administrators, District FSDs, and Unit Managers. 
 
 
Measure of dread risk 
 
District  FSDs 
(n = 382) 
District 
administrators 
(n= 46) 
 
Unit managers 
(n = 99) 
n M
ab
 SD n M
ab
 SD n M
ab
 SD 
To what extent is terrorism a risk to 
your school foodservice? 
330 1.81d 0.80 32 1.50 0.72 86 1.31d 0.56 
To what extent is food tampering a risk 
to your school foodservice operation?  
365 1.82d 0.80 38 1.61 0.75 95 1.29d 0.58 
How much do you worry about 
terrorism risks?  
370 1.75d 0.80 43 1.23d 0.48 95 1.36d 0.65 
How much do you worry about food 
tampering?  
371 1.87d 0.81 42 1.33d 0.61 96 1.35d 0.63 
How much personal control do you feel 
you have over terrorism risks?
c 
353 2.30 0.97 39 1.97 0.96 83 2.48 1.34 
How much personal control do you feel 
you have over food tampering?
c 
374 2.86d 0.82 42 2.26de 1.06 94 3.0e 0.99 
 Note. Titles for 16 respondents did not fit these categories. 
a
Rating scale: 1 = almost none, 2 = 
slight, 3 = moderate, 4 = high; 
b
 Don’t know responses were not used when computing mean and 
standard deviation; 
c
 Reverse coding used to compute the overall mean for each title group. 
d 
Statistically different at p < .05.  
e
 Statistically different at p < .05. 
 
 The means for worry and risk (perceived threat) were similar to those found in a national 
survey of 1,502 Canadians and reported in LeMyre, Turner, Lee, and Krewski (2006) and Lee, 
LeMyre, and Krewski (2010).  The 2006 study reported responses to three questions about the 
threat of terrorism.  The greatest mean of the three, for responses to “to what extent do you think 
that terrorism is a threat to Canadians in general?” was 2.56 on a 5-point scale, representing a 
value between a little and moderately.  Responses to “to what extent do you think terrorism is a 
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threat to you and your family?” and “to what extent do you currently worry about terrorism in 
Canada?” were lower, having means of 1.80 and 1.87, respectively, indicating a response  
between not at all and a little.  The 2010 study reported responses about perceived threat, 
perceived control, and worry having respective means of 1.77 (threat), 1.43 (control), and 1.92 
(worry) using the same 4-point scale presented in the current study.  All represent values 
between slight and none at all.  They compared these means with those of ratings for threat, 
personal control, and worry about motor vehicle use, climate change, recreational physical 
activity, and cell phones.  Compared to these results, the means for the perceived threat of 
terrorism and food tampering in the current study were lower than Canadians’ perceptions of 
threats posed by motor vehicles and climate change, and the same as the threat from recreational 
physical activity.  The extent of worry about terrorism in the Lee et al. study was the same as 
worry about recreational physical activity and lower than worry about climate change or use of 
motor vehicles.  In Lee et al. (2010), Canadians perceived greater personal control over motor 
vehicles, and surprisingly, over climate change compared to terrorism.  Strangely, perceived 
control over recreational physical activity was not significantly different from perceived control 
over terrorism.  Generalizing Lee’s results to the present study suggests that measures of dread 
risk for terrorism and food tampering are similar to those for recreational physical activity, and 
motor vehicle use, which are common and accepted activities.  This finding suggests there is a 
need for increased awareness among those with responsibility for ensuring the safety of food in 
child nutrition programs.  
 The timing of data collection in relation to violent events may have influenced risk 
perceptions of respondents in both the current study and Lee et al (2010).  The data for the study 
by Lee et al. (2010) was collected in 2004, when the effects of the 9-11-01 attacks and the 
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bombing of the London Underground in March 2004 were recent, but before the terrorist attack 
on trains in Madrid in 2005.  At the time of that survey, terrorist attacks in developed nations 
may have been perceived as novel and unlikely to happen again.  The data for the current study 
were collected at a time when no attacks on the U.S. or Europe had occurred for many years (the 
Boston City Marathon bombings of 2013 occurred just after the survey data was collected).  
Respondents’ concerns may have turned toward other risks, especially considering that the 2012 
shooting of 26 elementary school teachers and children in Newtown, Connecticut occurred just 
weeks before this survey was deployed.  District administrators turned their attention to 
restricting intruders from their schools and reviewed school crisis management plans with their 
staff.  Although the Newtown event heightened the security awareness of school staff, the horror 
of it may have caused food tampering risk to be perceived as less of a concern. 
 Lee et al. (2010) had a nationally representative sample that was 75% urban as defined by 
LeMyre et al. (2006) compared to the regional and rural population of the current study.  
Canada’s major urban centers are located farther east than the central U.S. population in the 
current study and geographic location may have influenced risk perceptions.  Fischoff, Gonzalez, 
Small, and Lerner (2003) found that the perceived risk of terrorism was decreased as distance 
from New York City increased; the results of the present study could be viewed as supporting 
those results. 
Implementation of Food Defense Best Practices 
 Food defense practices were grouped into four categories on the survey instrument (Table 
21).  The categories’ overall means were general food defense (3.97), utility security (2.76), 
facility security (3.87, with one negatively phrased item reverse coded), and communication 
(3.30).  The overall means for general food defense, facility security, and communication 
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represented responses between sometimes = 3 and most of the time = 4 on the 5-point scale with 
5= always, whereas the overall mean for utility security represented a frequency between rarely 
and sometimes.  Cronbach’s alpha for three of the four categories (general food defense, α = .72; 
facility security,  = .76; and communication, =.87 indicated acceptable reliability.  The facility 
security category had one reverse-coded item; reverse coding was used to compute alpha.  The 
alpha for utility security was .60 suggesting less reliability for this category. 
 Of particular interest are those items with the highest and lowest mean levels for 
frequency of practice.  More than half of the 31 listed food defense practices (n = 16, 52%) had 
reported means greater than 4.0, indicating the practice was implemented at least most of the 
time.  These results suggest that many food defense practices have become “mainstream” or 
routine, such as restricting access to the kitchen or keeping exterior doors locked.  Only six 
practices (19.4%) were reported as implemented less than some of the time.  Two of these 
practice statements began “our district . . .” and could be considered the responsibility of the 
school district: “our district follows a policy that all delivery trucks on the premises be locked 
when not being loaded or unloaded” and “our district performs criminal background checks on 
current employees at specified intervals” whereas the remaining four would typically be 
considered responsibility of the foodservice operation.  These findings again illustrate the theme 
of separateness of the child nutrition program within the district.  
 Of the total 31 practices, seven had a mean rating greater than 4.5 on the 5-point scale (5 
= always), indicating that the practice was very widespread in districts.  Two of these practices 
were reported as under district authority, including the practice with the highest mean frequency 
of implementation (M = 4.82): performing criminal background checks on all newly hired 
foodservice employees. 
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 Table 21 
Frequency of Implementation of Food Defense Practices Reported by School Districts  
General food defense practices ( α = .72) n M
 a
 SD 
Our employees inspect food packages prior to use for evidence of 
tampering. (Examples of evidence are a broken seal or discoloration 
of food inside a package). 
503 4.70 0.62 
A foodservice employee receives all food deliveries. 
 
506 4.57 0.75 
Our district performs criminal background checks on all newly hired 
foodservice employees. 
 
464 4.82 0.75 
Our district performs criminal background checks on current 
employees at specified intervals. 
 
317 2.30 1.56 
Our foodservice employees have been trained about detecting food 
tampering.  
 
457 3.53 1.40 
Our foodservice employees wear photo ID badges while at work. 
 
488 2.56 1.73 
Foodservice employees wear aprons or uniforms that are unique and 
not easily duplicated. 
 
496 3.30 1.67 
Our district keeps track of keys provided to employees.  
 
476 4.63 0.79 
Our district keeps track of identification badges provided to 
employees. 
400 3.39 1.73 
 
Our foodservice operation restricts visitor access to the food storage 
areas. 
501 4.23 1.11 
 
Our foodservice operation restricts visitor access to the food 
production areas. 
 
502 4.19 1.07 
Our foodservice employees are trained to use chemicals properly to 
prevent food contamination. 
499 4.73 0.72 
Overall category 
 
 
 
 
510 3.97
a
 0.62 
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Table 21, continued.    
Utility security (α = .60) n M
 a
 SD 
    
Our district restricts access to the central controls for utilities. 346 4.38 1.00 
Our district has procedures to follow if they suspect utility sources 
have been compromised. 
230 4.13 1.23 
Our foodservice operation periodically monitors drains and water 
lines in food production areas for possible tampering 
337 2.54 1.50 
Overall category 407 2.76 1.42 
Facility Security Practices (α = .76) n M
 a
 SD 
Our district follows a policy that all delivery trucks on the premises 
be locked when not being loaded or unloaded. 
295 2.39 1.65 
Our district controls access points into the foodservice facility with 
security hardware (e.g. cameras). 
460 3.52 1.65 
Our operation controls access to food products by unauthorized 
individuals. 
484 4.09 1.20 
Our foodservice operation controls access to all chemical storage by 
unauthorized individuals. 
449 4.02 1.24 
Our foodservice employees monitor food production areas to prevent 
someone from intentionally contaminating food during preparation. 
489 4.63 0.71 
Outside entrances to the foodservice operation are kept secure. 483 4.34 .98 
Outside refrigeration/storage units are kept secure. 377 4.65 0.83 
Our district allows the foodservice production area to be used for 
special events by outside groups.
c
 
489 3.14
c
 1.20 
Our district requires a foodservice staff member be present when the 
foodservice production area is used by outside groups. 
416 3.62 1.46 
Overall category 498 3.87 0.66 
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Table 21, cont. 
The FSD (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) 
communicates with district administrators about food safety issues. 
478 3.53 1.40 
The FSD (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) 
communicates with district administrators about food defense issues. 
471 3.14 1.51 
The FSD (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) 
communicates with community resource officers (including 
emergency responders) about food safety issues. 
438 2.38 1.48 
The FSD (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) 
communicates with community resource officers (including 
emergency responders) about food defense issues. 
430 2.24 1.45 
Overall category 491 3.30 1.08 
a 
Rating scale: 1= never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4= most of the time, 5= always. 
b
 Don’t know and not under my authority responses were not used when computing mean and 
standard deviation.  
c
Reverse coding used to compute the overall mean. 
 
The other district-controlled practice with a high frequency rating was “accounting for keys 
provided to employees” (M = 4.63).  The five other practices with means greater than 4.5 but 
reported as under authority of the foodservice department were: assigning foodservice personnel 
to receive deliveries (M = 4.57), training employees to use chemicals properly to prevent food 
contamination (M = 4.73), monitoring food production areas (M = 4.6), securing outside 
 
Communication practices (α = .87 ) n M
 a
 SD 
Foodservice staff knows what to do in the event of a food tampering 
incident. 
445 4.06 1.09 
A list of suppliers’ contact information is readily available to 
foodservice staff. 
475 4.22 1.18 
Expectations about food defense are included when negotiating 
contracts with vendors. 
342 3.28 1.53 
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refrigeration/storage units (M = 4.65), and inspecting packages for evidence of tampering (M = 
4.70).   
 These results support the findings by Yoon (2007) who reported mean ratings greater 
than 6.1 on a 7-point scale (indicating an average response between most of the time and always) 
for four items: inspection of packages for evidence of tampering, chemical storage and safe 
handling, background security checks for new hires, and requiring an authorized person to 
receive all foodservice orders.  The first phase of the current study found that school foodservice 
production workers associated food defense with checking packages for signs of tampering.  
Food safety training lessons have traditionally included inspection of food packaging as part of 
the content related to receiving practices, which is likely reflected in these results.   
  The high frequency of implementation of district policies requiring criminal background 
checks of newly hired employees and accountability for keys issued suggested a strong 
commitment to security practices that safeguard students and resources; district administrators 
may not understand that the practices serve the dual purpose of keeping food safe from 
intentional contamination.  Interestingly, district policy to perform criminal background checks 
on current employees at specified intervals had the next-to-lowest rating of all 31 practices (M = 
2.30) between rarely and sometimes.  The Department of Education for most states requires that 
criminal background checks be made of all new employees, but state policies do not require 
criminal background checks after point of hire.  Given that most of the districts in this study are 
small and rural, with all policing activity published in the local newspaper, administrators may 
perceive that criminal background checks on known employees are unnecessary.  This may also 
explain why the requirement to wear ID badges had among the lowest frequency of practice (M = 
2.56). 
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 Food defense practices related to chemical use and storage were also the most frequently 
implemented practices in Yoon and Shanklin’s (2007a) study of school FSDs in the state of 
Kansas.  Secure storage of chemicals and employee training about chemical use (combined) was 
ranked second in frequency of 12 defensive practices in Yoon’s (2007) national survey of FSDs 
in large districts (>7,500 students).  Storage and handling of chemicals is included in food safety 
training programs commonly used in school foodservice operations, but the focus has 
traditionally been to prevent accidental addition of chemicals to food.  Instruction about safe 
handling of chemicals should be expanded to include the importance of monitoring inventory of 
chemical supplies and reconciling departmental use with product on hand.  A recent food defense 
planning guide published by USDA (2012) elaborated on safe chemical use and storage for food 
defense, recommending that access to chemical storage areas be restricted, and monthly 
inventories be conducted and reviewed for unusual usage or loss of the chemicals.  
 At the other end of the frequency of practice scale were six items with mean scores below 
3.0 on the 5-point scale, placing them between sometimes and rarely implemented.  These items 
showed a greater distribution of answers than those having higher means, with a range of 
standard deviations from 1.45 to 1.74.  Unlike the items with reported highest frequency of 
practice, that were concentrated  in the general food defense and facility security categories, one 
or two of the measures practiced least frequently was found in each of the four categories.  The 
mean for “our district follows a policy that all delivery trucks on the premises be locked when 
not being loaded or unloaded” was 2.39 and had a low number of responses (n = 295, 54%).  The 
low number of responses, the low mean, and the large standard deviation (SD = 1.65) are three 
indicators that few districts recognize the potential for intentional contamination of food 
occurring even before it enters the building.  Vendors “own” the food until the delivery invoice 
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is signed, and it is the responsibility of the driver to maintain safe chain of custody from the 
warehouse to entry into the school building.  It is impossible to see the chain of custody, but one 
sign of diligence in food defense is a delivery truck that is kept locked when unattended. 
 The utility security category of practices had the lowest overall mean (M = 2.76) of the 
four categories.  The practice of  “our foodservice operation periodically monitors drains and 
water lines in food production areas for possible tampering” had a similar mean of 2.54 (337 
respondents).  Of the three practices in this group, two were worded as district-level practices 
(restricting access to central controls and having procedures to follow if compromise of utilities 
is suspected).  Of those who responded (n = 346 and 230, respectively), there was confidence 
that the district-level practices were implemented most of the time (M = 4.38, 4.13, respectively) 
in contrast to the low frequency rating for the foodservice department action of monitoring drains 
(M = 2.54).  This suggests the sample of school food authorities and FSDs in the current study 
are unsure of their authority or responsibility regarding maintaining safety of the water supply.  It 
is a district controlled utility, but is used by all departments, including foodservice, each day. 
 The communication category of practices had a mean of 3.30.  The two items with the 
highest implementation frequency in this category were “foodservice staff knows what to do in 
the event of a food tampering incident” (M= 4.06) and “a list of suppliers’ contact information is 
readily available to foodservice staff” (M = 4.22).  These items are examples of communication 
within the department, a sharing of information among the foodservice staff.  Discussions with 
suppliers about food defense expectations were reported as less frequent (M = 3.28).  The 
remaining four items in this category are indicators of communication that occurs between the 
department and school administrators, and between the department and emergency responders.  
These items were not included in previous research, but were added to the current study because 
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results from Phase One of this study suggested the foodservice operation was viewed as separate 
from other school district operations, which might imply a lack of communication about food 
safety and food defense with key stakeholders.  
 One role of the foodservice department leader is to communicate with district 
stakeholders about the child nutrition program on topics related to nutrition education, safe food 
production, and operations.  The National Food Service Management Institute (NFSMI) 
addresses communication roles in its publication of competencies, knowledge, and skills 
expected of district-level school nutrition professionals (NFSMI, n.d.).   Expectations for 
communication with emergency responders and community officials are focused on the potential 
need for schools to shelter-in-place students and employees, or to provide emergency food and 
shelter to the community.  “Networking with community disaster agencies” and having updated 
contact information are listed as advanced skills. 
 The means of reported frequency of practice in this study suggest that foodservice 
authorities are more likely to communicate about food safety (M = 3.53) than food defense (M = 
3.14).  The mean for foodservice authorities’ communications with school administrators about 
food defense represents a frequency between sometimes and most of the time; the mean for 
communication with emergency responders about food defense lies between rarely and 
sometimes, with 10.5% of respondents indicating that they never communicate with emergency 
responders about food safety and 36.5% reporting they never communicate with emergency 
responders about food defense.  This low reported frequency of communication with emergency 
responders may be a function of the school size or lack of the regular presence of an emergency 
responder.  Implementation of the communication category activities described in the USDABC 
in school foodservice operations has consistently been an area with low frequency of 
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implementation in previous research (Story, Sneed, Oakley, & Stretch, 2007; Yoon & Shanklin, 
2007a; Yoon, 2007).  However these studies looked at larger districts with more formal 
communication channels and FSDs with greater education, training, and experience. 
 Olds (2010) adapted Yoon and Shanklin’s (2007a) list of food defense practices to survey 
a national sample of 261 country club managers and found a group of five items pertaining to 
chemical use and storage had the highest mean reported frequency of practice (M = 4.35 on a 5-
point scale with 5 = all the time ). Within this group the highest mean was reported for “training 
employees to use chemicals properly to prevent accidental contamination of food and human 
exposure” (M = 4.7).  Another similarity with findings from this study was the low mean 
reported frequency for having a policy that trucks be locked when not being loaded or unloaded 
(M = 2.2). These findings show that among sectors of retail foodservices (specifically schools 
and country clubs), there are common best practices. 
Participation in Food Defense Training 
 Table 22 displays the percent of respondents from each state who reported some training 
on food defense.  A total of 117 (21.5%) respondents reported attending at least one training 
event that included content about food defense; 354 (65.2%) reported no food defense training 
and 72 (13.3%) did not respond.  One of the group of 117 who had been trained about food 
defense was trained before 2001, 11(9.4% of the 117) reported training during 2001-2004, but  
the majority (n = 52, 44.4% of the 117) of respondents received training between 2005 and 2009.  
From 2010 to the date of this survey in 2012, only 17 additional respondents were trained about 
food defense, indicating possible  decline in interest in this topic, perhaps due to other identified 
needs as a result of new regulations.   
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Table 22 
Frequency of Training about Food Defense Reported by State  
  
 
Minnesota 
 
 
Wyoming 
 
 
Iowa 
 
South 
Dakota 
 
 
Wisconsin 
 
 
Montana 
 
North 
Dakota 
State 
Not 
Reported 
 
Total 
Training 
reported 
28 
(32.6) 
5 
(27.8) 
37 
(27.0) 
18 
(22.2) 
22 
(18.9) 
5 
(17.2) 
1 
(5.9) 
1 
(1.7) 
117 
(21.5) 
Training 
not 
reported 
56 
(65.1) 
11 
(61.1) 
96 
(70.1) 
61 
(75.3) 
90 
(77.6) 
24 
(82.8) 
16 
(94.1) 
- 354 
(65.2) 
No 
response 
2 
(2.3) 
2 
(11.1) 
4 
(2.9) 
2 
(2.5) 
4 
(3.5) 
- - 58 
(98.3) 
72 
(13.3) 
Total 86 
 
18 
 
137 
 
81 
 
116 
 
29 
 
17 
 
59 
 
543 
 
Note: Percentages shown in parentheses. 
 
 Of the 117 who received training 87.2% (n = 102) were district FSDs and 12.0% (n = 14) 
were unit managers (Table 23).  One district administrator reported food defense training and 
reported training on more than one occasion.  A chi-square test of independence showed that 
those from districts with enrollments >7,500 were more likely to report food defense training   
 (2, 471) = 6.93, p = .031.  Respondents from districts with enrollments greater than or equal to 
7,500 had a higher frequency of receiving food defense training. 
 Yoon (2007) reported that 26.4 percent of school FSDs participating in her national 
survey had attended training about food defense.  Yoon’s results showed that the USDA-RMA 
Northern Compliance Region had the lowest percentage (7.3%, n = 31) of FSDs trained in food 
defense.  The present study found that 21.5% (n = 117) of respondents had been trained at least 
once about food defense while 5.7% (n = 31) had received training on more than one occasion, 
but these statistics included districts of all sizes.  Yoon’s study included only FSDs from districts 
with enrollments greater than 7,500, an audience more likely to have the resources to participate 
in professional development opportunities, whereas the present study included 
 
120 
Table 23 
Frequency of Food Defense Training by Position Title  
 
Position title 
Once More than once No training Not reported 
n % n % n % n % 
District FSD 77 20.2 25 6.5 238 62.3 42 11.0 
District 
Administrator 
0 - 1 2.2 37 80.4 8 17.4 
Unit Manager 9 9.1 5 5.1 65 65.7 20 20.2 
All respondents 86 15.8 31 5.7 354 65.2 72 13.3 
 
individuals with a variety of titles and from predominantly rural and very small school districts 
(enrollment less than 2,500 students).  Among districts in this study reporting enrollments   
>7,500 students, the prevalence of food defense training was 15.4% (n = 16).  These findings 
suggest that, despite increased training opportunities from Homeland Security and NFSMI, 
among others, there continued to be slight interest in the topic.  Major legislation in the last 
decade had a strong focus on preventing childhood obesity and associated new regulations may 
have taken the focus away from food safety and food defense concerns.  The Child Nutrition and 
WIC Authorization Act (2004) mandated new food safety requirements, but also required 
schools to implement comprehensive wellness policies.  The Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act of 
2010, the most recent reauthorization legislation, mandated significant changes in the menu-
planning requirements for reimbursable meals.  The new regulations for the lunch program under 
this act, implemented in 2012, created new demands on school nutrition programs and resulted in 
a need for training, leaving few resources for food defense planning.  
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 Wyoming, Iowa, and South Dakota were states with response rates above 40% that also 
showed a relatively high frequency of training.  These results could reflect a bias that 
respondents with prior food defense training would be more likely to complete the survey.  It is 
interesting to note that the prevalence of food defense training is not directly correlated with 
population, because less-populated states such as Wyoming and South Dakota had higher rates 
than the more populous states of Iowa and Wisconsin. 
 Wyoming and South Dakota have unique characteristics that may attract federal support 
for training, including food defense training.  Both states have higher percentages of Native 
Americans (5.5% for Wyoming, 8.9% for South Dakota) than the national average of 1.2% (U.S 
Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.) and are the locations for five of the 20 
most populous Indian reservations in the United States. (Norris, Vines, & Hoeffel, 2012).  
Poverty and crime rates on reservations are higher than U.S. averages in general, and are among 
the worst on three reservations in South Dakota and Wyoming (United States Department of the 
Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, n.d).  In view of these facts, the state agencies administering 
child nutrition programs in Wyoming and South Dakota may emphasize food defense in the 
training programs they offer.    
 Three states in the population, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Montana, share a land 
border with Canada comprising 1,402 miles or 35.1% of the Canada-United States border (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  Recently, the Department of Homeland 
Security reemphasized in Northern Border Strategy, the potential for terrorists to enter the 
United States as the greatest security threat associated with the northern border (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2012).  A manual count of the grants awarded by the U.S. Department of 
Education for emergency planning showed that between the years of 2003 to 2010, Iowa 
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received the most grants (n = 12), but the border states of Montana and Minnesota were awarded 
the next two highest number of grants to school districts among the states in the current study’s 
population, 11 and 8, respectively.  The remaining border state from this population, North 
Dakota was not awarded any grants for emergency planning.  The fewest number of respondents 
was from North Dakota (n = 17), as well as the fewest reporting food defense training (n = 1).   
 The lack of well-defined patterns suggests that multiple factors are involved in 
motivating SFAs to receive training in food defense.  Those who had received training were 
given an open-ended question asking for details about their training.  An open-ended approach 
was selected to elicit the widest variety of responses, but resulted in varying amounts of detail 
and 37 (43.0%) non-responses.  The responses to this item were manually coded for the sponsor 
of the training session, the length of the session, and the overall topic of the session and 
frequencies computed from the total of 49 responses.  Most responses did not include all of this 
information.  The percentage of those not reporting a sponsor was 38.8%, with 44.9% of 
responses not mentioning length or topic.  Those responding (n = 49) reported learning about 
food defense at training sessions sponsored by local (n = 6, 12.2%), state (n = 3, 6.1%), and 
federal agencies (n = 2, 4.1%).  A variety of other sponsors was mentioned: the NFSMI (n = 3, 
6.1%), colleges and universities (n = 8, 16.3%), vendors’ food shows (n = 3, 6.1%), and the 
School Nutrition Association or its state affiliates (n = 5, 10.2%).  Training about food defense 
was most often mentioned as part of HACCP (n = 8, 16.3%) or food safety (n = 5, 10.2%) 
training, but was also included as part of an emergency response planning workshops (n = 5, 
10.2%) with a focus on pandemic preparedness, multi-hazard emergency planning for schools, 
and preparedness for natural disasters.  Five (10.2%) respondents reported attending training 
events where food defense was the primary topic.  Training was reported as one to two hours in 
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duration (n = 13, 26.5%), 4 hours or half a day (n = 4, 8.2%), or between one and three days (n = 
5, 10.2%).  The diversity of these results revealed that food defense training is not being directed 
to FSDs in an intentional way.  The topic of food defense increased in each of the last three 
editions of the ServSafe® textbook to a length of  1-1/2 pages in the current sixth edition 
(National Restaurant Association, 2012); however not all school foodservice workers and 
administrators are required to obtain food safety training through ServSafe®.  
 
The NFSMI 
(2009) offers a program titled Serving It Safe, targeted to school employees.  Group training on 
Serving It Safe must be requested through the state agency administering the school nutrition 
program, the USDA Regional Office, or state affiliates of the School Nutrition Association with 
the possibility of complete funding through NFSMI.  Serving It Safe is also offered free of 
charge as an online course for individuals.  The Serving It Safe participant manual does not 
include content on food defense or food tampering, however the NFSMI document library offers 
two streaming videos about food tampering by a disgruntled employee (NFSMI, 2012a) or 
intentional contamination by an intruder (NFSMI, 2012b).
  
Although SFAs report learning about 
food defense at HACCP workshops, food defense is not included in the Guidance Document 
provided by USDA (USDA-FNS, 2005).  There is a need to add food defense learning outcomes 
to food safety and HACCP training materials targeted to school nutrition program employees. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study consisted of both qualitative and quantitative phases of data collection with 
the purpose of describing current levels of implementation of food defense practices in school 
districts in one region of the United States.  This chapter includes the summary of findings, 
conclusions, limitations of the study, and recommendations for further research. 
Summary of Findings 
Phase One: Multisite Case Study 
 A multi-site case study design included a convenience sample of five districts’ Child 
Nutrition Programs in the states of Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and South Dakota.  Sites were 
selected to ensure maximum variation of districts regarding: enrollment; setting (urban, rural, 
and suburban); production system; and FSD credentials.  In each district, meal production and 
service were observed using a structured document based on the Food Defense Checklist for 
Retail Foodservice Operations developed by the extension services of Iowa State University and 
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.  Interviews were conducted with the FSD, a principal, two 
production workers, and an emergency responder in each district about their knowledge of food 
defense, practices in their district or school, and their perceptions of the risk of terrorism and 
food tampering.  The focus of this phase was on food defense practices included in the 
Communication, Handling a Crisis, Foodservice/Food Preparation, and Water and Ice Supply 
sections of the USDABC.  
 Summary of observations.  Seven foodservice operations were observed during the five 
case study visits.  One central kitchen, a private school served by the central kitchen, and five 
onsite production facilities were observed.  Food preparation was observed at five of seven 
facilities visited, and lunch service, but no preparation, was observed at the remaining two sites.  
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Breakfast service was observed in four service sites and lunch service was observed in four sites.  
 One district had a food defense plan and a team of employees responsible for it.  
Emergency contact information was posted in the kitchen at one of seven sites.  The primary 
building entrance was locked at one site, monitored at one site, and unlocked at five sites.  
Unlocked exterior doors in proximity to the kitchen were observed in three sites.  One custodian 
and two delivery persons were observed in production areas in two sites; other than that no 
unauthorized persons were observed in production areas.   
 Employees at all sites were issued photo identification badges, but they were not worn at 
one site.  Employee lockers were observed or reported to be available at four sites, but were not 
being used at one site.  At other sites personal belongings were kept in managers’ offices or in 
the storeroom.  All self-service bars and serving lines were monitored by foodservice employees.  
Storage areas were locked at two sites in the same district, were unlocked in four sites, and not 
observed at one site.  Two of the unlocked storage areas were located in public areas.  Receiving 
entrances were observed at all sites, with unlocked doors observed at four sites.  Chemicals were 
stored away from food at all sites, but were in a locked cabinet in only one site. 
 Summary of interviews.  Twenty-five interviews were conducted with district 
stakeholders: FSD, principal, production workers, and emergency responders.  Four themes 
emerged from these interviews: 1) lack of awareness; 2) lack of concern; 3) food is not 
considered as a potential danger; and 4) conflicting priorities and expectations influence food 
defense.  
 Awareness.  Food defense was an unfamiliar concept among most of the stakeholder 
groups, but most notably among principals.  Principals confused food defense with the need for 
food and water supplies to shelter students during an emergency, or with the need to maintain a 
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safe environment in the school cafeteria.  Emergency responders with work-related experience 
involving food tampering had not transferred the threat of intentional food contamination to the 
school setting.  Production workers often related the concept of food defense to the need to check 
produce and food packaging for tampering, with several production workers identifying food 
safety training as their introduction to the concept of food defense.  Awareness of food defense 
was not related to size of school district or type of production system.   
 The four stakeholder groups each identified different areas of vulnerability to acts of 
intentional food contamination in their districts.  Principals expressed concern for preventing 
entry of intruders while FSDs perceived most vulnerable areas to be outside of the production 
area, such as on the loading dock or at a previous point in the supply chain.  Most of the 
production workers identified in-house operational steps outside of their control, such as serving 
lines, or policies and district culture regarding security measures as factors creating vulnerability 
to food tampering. 
 Lack of concern.  Responses to risk perception questions indicated a general lack of 
concern about terrorism and food tampering, with participants expressing beliefs that attacks on 
the food supply would occur in large cities, at nationally recognized locations, in other 
geographic locations such as the “east,” or at other points in the supply chain, but not in their 
schools.  The strong “not in my back yard” belief was in contrast with actual experiences 
reported in the interviews.  Beliefs that food is safe once under control of the foodservice 
operation may be unfounded given that 75% of food tampering incidents reported in Phase One 
interviews occurred in school foodservice operations.  Four (80%)of five FSDs interviewed 
knew of a food tampering incident that had occurred in their districts; in spite of this only one 
FSD rated the level of risk of food tampering as high.  In these incidents the perpetrators were 
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identified as students or co-workers.  When students were perpetrators, incidents were handled 
internally and considered pranks.  There is a need for training to increase the awareness of school 
stakeholders about vulnerability to intentional contamination of student meals with harmful 
substances. 
 Food is not considered a potential danger.  Principals and FSDs interviewed had no 
specific procedures for dealing with food tampering; only one district had procedures for 
handling food in which contamination was suspected.  The two emergency responders reporting 
work-related experiences with food tampering expressed belief that it is a reasonable concern for 
schools, but the other three did not, suggesting awareness of a potential danger raised only 
through experiences.  Emergency responders did not rule out a rural location or small district as 
too unimportant to be the target of terrorist attacks, expressing the view that an attack in the 
heartland of America would achieve terrorist goals of causing nationwide fear and disruption.  
The success of food-related pranks initiated by students indicated districts were vulnerable to 
more serious attacks. 
 Foodservice operations were perceived by most district administrators and emergency 
responders as being separate from other school district operational units; with an assumption the 
FSD had policies to protect the food.  The USDABC topics that were the focus of the current 
study, Communication, Handling a Crisis, and Water and Ice Supply included control steps that 
overlap with school district operations; thus some food defense controls extend beyond the 
authority of the nutrition program.  
 Conflicting priorities and expectations influence security.  School administrators did not 
perceive that their goals of preventing entry of intruders, monitoring student safety in the 
cafeteria, or preventing theft and vandalism were helpful with food defense.  The focus of school 
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security measures was on protecting children from harm; when children were not present, 
security measures were loosened.  There was lack of understanding that good security practices, 
enforced 24 hours a day, served multiple purposes, including protection of food in the child 
nutrition program from intentional contamination. 
  Findings from this small sample size among districts in one region suggests that variation 
exists among school districts in organizational structure and chain of command, procedures for 
handling suspected food tampering, and methods for communicating information.  Few districts 
had even a list of emergency contact names readily available.  Although crisis management 
planning, or emergency response planning as it is called under the NIMS system, is 
recommended in all school districts by  the U.S Department of Education and the Department of 
Homeland Security, food tampering was not identified as an event in existing plans of the five 
districts participating in Phase One. 
 Because public schools are partially funded by community property tax dollars, school 
administrators felt obligated to consider the values and desires of the community.  Two districts 
in this phase of the study reported community groups expected to be able to use school kitchens 
for events not related to the child nutrition program: district policies required a foodservice 
employee be present, however this policy was not enforced during the summer in one of the 
schools where observation occurred.  
 Risk perception.  All interviewees were asked 10 questions about their perceptions of 
the risks of terrorism and food tampering.  Of four items measuring unknown risk, the inability 
to see contamination in food was the greatest contributor to risk perception.  The extent of risk 
for food tampering and terrorism, and the extent of worry about those threats were between 
almost none and slight.  The mean for perceived personal control over terrorism was also 
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between almost none and slight, but the mean for perceived control over food tampering fell 
between slight and moderate.  Further analysis of the Phase One interview results showed that no 
principals or emergency responders perceived higher than slight personal control over food 
tampering and only production workers and FSDs responded with a high level of personal 
control.   
Phase Two: Regional Survey 
 In this phase, FSDs or SFAs from 556 districts of the 1,501 contacted in northern U.S. 
states responded to an internet-administered survey for a response rate of 37 percent.  The survey 
included questions about districts’ operational and demographic characteristics, levels of 
implementation of 31 listed food defense best practices, and perceptions of risk of terrorism and 
food tampering.  
 Operational and demographic characteristics.  The majority (70.4%) of respondents 
were district-level foodservice administrators.  Most districts (67.7%) had enrollment of less than 
2,500 students.  An on-site production system was prevalent.  A majority of districts (56.5%) 
reported having a crisis management plan; 9.4% of these (n = 51) included a food tampering 
scenario.  A small percentage (15.5%) of districts reported a foodservice manager involved with 
crisis management planning.  The majority of district foodservice administrators reported having 
influence over department utility and building related security policies (61.8% and 75.1%, 
respectively), but fewer than half reported influence over district (board-level) policy related to 
those topics.  Few districts (14.5%) reported implementing a food defense plan.  Implementation 
of a food defense plan was related to FSD involvement in district crisis management planning, 
inclusion of a food tampering scenario in the crisis management plan, and training of the FSD 
about food defense. 
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 Participation in food defense training was not common; 21.6% reported training with 
food defense content.  At least 20% of respondents from Minnesota, Wyoming, Iowa, and South 
Dakota reported having received training about food defense on at least one occasion.  Those 
with training were asked to describe the training event, resulting in a very diverse array of 
sponsors, program lengths, and overall program topics.  Most frequently, food defense was 
included in training about HACCP, food safety, or emergency planning.  Most (n = 52 or 
approximately 10% of all respondents) reported training occurred between 2004 and 2009 with 
an additional 17 (3.3% of sample) indicated training was received after 2009. 
 Risk perception.  Ten questions that assessed elements of risk perception, identical to 
those asked during interviews in Phase One, were included on the Phase Two regional survey. 
Survey results showed level of agreement to six statements representing dread risk was 1.97 (4-
point scale; 4 = strongly agree).  The inability to visibly see whether food had been contaminated 
was the predominant contributor to unknown risk.  Measures of dread risk were low for both 
terrorism and food tampering; respondents perceived more personal control over food tampering 
than terrorism.  District FSDs had higher scores than unit managers for worry and extent of risk 
and higher scores for personal control over terrorism and food tampering compared to district 
administrators. 
 Implementation of food defense practices.  The overall mean for each category of food 
defense practices (general food defense, facility security, utility security, and communication) 
indicated a practice frequency between sometimes (3 on the 5-point scale) and most of the time (4 
on a 5-point scale with 5 = always).  Of the 31 listed practices, 16 practices had mean 
frequencies of implementation between most of the time and always (M > 4.0).  Of these, 13 
practices were the responsibility of the foodservice operation.  Those frequently practiced 
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general food defense practices were: inspecting packages for evidence of tampering, assigning 
employees to receive food deliveries, restricting access to food storage and production areas, and 
training employees about safe chemical use.  Five facility security practices were implemented 
between most of the time and always including monitoring food production areas, controlling 
access to food production and chemical storage areas, and securing outside entrances and outside 
refrigeration and storage units.  In the utility security category, two practices were frequently 
implemented with means between 4 or 5: restricting access to central utility controls, and having 
procedures to follow if utilities were compromised.  Two communication practices were 
frequently implemented( M >4.0): “foodservice staff knows what to do in the event of a food 
tampering incident” and “a list of suppliers’ contact information is readily available to 
foodservice staff”. 
  Six practices (19.4%) were implemented less than some of the time (mean rating of < 
3.0).  Of these, two could be considered district responsibilities and out of the control of the 
foodservice operation: making criminal background checks on employees periodically after hire, 
and implementing a policy that all delivery trucks be locked when unattended.  The practice of 
foodservice employees wearing photo ID badges while at work (mean of 2.6) could be 
considered a joint responsibility as the district must issue IDs and the FSD must enforce their 
use.  The frequency of communication between the FSD and emergency responders for food 
safety and food defense matters had means of 2.4 and 2.2, respectively.  Finally, the utility 
security item “our foodservice operation periodically monitors drains and water lines in food 
production areas for possible tampering” had a mean of 2.5.  
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Conclusions 
 Schools have security measures in place that could strengthen food defense, but 
administrators lack an understanding of the broader utility of these.  The FSD is not routinely 
involved in discussions about school security, which prevents security resources from being used 
effectively to mitigate threat of intentional food contamination.  Administrators and emergency 
responders need to be educated about the topic and encouraged to recognize their roles in 
maintaining food defense.  Food defense must be viewed as a district-wide safety precaution, as 
is fire safety or building security.  To keep food safe from intentional contamination, water and 
air supplies, chemical supplies and food storage areas throughout the school buildings must be 
secure during all hours of the day, even when children are not present.  When school employees 
are empowered to challenge unauthorized visitors, their monitoring can keep areas secure; 
however, employees are not always present and available to monitor storage areas, loading 
docks, and exterior entrances.   
 The findings of Phase One suggest that stakeholders’ beliefs about the vulnerability of 
their school foodservice operations to incidents of food tampering are inaccurate.  Interviewees 
reported six incidents of food tampering in schools; five occurred in schools in the current study 
sample and one in a school district in which the FSD had been previously employed.  Food was 
contaminated while it was under the control of the foodservice operation.  These experiences 
contrasted with interview findings which indicted a belief that food was not vulnerable once it 
was delivered to the kitchen.  Although all food tampering incidents were handled internally, 
food tampering by students was treated as a prank.  Employees were suspected in two of the 
incidents.  Results from the Phase Two regional survey showed that the practice of making 
periodic background checks of current employees was one of the least frequently implemented, 
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so that any criminal activity that occurred after an employee was hired would remain unknown to 
employers.  These past food tampering incidents, although not resulting in harm, point out 
vulnerabilities that exist within child nutrition programs and indicate a need to for school 
districts to include food tampering in crisis management plans. 
 Results from Phase One and Phase Two of this study show current crisis management 
planning activities fail to identify food-related emergencies as a threat.  These results suggest 
that an effective threat appraisal should include multiple stakeholder groups, including 
production workers.  Because of the potential for widespread effects, there is a need for school 
personnel and emergency responders to agree on procedures for responding to acts of food 
tampering that occur in schools.  Findings indicate a need to identify district level avenues of 
communication about food defense among stakeholders.  District emergency response planning 
and training activities offer an opportunity to open or strengthen communication between the 
foodservice operation, school administration, and community emergency response teams.  In 
situations where community expectations may conflict with food defense practices, inclusion of 
multiple perspectives will ensure children are protected.  
 Both phases of this study showed that the perception of risk of intentional food 
contamination was low, similar to those found in a Canadian study for cell phone use, use of a 
motor vehicle, and physical activity.  In the current study, food tampering and terrorism were not 
perceived by respondents as a threat to their schools.  Worry about food tampering is low and 
foodservice personnel reported feelings of personal control to prevent food tampering.  Although 
the probability of food tampering causing harm to children in any one district is minute, the 
potential consequences could be catastrophic given that many districts prepare food for non-
student populations such as child care and adult care programs; school and community 
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stakeholder groups must be made aware of this risk and develop action plans to reduce threat 
levels and respond if there is a need. 
 Although production workers and FSDs interviewed in Phase One identified the food 
supply chain and food deliveries as areas potentially vulnerable to food tampering, few controls, 
such as restricting access to the building via the loading dock, were observed during site visits to 
be in place.  Survey results indicated that outside entrances were kept secure most of the time  
(M = 4.3 on a 5-point scale), but it was infrequent for districts to have a policy that delivery 
trucks be locked when unattended or for food defense expectations to be communicated with 
vendors (M = 2.4, M = 3.3 on a 5–point scale, respectively).  Training is needed to make 
personnel at all points in the flow of food aware of the risk of intentional contamination of food 
during transit, whether arriving from a vendor or from a centralized warehouse or production 
kitchen. 
 The food tampering experiences related by six (24%) of the interviewees in Phase One 
suggest a need to challenge stakeholders’ assertions that intentional food contamination would 
only happen somewhere else, that food is most vulnerable to attack before it arrives to the school 
district, and that co-workers are unlikely to be perpetrators of food tampering.  There is a need 
for administrators and foodservice personnel to receive training to increase their level of 
awareness and concern for the threat of food tampering. 
 ServSafe ® and the district’s HACCP-based food safety plan can prepare foodservice 
production workers to maintain food defense within their realms of responsibility.  Inclusion of 
food defense practices into an existing HACCP plan will allow for integration of efforts to 
protect the safety of food while in district’s custody and provide a communication tool with 
written standard operating procedures within the district.  Exposure to the concept of food 
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defense through food safety training may explain production workers’ higher awareness of the 
risk and their higher sense of personal control compared to district administrators and emergency 
responders.  Districts food safety trainings (i.e. in-services) and HACCP plans should be 
expanded with input from all district stakeholders, to include food defense.  
 Food defense planning is not widespread, however at least one survey respondent from 
each state reported having a food defense plan.  Implementation of a food defense plan was 
related to FSD involvement in district crisis management planning, but was not related to 
demographic and operational characteristics of the district.  Food defense practices under the 
control of the foodservice operation had high rates of implementation; yet best practices that 
overlap with district control had low reported frequencies of implementation, thus there is a clear 
need to increase involvement of all district decision makers in development of food defense 
plans.  Practices that achieved district goals of physical security and loss prevention were 
frequently implemented, but as noted by Phase One interviewees; these practices were not 
recognized as food defense measures.  District administrators must be made aware of the threat 
of intentional food contamination and the risk of catastrophic consequences so district security 
measures already in place can be effectively used for food defense.   
 The results of this study support previous research that showed food defense practices 
related to use and storage of chemicals were frequently implemented and communication 
practices were infrequently implemented.  There is a need to expand employee training about 
chemical use and storage to include the threat of chemicals being removed and intentionally 
added to food.  While it is clear FSDs communicate about food safety and food defense within 
their departments, as demonstrated by high frequency of performance of food defense practices 
under department responsibility, communication about food safety and defense with stakeholders 
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outside of the foodservice operation appears to be less common.  The ability to communicate 
with administrators and emergency responders about food defense issues must be recognized as 
an essential skill for district-level FSDs and woven into job descriptions and performance 
reviews.  Additionally, training programs are needed to help develop these competencies. 
 Results from the current study suggest that food defense training is more prevalent than 
documented in earlier research; yet low incidence and frequency shows need for continued 
training for all district stakeholders.  Food defense training was related to implementation of 
food defense plans, thus it is important to develop food defense training programs targeted to 
school district personnel specifically, in addition to training to others with decision making 
responsibility within the district.  To assure that all stakeholders in school districts are informed 
about food defense, consistent curricula for each contingent about food defense needs to be 
included in trainings for superintendents, other school board policymakers, district SFAs, those 
in charge of school nutrition programs on a daily basis, production and transportation staff. 
Limitations of the Study 
 Although the qualitative phase of the study was limited to five case districts, the rigor 
was strengthened by using methods recommended by Yin (2008), including multiple sources of 
evidence, creating a case study database, and maintaining a chain of evidence.  The combination 
of written interview forms, digital recordings of interviews, and observations based on a standard 
food defense checklist, documenting food defense practices or lack of provided a durable body 
of evidence. 
 Case study visits were made during two 2-week periods separated by a span of 6-months, 
which may have led to differences in the data collected.  All interviews were conducted by the 
primary researcher using an interview guide with structured questions, but as interviews 
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progressed the use of follow-up questions by the primary investigator increased.  Merriam (2009) 
explained that it is common for interviewers to become less dependent on the interview guide as 
they become more comfortable with the interview process and content.  Kvale and Brinkmann 
(2009)  emphasized that “method” should not drive an interview; rather the interviewer’s ability 
to pose questions determines the quality of interview data.  Following this premise the 
knowledge and experience gained by the primary investigator from the first three site visits 
would add to the quality of the data. 
 Phase Two survey data were based on information reported by respondents; any self-
reported data is limited by the respondents’ understanding of the survey items, and the sincerity 
and truthfulness with which responses are made.  A further limitation is that respondents 
represented a variety of position titles, having different degrees of knowledge, experience, and 
direct oversight of the foodservice operation.  Survey recipients who did not hold the position of 
FSD were requested to forward the survey to the person responsible for day-to-day operation of 
the school foodservice.  Even so, 58 responses were received from school district personnel not 
employed in the foodservice operation.  In very small districts, the individual responsible for 
day-to-day operations may be a part-time employee with limited authority.  The SFA receiving 
the survey may have felt more qualified than the person in charge of foodservice operations on a 
daily basis to answer the survey questions.  Another limitation is the large number and percent of 
non-response or don’t know responses for some survey items; this may be due to unit managers 
or others having limited knowledge about board policies or district-level procedures.    
 Only seven states were included in the study; thus only one region of the United States is 
featured.  Having only 17 responses (response rate of 10%), the state of North Dakota was 
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underrepresented compared to the other states in the population; thus, results may not be 
generalizable to North Dakota school districts.   
Recommendations for Further Research 
 
 This study points to a need to open avenues of communication between administrators, 
emergency responders, and FSDs with the purpose of achieving strong food defense within 
districts with the least expenditure of resources given increasing responsibilities assigned to 
school districts.  Production workers are the main line of defense in the kitchen and storeroom 
settings; it is their vigilance that maintains food defense in these areas.  Production workers’ 
understanding of food defense threats and practices that mitigate these threats, as well as their 
level of motivation to perform food defense practices is not known.  Thus, research is needed to 
define the knowledge, skills, and attributes needed by production workers to implement food 
defense practices so that qualified and reliable workers may be hired. 
 Central kitchen production systems use economies of scale to reduce production costs of 
school meals.  This type of system has characteristics making it possible for an incident of food 
tampering to affect a large number of children during a short period of time.  Production workers 
in central kitchens have no contact with their customers, the children, and may feel a different 
level of motivation to maintain food defense compared to workers in onsite kitchens who interact 
with children daily.  Research is needed to assess employee motivations to maintain food safety 
and defense in this setting; particularly to assess the workplace culture and employee job 
satisfaction in central kitchens.  A disgruntled employee working in a central kitchen has the 
potential to harm many students or cause widespread damage to the reputation of the child 
nutrition program. 
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 The results of this study indicated that many stakeholder groups, not just child nutrition 
program personnel, have responsibilities in maintaining food defense or responding to a food 
tampering incident in a district.  Principals and other administrators had limited understanding of 
the scope of food defense, perceiving it as a responsibility that could be assumed by the FSD 
alone.  Food defense may be out of the control of the foodservice operation because school 
nurses may have responsibility to identify student illnesses resulting from intentional food 
contamination and custodians hold the responsibility for assuring that food production and food 
and chemical storage areas are monitored during cleaning procedures after foodservice personnel 
have left for the day.  Transportation directors may coordinate distribution of prepared food to 
satellite units.  Thus, research is needed to determine the levels of awareness and importance that 
district administrators, school nurses, and other noncertified staff hold regarding food defense 
practices, and to determine how food defense practices are included in job preparation training 
materials.   
 Emergency responders, principals, FSDs, and production workers in this study 
demonstrated knowledge and expertise that contributes to a safe school environment for students.  
Research funds could support pilot projects that develop and assess the effectiveness of various 
communication tools to increase awareness of food defense among broader populations of 
district stakeholders.  
 In 2012 USDA published a guidance document entitled Creating Your School Food 
Defense Plan that included four components with checklists.  Research is needed to assess 
whether the document is being used and the frequency with which the checklist items are 
performed.  Current levels of food defense implementation data are needed on a state by state 
basis with involvement of state child nutrition agencies to assure representation of schools of all 
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sizes, organizational structures, and geographic locations.  FSDs’ knowledge of and participation 
in school multi-hazard emergency response planning should be explored. 
 Finally, methods for qualitative studies should continue to be the subject of research to 
further define best practices for this approach.  Although the recommendation is to prevent 
“method” from dominating interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) it may prove valuable to 
analyze for differences the data obtained from interviews separated by a long time span. 
  
141 
References 
Arnon, S.A. (2001). Botulinum toxin as a biological weapon: Medical and public health 
management. JAMA, 285, 1059-1070. doi:10.1001/jama.285.8.1059 
 
Ashford, D. A., Kaiser, R. M., Bales, M. E., Shutt, K., Patrawalla, A., McShan, A., . . . 
Dannenberg, A. L. (2003). Planning against biological terrorism: Lessons from outbreak 
investigations. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 9, 515-519. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/ 
 
Batz, M. B., Doyle, M. P., Morris Jr, J. G., Painter, J., Singh, R., Tauxe, R. V., . . . Lo Fo Wong, 
D. M. A. (2005). Attributing illness to food.  Emerging Infectious Diseases, 11, 993-999. 
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/ 
 
Bosnjak, M., & Tuten, T. L. (2003). Prepaid and promised incentives in web surveys: An 
experiment.  Social Science Computer Review, 21, 208. 
doi:10.1177/0894439303021002006 
 
Blum, S. C. (2011). Associations between prior life experiences and perceptions of risk of future 
terrorism, crime, and disaster in a national longitudinal stu dy. (Doctoral Dissertation). 
Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Database. (AAT 3477851). 
 
Bruemmer, B. (2003). Food biosecurity.  Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 103, 
687-691. doi: 10.1053/jada.2003.50154 
 
Burrows, W. D., & Renner, S. E. (1999). Biological warfare agents as threats to potable water. 
Environmental Health Perspectives, 107, 975-984. 
http://ehp03.niehs.nih.gov/home.action 
 
Busta, F. (2010, February 1). Risk factors: Product and process specific criteria. Paper presented 
at Assuring Safety of Imported Food: Public and Private Roles in a Risk-Based System, 
Washington, D.C. Retrieved from http://www.thefsrc.org/importsafety/FSRC-import-S2-
01_Busta_RiskFactors.pdf 
 
Carus, W. S. (2009). Bioterrorism and biocrimes: the illicit use of biological agents since 1900. 
Retrieved from Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense 
University website: http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/full_doc.pdf 
 
Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, 42 USC § 1751 (2004). 
 Retrieved from: http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/governance/legislation/historical/pl_108-
265.pdf 
 
Chung, S., & Shannon, M. (2005). Hospital planning for acts of terrorism and other health 
emergencies involving children. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 90(12), 1300-1307. 
doi: 10.1136/adc.2004.069617 
 
142 
Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Dalziel, G. R. (2009). Food defence incidents 1950-2008: A chronology and analysis of incidents 
involving the malicious contamination of the food supply chain. Retrieved from S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies: Nanyang Technological University website: 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens/publications/reports/RSIS_Food%20Defence_170209.pdf 
 
Defense Logistics Agency. (2011). DLA troop support food defense checklist. Retrieved 
fromhttp://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/fs_check.pdf 
 
Dillman, D. A. (2007). Mail and internet surveys : the tailored design method. Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley. 
 
Dillman, D. A., Smyth, J. D., & Christian, L. M. (2009). Mail, internet, and mixed mode surveys: 
The tailored design approach (3rd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
 
Elad, D. (2005). Risk assessment of malicious biocontamination of food. Journal of Food 
Protection, 68, 1302-1305. http://www.foodprotection.org/publications/journal-of-food-
protection/ 
 
Fischhoff, B., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A., & Lerner, J. S. (2003). Judged terror risk and 
proximity to the World Trade Center. The Journal of Risk and Uncertaintly, 26(2/3), 137-
151.  http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11166 
 
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How safe is safe 
enough? A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits. 
Policy Sciences, 9(2), 127-152. 
http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/political+science/journal/11077 
 
Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011. Pub L. No 111-353 § 3, 124 Stat. 3885. Retrieved from: 
 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ353/pdf/PLAW-111publ353.pdf 
 
Franco, C., & Sell, T. K. (2010). Federal agency biodefense funding, FY2010-FY2011. 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 8(2), 129-149. 
doi:10.1089/bsp.2010.0013 
 
Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Dread Risk, September 11, and Fatal Traffic Accidents. Psychological 
Science, 15, 286-287. 
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/journals/psychological_scie
nce 
 
Graham, B., & Talent, J. (2009). Bioterrorism: Redefining prevention. Bioterrorism and 
Biosecurity: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 7(2), 125-126. 
doi:10.1089/bsp.2009.0610 
 
143 
Greene, B., Barrios, L. C., Blair, J. E., & Kolbe, L. (2004). Schools and terrorism. Journal of 
School Health, 74(2), 39-51. http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-
4391&site=1 
 
Hall, S. D., Herbold, J., & England, E. C. (2001). Food for thought-the use of hazard and critical 
point analysis to assess vulnerability of food to terrorist attack in deployment locations: 
A case study. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12502176 
 
Jackson, L. S. (2009). Chemical food safety issues in the United States: Past, present, and future. 
Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, 57, 8161-8170. 
http://pubs.acs.org/journal/jafcau 
 
Jerardo, A. (February, 2008). What share of U.S. consumed food is imported? Amber Waves. 
Retrieved from http://www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/february08/datafeature/ 
 
Keteyian, A. (December 20, 2010). Latest terror threat in US aimed to poison food.  Retrieved 
from CBS News website: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/20/eveningnews/main7169266.shtml  
 
Khan, A. S., Swerdlow, D. L., & Juranek, D. D. (2001). Precautions against biological and 
chemical terrorism directed at food and water supplies. Public Health Reports, 116(1), 3-
14.  http://www.publichealthreports.org/ 
 
Kvale, S., & Brinkmann, S. (2009). Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research 
interviewing (2
nd
 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Lee, J. E. C., Lemyre, L., & Krewski, D. (2010). A multi-method, multi-hazard approach to 
explore the uniqueness of terrorism risk perceptions and worry. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 40(1), 241-272. http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0021-9029 
 
Lesho, M. E., Dorsey, M. D., & Bunner, D. (1998). Feces, dead horses, and fleas: Evolution of 
the hostile use of biological agents. Western  Journal of  Medicine, 168, 512-516. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/journals/183/ 
 
Mara, A., & McGrath, L. (2009). Defending the military food supply: Aquisition, preparation, 
and protection of food at U.S. military installations (Center for Technology and National 
Security Policy, National Defense University). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506611&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health. (2009). Food defense planning self-inspection 
checklist for food service and retail food establishments. Retrieved from 
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/environmental/foodsafety/food-security-
planning.pdf 
 
Maykut, P., & Morehouse, R. (1997). Beginning qualitative research: A philosophic and 
practical guide. London: Routledge Falmer. 
144 
 
Merriam, S. B. (2009). Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Mohtadi, H., & Murshid, A. P. (2009). Risk analysis of chemical, biological, or radionuclear 
threats: Implications for food security. Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 29, 1317-
1335. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01260.x 
 
National Food Service Management Institute, & United States Department of Agriculture, Food 
and Nutrition Service. (2002). A guide to centralized foodservice systems. (Item Number 
EX54-02). Retrieved from http://www.nfsmi.org/ResourceOverview.aspx?ID=81 
 
National Food Service Management Institute. (2004). Prevalence of food production systems in 
school foodservice (Item Number R-75-04). Retrieved from 
http://www.nfsmi.org/documentlibraryfiles/PDF/20080225032721.pdf 
 
National Food Service Management Institute. (2009). Serving it safe, 3
rd
. ed. 
http://www.nfsmi.org/DocumentSearch.aspx 
 
National Food Service Management Institute. (2012a). Produce safety videos: What went 
wrong? Food defense. http://www.nfsmi.org/DocumentSearch.aspx 
 
National Food Service Management Institute. (2012b).  Produce safety videos: What went 
 wrong? Disgruntled employee. http://www.nfsmi.org/DocumentSearch.aspx 
 
National Food Service Management Institute. (n.d.) Competencies, knowledge, and skills 
 for district-Level School NutritionProfessionals in the 21st Century. Retrieved from 
 http://www.nfsmi.org/documentlibraryfiles/PDF/20090514085653.pdf 
 
National Food Service Management Institute and United States Department of Agriculture, Food 
 and Nutrition Service. (2004). A Biosecurity Checklist for School Food Service. 
Retrieved  from National Food Service Management Institute website: 
 http://healthymeals.nal.usda.gov/hsmrs/biosecurity.pdf. 
 
National Restaurant Association. (2012).  ServSafe manager (6
th
 ed). Chicago IL: National 
Restaurant Association Education Foundation. 
 
New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services. (2009). Food defense planning for retail 
food establishments: a self-inspection checklist. Retrieved from 
http://www.state.nj.us/health/forms/f-26.pdf 
 
Norris, T., Vines, P. L., & Hoeffel, E. M. (2012). The American Indian and Alaska Native 
Population: 20102010 Census Briefs. (C2010BR-10). Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf 
 
145 
Ohio Department of Agriculture, Division of Food Safety. (2005). Retail food establishment self-
assessment checklist. Retrieved from http://www.shelbycountyhealthdept.org/Self-
AssessmentChecklist.pdf 
 
Olds, D. A. (2010). Food defense management practices in private country clubs. (Doctoral 
Dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Database. (AAT 
3438587). 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
188, 42 USC § 247d–3a (2002). Retrieved from: 
 http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/legislation/ucm148797.htm 
 
 
Radosavljevic, V., & Belojevic, G. (2009). A new model of bioterrorism risk assessment. 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 7(4), 443-451. 
doi: 10.1089/bsp.2009.0016 
 
Rotz, L. D., Khan, A. S., Lillibridge, S. R., Ostroff, S. M., & Hughes, J. M. (2002). Public health 
assessment of potential biological terrorism agents. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8(2), 
225-230. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/ 
 
Shane, S. (2010, November 20). Qaeda branch aimed for broad damage at low cost, The New 
York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/middleeast/21parcel.html 
 
Siegrist, M., Keller, C., & Kiers, H. A. L. (2006). Lay people's perception of food hazards: 
Comparing aggregated data and individual data. Appetite, 47, 324-332. doi: 
10.1016/j.appet.2006.05.012 
 
Slovic, P. (1987, April 17). Perception of risk. Science, 236, 280-285. 
http://www.sciencemag.org/ 
 
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1982). Why study risk perception? Risk Analysis, 
2(2), 83-93. http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0272-4332 
 
Sneed, J., & Strohbehn, C. H. (2008). Trends impacting food safety in retail foodservice: 
Implications for dietetics practice. Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 108, 
1170-1177. doi: 10.1016/j.jada.2008.04.009 
 
Sobel, J., Khan, A. S., & Swerdlow, D. L. (2002). Threat of a biological terrorist attack on the 
U.S. food supply: the CDC perspective. Lancet, 359, 874-880. 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/issue/current 
 
Steinberg, E. B., Henderson, A., Karpati, A., Hoekstra, M., Marano, N., Martinelli Souza, J., . . . 
Griffin, P. M. (2006). Mysterious outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness associated with 
146 
burritos supplied through school lunch programs. Journal of Food Protection, 69, 1690-
1698. http://www.foodprotection.org/publications/journal-of-food-protection/ 
 
Stinson, T. F. (2010). The national economic impact of a food terrorism event: initial estimate of 
indirect costs. In H. W. Richardson & P. Gordon (Eds.), The economic costs and 
consequences of terrorism. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Story, C., Sneed, J., Oakley, C. B., & Stretch, T. (2007). Emergency preparedness needs 
assessment of centralized school foodservice and warehousing operations. Journal of the 
American Dietetic Association, 107, 2100-2104. doi: 10.1016/j.jada.2007.09.007 
 
Strohbehn, C. H., Sneed, J., Paez, P., & Beattie, S. (2007). Food defense checklist for retail 
foodservices. N3506.   Ames, IA: Iowa State University. 
 
Streiner, D.L. (2003). Starting at the beginning: An introduction to coefficient alpha. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 80, 99-103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327752JPA8001_18 
 
Torok, T. J., & Tauxe, R. V. (1997). A large community outbreak of Salmonellosis caused by 
intentional contamination of restaurant salad. JAMA: Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 278, 389-395. http://jama.ama-assn.org/ 
 
Turvey, C. G., Onyango, B., Cuite, C., & Hallman, W. K. (2010). Risk, fear, bird flu and 
terrorists: A study of risk perceptions and economics. Journal of Socio-Economics, 39(1), 
1-10. doi: 10.1016/jsocec.2009.08.008 
 
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2010). Career guide to industries, 2010-11 edition: 
Food manufacturing. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs011.htm 
 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2011). Briefing room: 
food marketing system in the U.S.:  Food and manufacturing. Retrieved from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FoodMarketingSystem/ 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. (2004). A biosecurity 
checklist for school food service.  Retrieved from 
http://healthymeals.nal.usda.gov/hsmrs/biosecurity.pdf 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. (2005, June). Guidance for 
School Food Authorities: Developing a School Food Safety Program Based on the 
Process Approach to HACCP Principles. Retrieved from 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/pdf/HACCPGuidance.pdf 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. (2006). Procurement 
questions relevant to the buy american provision, SP_20-2006.Retrieved from 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/governance/Policy-Memos/2006/SP_20-2006.pdf 
 
147 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service (2010a). National School 
Breakfast Program fact sheet. Retrieved from http://www.fns.usda.gov/ 
cnd/Breakfast/AboutBFast/SBPFactSheet.pdf 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. (2010b). National School 
Lunch Program fact sheet. Retrieved from 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/Lunch/AboutLunch/NSLPFactSheet.pdf 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. (2010c). The school-based 
after-school snack program. Retrieved from 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/afterschool/AfterschoolSnacksFactSheet.pdf 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. (2011, August). Program 
information report (key data), U.S. summary, FY 2010 - FY 2011, Table 25a. Retrieved 
from http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/key_data/august-2011.pdf 
 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service. (2012, July). Creating 
your school food defense plan. Retrieved from 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/pdf/Creating_Food_Defense_Plan.pdf 
 
United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau. (2012). Statistical abstract of the 
United States. Table 363. Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0363.pdf 
 
United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, (n.d.). State and county quick 
facts. Retrieved May 2, 2013, from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html 
 
United States Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education. (2011). 
Readiness and emergency management for schools: discretionary/competitive grants. 
Retrieved from http://www2.ed.gov/programs/dvpemergencyresponse/index.html 
 
United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2011). Digest 
of education statistics: 2011. (NCES 2011-015). Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_002.asp?referrer=list. 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration. 
(2003). Fact sheet on FDA's new food terrorism regulation: interim final rule- registration 
of food facilities. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/Bioterrorism/FoodFacilityRegistration/ucm08161
0.htm 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration 
(2004a). Fact sheet on FDA's new food terrorism regulation: Establishment and 
maintence of records. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/Bioterrorism/Recordkeeping/ucm061476.htm 
 
148 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration 
(2004b). Fact Sheet on FDA's new food terrorism regulation: Final rule-administrative 
detention. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/Bioterrorism/AdministrativeDetention/ucm06217
7.htm 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration (2007). 
Guidance for industry: Retail food stores and food service establishments: Food security 
preventative measures guidance. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocume
nts/FoodDefenseandEmergencyResponse/ucm082751.htm 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration. 
(2011a). A special report: Pathway to global product safety and quality. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/GlobalProductPathway/default.htm 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration. 
(2011b). Fact sheet on FDA's interim final rule- information required in prior notice of 
imported food. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/Bioterrorism/PriorNotice/ucm153720.htm 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration. 
(2011c). Food defense acronyms, abbreviations and definitions. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/Training/ucm111382.htm 
 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration (n.d.) 
An introduction to food security awareness. Retrieved from 
http://www.fda.gov/Training/ForStateLocalTribalRegulators/ucm120951.htm. 
 
United States Department of Homeland Security. (2004). Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 9: Defense of United States Food and Agriculture. Retrieved from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1217449547663.shtm 
 
United States Department of Homeland Security. (2012). Northern Border Strategy. Retrieved 
from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/policy/dhs-northern-border-strategy.pdf 
 
United States Department of Homeland Security & United States Department of Education. 
(2010). Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan. Retrieved from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-education-facilities-2010.pdf 
 
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. (n.d.) Budget justifications 
and performance information, fiscal year 2013: Indian Affairs. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc016442.pdf 
 
149 
Unnevehr, L. (2010, February 1). Information needs to creating incentives in global supply 
chains. Paper presented at Assuring Safetyof Imported Food: Public and Private Roles in 
a Risk-Based System, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from  
 http://www.thefsrc.org/importsafety/FSRC-import-S2-01_Busta_RiskFactors.pdf 
 
William F. Goodling Child Nutrition Reauthorization Act of 1998 , Pub. L. 105-336, §104(d)  
 112 STAT. 3143. Retrieved from http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/care/Regs-
Policy/Legislation/PL105-336.pdf  
 
Woods, J., Ten Eyck, T. A., Kaplowitz, S. A., & Shlapentokh, V. (2008). Terrorism risk 
perceptions and proximity to primary terrorist targets: How close is too close? Human 
Ecology Review, 15(1), 63-70. http://www.humanecologyreview.org/ 
 
World Health Organization, Department of Food Safety, Zoonoses and Foodborne Disease. 
(2008, May). Terrorist threats to food: Guidance for establishing and strengthening 
prevention and response systems: Retrieved from 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545844.pdf 
 
Xirasagar, S., Kanwat, C. P., Qu, H., Smith, L. U., Patterson, N. J., & Shewchuk, R. M. (2010). 
Preventing intentional food contamination: A survey to assess restaurant preparedness. 
Journal of Public Health Management and Practice, 16(4), E7-E17. 
http://www.lww.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/product__11851_-1_9012052_Prod-
10784659 
 
Xirasagar, S., Kanwat, C. P., Smith, L. U., Li, Y.J., Sros, L., & Shewchuk, R. M. (2010). 
Restaurant industry preparedness against intentional food contamination: Results of a 
South Carolina survey. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice,16(4), E18-
E30. http://www.lww.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/product__11851_-
1_9012052_Prod-10784659 
 
Yin, R. K. (2008). Case study research; Design and methods (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
 
Yoon, E. (2007). Food defense management plan implementation intention: An application of 
protection motivation theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses Database. (AAT 3291401). 
 
Yoon, E., & Shanklin, C. W. (2007a). Food security practice in Kansas schools and health care 
facilities.  Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 107, 325-329. doi: 
10.1016/j.jada.2006.11.016 
 
Yoon, E., & Shanklin, C. W. (2007b). Food terrorism: Perceptional gaps betweenimportance and 
performance of preventive measures. Journal of Foodservice Business Research, 10(4), 
3-23. doi: 10.1300/J369v10n04_02 
 
150 
Yoon, E., & Shanklin, C. W. (2007c). Implementation of food biosecurity management plan 
against food terrorism in on-site foodservice operations. Journal of Hospitality and 
Tourism Research, 31(2), 224-240. doi: 10.1177/1096348006297291 
  
151 
APPENDIX A 
IRB Approval 
152 
153 
Appendix B 
 
Sampling Frame for Case Study Sites 
State Size, total 
student 
enrollment 
Production 
System 
Central 
Warehouse 
Location Credentials of 
FS Director 
Minnesota >28,000 Centralized yes Urban Bachelor 
degree 
Wisconsin 2,500-7500 On-site 
Commissary 
no Suburban RD 
 
Iowa >7,500<10,000 On-site yes Suburban Advanced 
Degree , RD, 
SNS 
 
South 
Dakota 
<2,500  On-site yes Rural  Some college 
Note: RD = Registered Dietitian, SNS = School Nutrition Specialist. 
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Appendix C 
Recruiting Scripts:  
 
School Foodservice Director 
 
Hello. My name is Carol Klitzke, and I am a doctoral candidate at Iowa State University in the Hospitality 
Management program. Presently, I am working on a research project with the purpose of describing the 
implementation of food defense practices in school districts in the northern U.S. The research involves observation 
of meal service, a tour of building security, and interviews with key people in school districts. I would also like to 
review the crisis management plan and policies and procedures that relate to practices important for food defense. 
 
I am interested in observing breakfast and lunch service in the largest school in your district. I will be observing 
food defense practices using a 2-page checklist developed at Iowa State University.   I would like to interview an 
administrator responsible for building security, such as the Director of buildings and grounds, or the school principal 
or assistant principal. I would also like to interview you and a member of your production staff about your beliefs 
about food defense.  
 
Would you be willing to participate in this project? Your participation is voluntary. In the interview you will be 
asked about your crisis management plan, your beliefs about food defense, and the barriers to implementing food 
defense in your district. You may choose not to respond to any of the questions if you wish. The visit would last 
no more than one school day.  In addition to the interviews my activities will include review of your crisis 
management plan, review of policies and procedures, a tour of the foodservice operation and observation of meal 
service. I would also like to take photos, if permitted.  It will not be necessary for you to spend all of the time with 
me. All information gathered through observations and interviews at your school district will be shared with you 
after the visit. Information you provide and observations that I make will be kept confidential. All gathered 
information will be summarized before it is published or presented. The site visit will be scheduled at your 
convenience.  
 
Is this something you would be willing to help with?  
 
During my visit I would like to interview an administrator such as the Director of buildings and grounds, or a school 
principal.  Can you give me the name of the person in your district that I should contact? 
 
Thank you! I will send a confirmation letter and consent form to you by email today. May I have your email 
address?  Would you like to set a date now? 
 
If you have questions about this study you may contact me at cjklitzke@viterbo.edu 
Or, feel free to contact my major professor and faculty supervisor, Dr. Catherine Strohbehn, 515-294-3527, 
cstrohbe@mail.iastate.edu, 
 
 
School District Administrator 
 
Hello. My name is Carol Klitzke, and I am a doctoral student at Iowa State University in the Hospitality 
Management program. Presently, I am working on a research project with the purpose of describing the 
implementation of food defense practices in school districts in the northern U.S. I have contacted your district 
foodservice director and arranged to meet with him/her on __________________________. 
 
While in your district, I would like to interview an administrator responsible for building security, Your district 
foodservice director suggested that I talk with you and ask to set up an interview. 
 
Would you be willing to participate in this project? Your participation is voluntary. In the interview you will be 
asked about your crisis management plan, your beliefs about food defense, and the barriers to implementing food 
defense in your district. You may choose not to respond to any of the questions if you wish. The interview would 
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take 30 minutes.  Information you provide and observations made by the researcher will be kept confidential. 
All gathered information will be summarized before it is published or presented.  
 
Is this something you would be willing to help with?  
 
During my visit I would like to interview an official from the agency (such as police or fire department) that you 
would contact if you suspected food tampering in your district.  Could you give me the name of the agency or the 
official that I should contact? 
 
Thank you! I will send a confirmation letter and consent form to you by email today. May I have your email 
address? 
 
Meanwhile, if you have questions about this study you may contact me at cjklitzke@viterbo.edu 
Or, feel free to contact my major professor and faculty supervisor, Dr. Catherine Strohbehn, 515-294-3527, 
cstrohbe@mail.iastate.edu, 
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  Emergency Response Official 
 
Hello. My name is Carol Klitzke, and I am a doctoral student at Iowa State University in the Hospitality 
Management program. Presently, I am working on a research project with the purpose of describing the 
implementation of food defense practices in school districts in the northern U.S. I have arranged to meet with school 
district officials on ______________.  While I am in your community I would like to interview an emergency 
response official about your agency’s involvement in crisis management planning.  _______________________ of 
the school district suggested that I call you and request  
 
Would you be willing to participate in this project? Your participation is voluntary. In the interview you will be 
asked about your knowledge of the school district’s crisis management plan, your beliefs about food defense, and 
the barriers to implementing food defense in the school district. You may choose not to respond to any of the 
questions if you wish. The interview would take 30 minutes.  Information you provide and observations made 
by the researcher will be kept confidential. All gathered information will be summarized before it is published or 
presented.  
 
Is this something you would be willing to help with?  
 
Thank you! I will send a confirmation letter and consent form to you by email today. May I have your email 
address? 
 
Meanwhile, if you have questions about this study you may contact me at cjklitzke@viterbo.edu 
Or, feel free to contact my major professor and faculty supervisor, Dr. Catherine Strohbehn, 515-294-3527, 
cstrohbe@mail.iastate.edu, 
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Appendix D 
Case Study Protocol 
 
A.  Introduction to the case study and purpose of protocol 
 
Food defense is the protection of food from intentional contamination by those who want to 
harm consumers.  Schools are vulnerable because they are locations where large batches 
of food are prepared and served to many of the children in the community.  The purpose 
of this study is to conduct a 360
o
 assessment of food defense readiness in four public 
school districts in the northern United States. This document is the standardized agenda 
for this study. 
 
 1.  Case study research questions 
 
 To what degree are the USDABC items in sections A (Communication), B (Handling a 
Crisis), J (Foodservice/Food Preparation Areas), and L (Water and Ice Supply) being 
implemented?  
 Who in the school district has the authority to implement them? 
 Why has communication been reported as the weakest area of food defense in schools?  
 What are methods used to communicate internally within the school district and 
externally with members of the community?  
 What type of information is disseminated?  
 What are perceptions of school nutrition program stakeholders (administrators, line 
employees,) as to the importance of implementing food defense practices 
 How do kitchen line employees view the importance of school food defense practices? 
 
 2.  Unit of Analysis 
 
 This case study uses multiple cases selected for maximum variation with an embedded 
 approach. The unit of analysis for each case is a public school district.  Data from 
 employee interviews, an interview with an emergency response official, document 
 review, and observation are included in each case. 
 
B. Data Collection Procedures 
 1.  Four Participating School Districts 
  a. name and contact person 
  b. name and contact person 
  c. name and contact person 
  d. name and contact person 
 2.  Preparation prior to visit 
  a. Recruit foodservice director 
   1) obtain name of administrator 
   2) send informed consent form for two employees 
   3) send list of documents to be reviewed 
  b. Recruit administrator 
  1) obtain name of emergency response agency or official 
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  2) send informed consent form 
  3) obtain permission to take photographs 
  c. Recruit emergency response official 
  1) send informed consent form 
 
 3.  Data Collection Plan 
  a. Interviews 
  1) school foodservice director 
  2) school foodservice workers 
  3) district administrator 
  4) community emergency response official 
  b. Observation 
  1) observation of one day’s breakfast and lunch meal services (estimated 3 hours    
  of observation)  
  2) Researcher completion of food defense checklist  
  c.  Document Review: district’s or foodservice department’s food defense plan 
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Appendix F 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENTS 
 
Foodservice Director 
 
Title of Study: Food Defense Practices of School Districts in Northern States 
Investigator: Carol J. Klitzke 
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. Please feel free to ask 
questions at any time. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to describe in detail the implementation of food defense practices in school districts in 
the northern U.S.  You are being invited to participate in this study because your school district is located in 
USDA’s northern compliance district and it is the size of district that I want to include in my study.   
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to  
 
 Allow me to observe breakfast and lunch meal production and service at your largest school building or at 
your central kitchen, if applicable 
 
 Allow me to take photographs of physical aspects of your facility that demonstrate degree of 
implementation of food defense. 
 
 Allow me to review the documents associated with your crisis management plan, policies and procedures, 
and food defense plan. 
 Participate in a 30-minute interview.  You will be asked questions about your awareness of food defense 
practices, the district’s policies and procedures, and barriers to implementing food defense.  If you allow it, 
your interview will be audio-taped. 
 Allow me to complete a 2-page checklist about the district’s food defense practices.  
 Allow two of your production workers to be interviewed by me in a 30-minute interview session. 
 
You will receive a summary of all data collected during the visit. 
 
While I am in your district I would also like to interview an administrator or principal and a local emergency 
response official about their involvements in food defense planning. I will arrange these appointments. 
Your participation will last for one school day, but you will not need to be with me all of the time.  I estimate the 
time required for each activity will be 
 
 Your interview -30 minutes 
 Staff member interviews-60 minutes 
 Review documents- 1.5 hours 
 Observe meal service at breakfast and lunch- 3 hours 
 Complete food defense checklist – 1.5 hours 
 Interview with administrator- 30 minutes 
 Interview with emergency response official -30 minutes. 
 
RISKS 
 
There are no known foreseeable risks other than inconvenience. 
 
BENEFITS 
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If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you. It is hoped that the information gained 
in this study will benefit the district with a third party assessment of current practices and society by helping schools 
protect meals from intentional food contamination. 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 
You will not have any costs from participating in this study. You will not be compensated for participating in this 
study. 
 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or leave the study 
at any time. If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study early, it will not result in any 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can skip any interview questions or 
checklist items that you do not wish to answer. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations 
and will not be made publicly available. However, federal government regulatory agencies, such as the National 
Institute of Health, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the Institutional Review Board (a committee 
that reviews and approves human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality 
assurance and data analysis. These records may contain private information.  
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be taken: All information from 
your school district will be coded to assure confidentiality. The code sheet will be kept in a locked file cabinet.  
Copies of any documents made will have district identifiers removed before they leave the school district.  No 
photos will be taken that include identifying information.  All computer files including references to the data will be 
password protected.  The information collected will be retained for one year  and then destroyed. During that time 
only my major professor and academic committee members will see the data. If the results are published, your 
identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
For further information about the study contact Carol Klitzke, 608-796-3661 or 608-780-6037; cklitzke@iastate.edu 
 
If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, please contact the IRB 
Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011.  
****************************************************************************** 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been explained to 
you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that your questions have been satisfactorily 
answered. You will receive a copy of the written informed consent prior to your participation in the study. 
Participant’s Name (printed)  
 
(Participant’s Signature)   (Date) 
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Administrator 
 
Title of Study: Food Defense Practices of School Districts in Northern States 
Investigator: Carol J. Klitzke 
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. Please feel free to ask 
questions at any time. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to describe in detail the implementation of food defense practices in school districts in 
the northern U.S.  You are being invited to participate in this study because your school district is located in 
USDA’s northern compliance district and it is the size of district that I want to include in my study.   
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to participate in a 30-minute interview.  You will be asked questions 
about your awareness of food defense practices, the district’s policies and procedures, and barriers to implementing 
food defense.  If you allow it, your interview will be audio-taped. 
 
RISKS 
 
There are no known foreseeable risks other than inconvenience. 
BENEFITS 
 
If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you. It is hoped that the information gained 
in this study will benefit the district with a third party assessment of current practices and society by helping schools 
protect meals from intentional food contamination. 
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 
You will not have any costs from participating in this study. You will not be compensated for participating in this 
study.  
 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or leave the study 
at any time. If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study early, it will not result in any 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can skip any interview questions or 
checklist items that you do not wish to answer. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations 
and will not be made publicly available. However, federal government regulatory agencies, such as the National 
Institute of Health, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the Institutional Review Board (a committee 
that reviews and approves human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality 
assurance and data analysis. These records may contain private information.  
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be taken: All information from 
your school district will be coded to assure confidentiality. The code sheet will be kept in a locked file cabinet.  
Copies of any documents made will have district identifiers removed before they leave the school district.  No 
photos will be taken that include identifying information.  All computer files including references to the data will be 
password protected.  The information collected will be retained for one year  and then destroyed. During that time 
only my major professor and academic committee members will see the data. If the results are published, your 
identity will remain confidential. 
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QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
For further information about the study contact Carol Klitzke, 608-796-3661 or 608-780-6037; cklitzke@iastate.edu 
 
If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, please contact the IRB 
Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011.  
 
**************************************************************************** 
 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been explained to 
you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that your questions have been satisfactorily 
answered. You will receive a copy of the written informed consent prior to your participation in the study.  
 
Participant’s Name (printed) 
(Signature)                                                                                  (date) 
Emergency Response Official 
 
Title of Study: Food Defense Practices of School Districts in Northern States 
Investigator: Carol J. Klitzke 
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. Please feel free to ask 
questions at any time. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to describe in detail the implementation of food defense practices in school districts in 
the northern U.S.  You are being invited to participate in this study because your school district is located in 
USDA’s northern compliance district and it is the size of district that I want to include in my study.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to participate in a 30-minute interview.  You will be asked questions 
about your awareness of food defense, your agency’s involvement in crisis management and food defense planning, 
and the security needs of the district’s foodservice operations.  If you allow it, your interview will be audio-taped. 
 
RISKS 
 
There are no known foreseeable risks other than inconvenience. 
 
BENEFITS 
 
If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you. It is hoped that the information gained 
in this study will benefit the district with a third party assessment of current practices and society by helping schools 
protect meals from intentional food contamination. 
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 
You will not have any costs from participating in this study. You will not be compensated for participating in this 
study.  
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PARTICIPANT RIGHTS 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or leave the study 
at any time. If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study early, it will not result in any 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can skip any interview questions or 
checklist items that you do not wish to answer. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations 
and will not be made publicly available. However, federal government regulatory agencies, such as the National 
Institute of Health, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the Institutional Review Board (a committee 
that reviews and approves human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality 
assurance and data analysis. These records may contain private information.  
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be taken: All information from 
your school district will be coded to assure confidentiality. The code sheet will be kept in a locked file cabinet.  
Copies of any documents made will have district identifiers removed before they leave the school district.  No 
photos will be taken that include identifying information.  All computer files including references to the data will be 
password protected.  The information collected will be retained for one year  and then destroyed. During that time 
only my major professor and academic committee members will see the data. If the results are published, your 
identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
For further information about the study contact Carol Klitzke, 608-796-3661 or 608-780-6037; cklitzke@iastate.edu 
 
If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, please contact the IRB 
Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011.  
******************************************************************************PARTICIPANT 
SIGNATURE 
 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been explained to 
you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that your questions have been satisfactorily 
answered. You will receive a copy of the written informed consent prior to your participation in the study.  
 
Participant’s Name (printed) 
 (Participant’s Signature) 
  (Date) 
 
 
Employee 
 
Title of Study: Food Defense Practices of School Districts in Northern States 
Investigator: Carol J. Klitzke 
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. Please feel free to ask 
questions at any time. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to describe in detail the implementation of food defense practices in school districts in 
the northern U.S.  You are being invited to participate in this study because your school district is located in 
USDA’s northern compliance district and it is the size of district that I want to include in my study.   
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DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to participate in a 30-minute interview.  You will be asked questions 
about your awareness of food defense practices, the district’s policies and procedures, and barriers to implementing 
food defense.  If you allow it, your interview will be audio-taped. 
 
RISKS 
 
There are no known foreseeable risks other than inconvenience. 
 
BENEFITS 
 
If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you. It is hoped that the information gained 
in this study will benefit the district with a third party assessment of current practices and society by helping schools 
protect meals from intentional food contamination. 
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
 
You will not have any costs from participating in this study. You will not be compensated for participating in this 
study.  
 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or leave the study 
at any time. If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study early, it will not result in any 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You can skip any interview questions or 
checklist items that you do not wish to answer. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations 
and will not be made publicly available. However, federal government regulatory agencies, such as the National 
Institute of Health, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the Institutional Review Board (a committee 
that reviews and approves human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality 
assurance and data analysis. These records may contain private information.  
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be taken: All information from 
your school district will be coded to assure confidentiality. The code sheet will be kept in a locked file cabinet.  
Copies of any documents made will have district identifiers removed before they leave the school district.  No 
photos will be taken that include identifying information.  All computer files including references to the data will be 
password protected.  The information collected will be retained for one year  and then destroyed. During that time 
only my major professor and academic committee members will see the data. If the results are published, your 
identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 
For further information about the study contact Carol Klitzke, 608-796-3661 or 608-780-6037; cklitzke@iastate.edu 
 
If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, please contact the IRB 
Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011.  
****************************************************************************** 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
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Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been explained to 
you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that your questions have been satisfactorily 
answered. You will receive a copy of the written informed consent prior to your participation in the study.  
Participant’s Name (printed)  
(Participant’s Signature)   (Date) 
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Appendix G 
Selected sections from Biosecurity Checklist School Foodservice Programs 
USDA and NFSMI 
2004 
  
169 
 
170 
 
171 
 
172 
 
173 
 
174 
 
175 
 
176 
 
177 
  
178 
Appendix H 
Interview Guides 
 
Foodservice Director Interview Form 
District Code: ____ 
Site Code:  
Code  Yes No 
1 How many students are enrolled in your school district?  __________   
2 On average, how many meals are served daily?  
Breakfast:_________ Lunch:________  
 
  
3 How is the foodservice department operated?  
A. Self-operated 
B. Outside contract management (please provide the name of the 
contractor__________________) 
        1. How many school nutrition employees are 
                 a. employed by the management company? 
                     Hourly______________ 
                     Managers/supervisors__________________ 
                     FTEs_________ 
 
 
                 b. employed by the school district? 
                     Hourly_______________ 
                     Managers/supervisors_________________ 
                     FTEs__________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Do you have a centralized warehousing operation?   
5 How many onsite kitchens does your district have?   
6 How many central kitchens do you have that include onsite service?   
7 How many central kitchens do you have with no onsite service?   
8 How many satellite kitchens do you have?   
9 Does your operation have one or more employee(s) dedicated to  implementing 
and monitoring  the HACCP food safety plan?  
 
  
10 Does your operation have one or more employee(s) dedicated to implementing 
and monitoring food defense, or for protection of food from food tampering?  
 
  
11 (show a copy) Are you aware of the USDA Publication “A biosecurity checklist 
for school foodservice programs”?    
 
  
12  If so, then how did you first become aware of this resource? 
Have you used this resource? 
Have you found it helpful? 
 
 
 
  
13 Are you aware of any other resources on food defense applicable to foodservice 
operations?   
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Do you want to know about other resources? 
14A Food being intentionally contaminated or tampered with is a new type of risk 
for me. 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scientists know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply. 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
  
14C When  food tampering occurs, safety inspectors can visibly see that it should 
not be consumed 
 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14D I know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply in my 
foodservice operation. 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14E To what extent is food tampering a risk to your school foodservice operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14F What level of uncertainty do you think there is, in general, about the risk of 
food tampering in your foodservice operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14G How much personal control do you feel you have over food tampering in your 
foodservice operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
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0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
14H How much do you worry about food tampering occurring in your foodservice 
operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
15 Have you ever attended a seminar or training related to food defense?  
Please describe it. 
 
  
16A Has this district implemented a written plan to address food defense?  
If yes, what documents exist?  
  
16B How frequently is the food defense management plan reviewed and updated? 
Who reviews the plan? 
What is the date of the most recent review? 
 
  
16C If you do not have a food defense plan, what is your timeline for developing 
one?  
 
  
17 What areas of your school(s) do you think are the most vulnerable to an 
intentional attack from persons not employed by the school district? 
 
  
18 Have you ever experienced or suspected any incident of food tampering 
(intentional food contamination) in this district? 
 Tell me about it 
  
19 Have you ever spoken with emergency response personnel about food defense 
measures for the child nutrition program? If so, which agency?  
Homeland Security 
 Food safety task force 
 Health inspectors  
Police 
First responders 
Fire Department 
Other 
  
20 When was the last time that emergency contact information for the foodservice 
department was updated? 
  
21 Does the district have board-level policies to cover these topics?   
21A restricting use of foodservice areas by outside groups   
21B Giving administrators access to employee lockers   
21C Outside foods and personal medications are prohibited in foodservice areas 
 
  
21D Items that employees are allowed to bring to work?   
22 Is storage provided for employees’ personal items so that these are not allowed 
in food preparation areas? 
  
23 Are confidential records stored in locked cabinets with access only by cleared 
individuals 
  
24 Are any doors in the foodservice operation kept locked 
When no one is working? 
During the work day? 
  
25 Are there any parts of the foodservice operation off limits to 
non-foodservice school employees? 
students? 
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delivery people? 
sales representatives? 
How is access by visitors and non-school foodservice employees to food 
storage, production and service areas controlled? 
 
26 Are computer systems protected with    
passwords   
Firewalls   
Virus detection software    
27 Please explain some perceived barriers to implementing a Food Defense Plan in 
your operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic Information 
Site code: 
Interviewee code: 
 
A.  What is the title of your position? 
District foodservice director 
District foodservice manager 
Business manager 
Cook/supervisor 
Head cook 
Superintendent 
Principal 
Health Coordinator 
Curriculum Coordinator 
Other 
 
B.  In your position, can you influence changes in  
a. foodservice department policy?   
  Yes  
   No 
b. district policy regarding building and utility 
security? 
 Yes  
 No 
C.  Are you a Registered Dietitian (R.D)? 
Yes 
No 
D.  Are you a School Nutrition Specialist (SNS)?  
Yes 
 No 
 
E.  What is your gender?  
 Female  
 Male 
F.  What is the highest level of education completed? 
  Less than high school 
 High school 
 Technical or vocational school 
 Some college  
 Bachelor Degree 
 Graduate degre
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Administrator Interview Guide 
Position Title:________________________ 
District Code: ____ 
Site Code:  
Code  Yes No 
1 How many employees work in your school (district)?  __________   
30 Does your district have a crisis management plan?   
31 What types of crises are covered in your plan?  
 
 
32 Does the plan address food-related emergencies, such as outbreaks foodborne 
illness or recalls of products? 
  
33 Were foodservice managers or employees involved in development and review of 
the crisis management plan? 
  
34 Were emergency response officials involved in development or review of the 
plan? 
  
35 Are you familiar with the concept of “food defense”?   
11 (show a copy) Are you aware of the USDA Publication “A biosecurity checklist 
for school foodservice programs”? 
  
12  If so, then how did you first become aware of this resource? 
 
  
13 Are you aware of any other resources on food defense applicable to foodservice 
operations?   
  
14A  Food being intentionally contaminated or tampered with is a new type of risk for 
me. 
 
4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14B 
 
 
 
Scientists know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply. 
4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14C When food tampering occurs, safety inspectors can visibly see that it should not 
be consumed. 
4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
 
  
14D I know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply in our school 
district. 
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4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
14E To what extent is food tampering a risk to your school district? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14F What level of uncertainty do you think there is, in general, about the risk of food 
tampering in your school district? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14G How much personal control do you feel you have over food tampering in your 
school district? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14H How much do you worry about food tampering occurring in your school district? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
16 Has this district implemented a written plan to address food defense?  
 
If yes, what documents exist?  
  
10 Who is responsible for food defense in your school district?   
41 Who is responsible for building security in your school district?   
17 What areas of your school(s) do you think are the most vulnerable to an 
intentional attack from persons not employed by the school district? 
 
  
18 Have you ever experienced or suspected any incident of food tampering 
(intentional food contamination) in this district? 
 Tell me about it 
  
19 Have you ever spoken with emergency response personnel about food defense 
measures for the child nutrition program? If so, which agency?  
Homeland Security 
 Food safety task force 
 Health inspectors  
Police 
First responders 
Fire Department 
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Other 
36 Who is responsible for assuring that outside doors in the foodservice area are kept 
locked? 
  
37 Is access to outside air and water intakes restricted?   
38 Is access to the HVAC system restricted?   
39 Is access to the internal water supply restricted?   
40 What is the policy for testing emergency alert systems in the district? 
 
  
When was the last time that the emergency alert systems were tested?   
26 Are computer systems protected with    
passwords   
Firewalls   
Virus detection software    
27  Please explain some perceived barriers to implementing a Food Defense Plan in 
your district. 
 
 
Demographic Information 
Site code:    Interviewee code: 
A.  What is the title of your position? 
District foodservice director 
District foodservice manager 
Business manager 
Cook/supervisor 
Head cook 
Superintendent 
Principal 
Health Coordinator 
Curriculum Coordinator 
Other 
 
B.  In your position, can you influence changes in  
1. foodservice department policy?   
  Yes 
   No 
2. district policy regarding building and utility security? 
 Yes  
 No 
C.  What is your gender?  
 Female  
 Male 
D.  What is the highest level of education completed? 
 Technical or vocational school 
 Some college  
 Bachelor Degree 
 Graduate degree 
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Emergency Responder Interview Form 
Position Title:__________________________ 
District Code: ____ 
Site Code:  
Code  Yes No 
41 Do you have a liaison officer with the school district?   
30 Are you familiar with the school district’s crisis management plan?   
34 Was your agency involved in development of the crisis management plan?  
 
 
35 Are you familiar with the concept of “food defense”?   
11 Are you aware of the USDA Publication “A biosecurity checklist for school 
foodservice programs”?    
  
12  If so, then how did you first become aware of this resource? 
 
  
13 Are you aware of any other resources on food defense applicable to foodservice 
operations?   
  
14A  Food being intentionally contaminated or tampered with is a new type of risk for 
me. 
 
4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14B 
 
 
 
Scientists know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply. 
4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14C When food tampering occurs, safety inspectors can visibly see that it should not be 
consumed. 
4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
 
  
14D I know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply in our school 
district. 
4 = strongly agree 
3 = somewhat agree 
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14E To what extent is food tampering a risk to your school district? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
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0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
14F What level of uncertainty do you think there is, in general, about the risk of food 
tampering in your school district? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14G How much personal control do you feel you have over food tampering in your school 
district? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
18 Have you ever experienced or suspected any incident of food tampering (intentional 
food contamination) in your jurisdiction? 
Can you tell me about it? 
  
48 Has your agency been in communication with the school foodservice director? 
In writing? 
Over the phone? 
In person? 
  
49 What should be done if an incident of intentional food contamination or food 
tampering at the school is suspected? 
  
27  Please explain the barriers that you see in assisting the school district with food 
defense planning? 
 
 
 
Demographic Information 
Site code: 
Interviewee code: 
A.  What is the title of your position? 
 
B.  In your position, can you influence changes in  
 a. school district foodservice department policy?   
   Yes 
    No 
 
 b. school district policy regarding building and utility security? 
  Yes  
  No 
C.  What is your gender?  
 Female  
 Male 
 
D.  What is the highest level of education completed? 
  Less than high school 
 High school 
 Technical or vocational school 
 Some college  
 Bachelor Degree 
 Graduate degree
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Foodservice Line Worker Interview Form 
Position Title:___________________________ 
District Code: ____ 
Site Code:  
Code  Yes No 
9 Does your operation have one or more employee(s) who is(are) responsible for 
the HACCP food safety plan?  
 
  
10 Does your operation have one or more employee(s) who is(are) responsible for 
food defense, or protection of food from intentional contamination?  
 
  
11 Have you heard of a concept called “food defense”?    
12  If so, then how did you first hear about it? 
 
 
 
  
14A Food being intentionally contaminated or tampered with is a new type of risk for 
me. 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14B 
 
 
 
 
Scientists know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply. 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
  
14C When  food tampering occurs, safety inspectors can visibly see that it should not 
be consumed 
 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14D I know a lot about how people could contaminate the food supply in my 
foodservice operation. 
4 = strongly agree  
3 = somewhat agree  
2 = somewhat disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
0 = don’t know 
 
  
14E To what extent is food tampering a risk to your school foodservice operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
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14F What level of uncertainty do you think there is, in general, about the risk of food 
tampering in your foodservice operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14G How much personal control do you feel you have over food tampering in your 
foodservice operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
  
14H How much do you worry about food tampering occurring in your foodservice 
operation? 
1=almost none 
2=slight 
3=moderate 
4= high 
0=don’t know/no opinion 
 
 
  
15 Have you ever received training about food defense?  
 
  
17 What areas of your operation do you think are the most vulnerable to an 
intentional attack from 
Persons not employed by the school district? 
District employees from outside the foodservice department? 
Foodservice employees 
  
  
18 Have you ever experienced or suspected any incident of food tampering 
(intentional food contamination) in this district? 
 Tell me about it 
  
21A What is your school’s policy about the use of the foodservice areas by outside 
groups? 
  
21B In the last year has a manager inspected your locker?   
21D Are there items that you are not allowed to bring to work and/or store in your 
locker? 
 
  
22 Where do you store personal items while at work?  
 
  
24 Are any doors in the foodservice operation kept locked 
When no one is working? 
During the work day? 
  
25 Are there any parts of the foodservice operation off limits to 
non-foodservice school employees? 
students? 
delivery people? 
sales representatives? 
you? 
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27 What issues make it difficult for you to protect food from intentional 
contamination in your kitchen? 
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Appendix I 
 
Table I1 
 
Rules for Inclusion and Sample Statements for Assigning  Interview Data Into Subthemes 
 
Subthemes Rules for Inclusion of Units of Meaning 
into Subthemes 
Sample Statements 
Food defense is an 
unfamiliar term, 
but the concept is 
not. 
 
Stakeholders are unfamiliar with the term food 
defense, but show an awareness of the potential 
for food to be intentionally contaminated.  Food 
defense is confused with unintentional cross 
contamination, or the need to have food and 
water available to shelter students in place 
during a lockdown. 
“When people take food supplies and then 
poison them, is that what you are talking 
about?”- Principal 
“Food defense.  I should say yes I have, 
but no, I can’t.  It’s not used in our 
everyday language maybe.  I know I’ve 
seen or heard it.”- emergency responder 
“For what to look for? Ya.” .- production 
worker 
 
Experience with 
food tampering was 
uncommon but not 
unheard of. 
 
Interviewees had personal knowledge of food 
tampering incidents. 
“We assisted (city) about five years ago, 
they had a wedding reception and there 
was a batch of punch and there was 
something. . . poured into this and 
probably 10 or 12 people got hauled out of 
there to the hospital.  I forgot about that 
one.” –emergency responder 
 
Different 
stakeholders 
perceive different 
areas of 
vulnerability. 
Stakeholder groups have different concerns 
about food tampering related to the 
requirements of their jobs. Production workers 
understand their role is to keep unauthorized 
persons out of the kitchen. 
 
Interviewer:  “What area of your school 
would be most vulnerable to an attack on 
the food?” 
Principal:  “It would have to be in the 
cafeteria.” 
Food is most 
vulnerable before it 
arrives to the site. 
Stakeholders believe that food is safe once it is 
on site.   
“Where is the food most vulnerable? I 
would say in the supply chain.” –
foodservice director 
Food is safe 
because co-workers 
are trustworthy. 
Stakeholders believe they know and can trust 
their coworker. An attack from an internal 
person would be considered less severe.   
 
“I never thought of tampering before, you 
know.  It’s just kind of a family here.” –
production worker 
No one would want 
to attack our 
school. 
Attacks on food would happen somewhere else; 
even though a school district has had problems 
with  intruders, stakeholders feel comfortable 
and safe. 
 
“The only time I really thought about 
terrorism was in the Mall of America . . .”- 
production worker 
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Table I1, continued   
Subthemes Rules for Inclusion of Units of 
Meaning into Subthemes 
 
Sample Statements 
The foodservice 
operation is perceived 
as separate from school 
operations. 
The foodservice operation has hiring, 
purchasing, and training procedures separate 
from the school district.  Communication with 
the foodservice director by other 
administrative personnel is limited.  
 
“There are three rooms I can’t get into 
and never want to.  One is the kitchen. . 
.” -Principal 
The foodservice 
operation is responsible 
for food defense and the 
administration is 
responsible for security. 
 
Food defense becomes an administrative and 
public concern when children are affected.  
Until then the foodservice is depended on to 
protect food.  Production workers understand 
and enforce that no unauthorized persons 
come into the kitchen.  FSDs see food defense 
as an extension of HACCP. 
Interviewer:  “Does your plan address 
any food related emergencies . . .?” 
Principal: “. . . nutrition would probably 
be the first line of defense, but if there 
was actually something that made it to 
the children then we would be involved 
in that.” 
 
Crisis management 
planning does not 
address food hazards. 
 
Food defense is not planned for or discussed. Interviewer: “What should be done if an 
incident of . . .food tampering is 
suspected at this school?” 
 
Emergency responder: “What should be 
done?” 
Interviewer: “Yes” 
Emergency responder:  Well first of all 
stop the food preparation.  Lock it up.  
Call in the medical people. Try to 
isolate it.  Keep people in the building.  
I guess that’s the first thought off the 
top of my head.” 
 
Security is designed to 
protect children, not 
food. 
 
Funds are spent to protect children from 
intruders or to help catch perpetrators.  When 
children are not present, security is a lower 
priority than for schools where children are 
present. 
“When you talk about those things, the 
locks, the cameras. . . , little by little 
our district keeps buying more and  
more.  But right now they’re not used in 
the kitchens, they’re used more in 
hallways and entrance ways of the 
school district.” – foodservice director 
 
Community 
expectations can impede 
food defense. 
 
Schools are community facilities and must be 
shared.  Taxpayers hold expectations for 
school practices. 
“Actually they let people use the 
kitchens for wakes.” – foodservice 
director 
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Appendix J 
 
Internet Administered Food Defense Survey 
 
Food Practices - Carol Klitzke 
 
Section A: Risk Perception 
Food defense practices protect food from intentional contamination by persons who want to cause harm by 
adding harmful substances to food. It’s often called “food tampering.” Food tampering has occurred 
throughout history, but recently the safety of the food supply from terrorist actions has emerged as a 
concern. 
 
The following seven questions ask about your feelings about terrorist acts against the food supply in 
general and in your own foodservice operation. Terrorist acts have the goal of promoting a political or 
social cause, weakening the government, or causing fear and social disruption. 
strongly agree = 4 ….. Don’t know = 0 
1) Food being contaminated by terrorists is a new type of risk for me. 
2) Scientists know a lot about how terrorists could contaminate the food supply. 
4) I know a lot about how terrorists could contaminate the food supply. 
 
High = 4 Don’t know/No opinion = 0 
5) To what extent is terrorism a risk to your school foodservice operation? 
6) How much personal control do you feel you have over terrorism risks in your school foodservice operation? 
7) How much do you worry about terrorism risks to your school foodservice operation? 
 
The following three questions ask about food tampering. Food tampering includes incidents such as contamination 
of food done as a prank, an act of revenge, or to damage reputations. 
High = 4 Don’t know/No opinion = 0 
8) To what extent is food tampering a risk to your school foodservice operation?  
9) How much personal control do you feel you have over food tampering in your school foodservice operation?  
10) How much do you worry food tampering in your school foodservice operation? 
 
Section B. Food Defense Planning 
Instructions: Please reply to the following questions about the food defense planning that occurs in your 
foodservice operations. 
11) My operation has already implemented a food defense management plan. 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
When was your plan implemented? 
(1) Within the last year 
(2) Within the last 2-5 years 
(3) More than 5 years ago 
When was the last time your plan was updated? 
(1) Within the last year 
(2) Within the last 2-5 years 
(3) More than 5 years ago 
(4) Our plan has not yet been updated 
My operation is currently in the process of developing a food defense management plan. 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
I plan to develop and implement a food defense plan in my foodservice operation 
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(1) Strongly Disagree … (5) Strongly Agree 
I will develop and implement a food defense plan in my foodservice operation within the next 3 years. 
(1) Strongly Disagree … (5) Strongly Agree 
At the present time, I have no intention of implementing a food defense plan in my foodservice operation. 
(1) Strongly Disagree … (5) Strongly Agree 
 
Section C: Food Defense Practices 
Please indicate the frequency with which these fundamental food defense activities are practiced by your 
district or your foodservice operation. 
12) Our employees inspect food packages prior to use for evidence of possible contamination. (Examples of 
evidence are a broken seal or discoloration of food inside a package). 
 (5) Always…..(1) Never…   (-1) Don't know ….(-2) Not under my authority 
Our employees inspect food packages prior to use for evidence of possible contamination. (Examples of 
evidence are a broken seal or discoloration of food inside a package). 
A foodservice employee receives food deliveries. 
Our district performs criminal background checks on newly hired foodservice employees. 
Our district performs criminal background checks on current employees at specified intervals. 
Our foodservice employees have been trained about detecting food tampering. 
Our foodservice employees wear photo ID badges while at work. 
Foodservice employees wear aprons or uniforms that are unique and not easily duplicated. 
Our district keeps track of keys provided to employees. 
Our district keeps track of identification badges provided to employees. 
Our foodservice operation restricts visitor access to food storage areas. 
Our foodservice operation restricts visitor access to the food production areas. 
Access to food storage areas by school personnel other than foodservice employees is restricted. 
Access to food production areas by school personnel other than foodservice employees is restricted 
Our foodservice employees are trained to use chemicals properly to prevent food contamination.  
Our district restricts access to the central controls for utilities. 
(5) Always…..(1) Never…   (-1) Don't know ….(-2) Not under my authority 
Our district has procedures to follow if they suspect utility sources have been compromised. 
Our foodservice operation periodically monitors drains and water lines in food production areas for possible 
tampering. 
Our district follows a policy that delivery trucks on the premises be locked when not being loaded or unloaded. 
Our district controls access points into the foodservice facility with security hardware (e.g. cameras). 
Our foodservice operation controls access to food products by unauthorized individuals. 
Our foodservice operation controls access to all chemical storage areas by unauthorized individuals. 
Our foodservice employees monitor food production areas to prevent someone from intentionally 
contaminating food during preparation. 
Outside entrances to the foodservice operation are kept secure. 
Outside refrigeration/storage units are kept secure. 
Our district allows the foodservice production area to be used for special events by outside groups. 
(5) Always…..(1) Never…   (-1) Don't know ….(-2) Not under my authority 
 
Our district requires a foodservice staff member be present when the foodservice production area is used by 
outside groups. 
(5) Always…..(1) Never…   (-1) Don't know ….(-2) Not under my authority 
 
Foodservice staff knows what to do in the event of a food tampering incident. 
A list of suppliers’ contact information is readily available to foodservice staff. 
Expectations about food defense are included when negotiating contracts with vendors. 
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The foodservice director (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) communicates with district 
administrators about food safety (i.e. prevention of unintentional contamination) issues. 
The foodservice director (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) communicates with district 
administrators about food defense issues (i.e. prevention of intentional contamination). 
The foodservice director (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) communicates with community 
resource officers (including emergency responders) about food safety issues. 
The foodservice director (or person in charge of daily foodservice operations) communicates with community 
resource officers (including emergency responders) about food defense issues.. 
 
Section D: Demographic Information 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about your district, the foodservice operation, and yourself. 
44) In which state is your district located? 
(1) Wyoming 
(2) Wisconsin 
(3) South Dakota 
(4) North Dakota 
(5) Montana 
(6) Minnesota 
(7) Iowa 
 
45) What is the certified enrollment in your school district? 
(1) <2500 students 
(2) 2501-5000 students 
(3) 5001-7500 students 
(4) 7501-10,000 students 
(5) 10,001-20,000 
(6) >20,000 
 
46) On average, how many reimbursable meals are served daily to students in your district by your foodservice 
program? 
Breakfast: _________ 
Lunch: _________ 
 
47) How is the foodservice department in your district administered? 
(1) Self-operated 
(2) Outside contractor (please provide the name of the contractor): _________________ 
 Taher = 1 
 Chartwell = 2 
 Aramark = 3 
Aviands = 4 
CBM Food = 5 
Lunchtime solutions = 6 
 
48) What type of production system does your school district have? 
(1) Onsite kitchen (all meals prepared and served in the same location). 
(2) Centralized/Commissary production (a production facility that prepares food for service only at other sites; no 
meals or food is served onsite). 
(3) Combination production system (both centralized and onsite production systems are in place in the district 
where food is prepared and served in one location andmeals or food items in bulk are sent to other 
locations for service). 
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How many onsite kitchens does the school district have? 
(1) 1…. (8) 8 …    (9) If more than 8, how many?: _________________ 
 
Does your onsite kitchen prepare food for delivery to facilities outside of the school district, such as to a day 
care center? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
(If yes) What types of facilities do you provide delivery to? (Check all that apply) 
[1] Day care center 
[2] Nursing home 
[3] Local college 
[4] Special school 
[5] Mental health facility 
[6] Military base 
[7] Community center 
[8] Other (please list) 
 1= Head start 
 2 = Assisted Living/senior dining 
 3= Private school 
 4= other public schools 
  
How many school district sites receive meals from the central kitchen(s)? 
(1) 1 
(2) 2 
(3) 3 
(4) 4 
(5) 5 
(6) 6-8 
(7) 9-12 
(8) 12-48 
(9) If more than 48, how many?: _________________ 
 
Are meals delivered to any facilities outside of the school district, such as to a day care center? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
(If yes) What types of facilities are served by the central kitchen? (Check all that apply) 
[1] Day care center 
[2] Nursing home 
[3] Local college 
[4] Special school 
[5] Mental health facility 
[6] Military base 
[7] Community center 
[8] Other (please list) 
 1= Head start 
 2 = Assisted Living 
 3= Private school 
 
How many non-school district sites receive meals from the central kitchen(s)? 
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(1) 1….  (8) 8 
(9) If more than 8, how many?: _________________ 
How many combination production sites does the school district have? 
(1) 1….  (8) 8 
 (9) If more than 8, how many?: _________________ 
How many schools sites receive meals from the combination production kitchen? 
(1) 1 
(2) 2 
(3) 3 
(4) 4 
(5) 5 
(6) 6-8 
(7) 9-12 
(8) 12-48 
(9) If more than 48, how many?: _________________ 
 
Are meals delivered to any facilities outside of the school district, such as to a day care center? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
(If yes) What types of facilities receive meals from the combination production kitchen? (Check all that apply) 
[1] Day care center 
[2] Nursing home 
[3] Local college 
[4] Special school 
[5] Mental health facility 
[6] Military base 
[7] Community center 
[8] Other (please list) 
 1= Head start 
 2 = Assisted Living 
 3= Private school 
 
How many non-school district sites receive meals from the combination kitchen? 
(1) 1….  (8) 8 
 (9) If more than 8, how many?: _________________ 
49) Do the district use a centralized warehousing operation for food? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
50) Does your district have a crisis management plan? 
(1) Yes, but there is no written document 
(2) Yes, and it is documented 
(3) No 
(4) Don't know 
 
If it is documented, who has access to the written plan? 
5 = no limitations/available on the internet 
4= school personnel only 
3=school administrators only 
2= foodservice director/employees only 
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1=community government/emergency responders 
 
____________________________________________  
51) Is a food tampering scenario included in the crisis management plan? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
52) Were any school foodservice managers included in district crisis management planning? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
53) Have you ever attended a seminar or training that included content about food defense? 
(1) Yes, once. 
(2) Yes, more than once. 
(3) No 
 
53-1. In what year was the training held? 
 
Year 
Briefly describe the length, 
location, and content of the 
training. 
 
2010-
2012 
2005-2009 2001-2004 
Before 
2001  
In what year was the training 
held? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ___ 
 
In what year was the training held? 
 
Year 
Briefly describe the length, location, and 
content of the training. 
 
2010-
2012 
2005-2009 
2001-
2004 
Before 
2001  
In what years was the 
training held? 
[1] [2] [3] [4] ___ 
 
54) What is the title of your position? 
(1) District Foodservice Director 
(2) District Foodservice Manager 
(3) Business Manager 
(4) Cook Manager, Kitchen Manager 
(5) Head cook 
(6) Superintendent 
(7) Principal 
(8) Health Coordinator 
(9) Curriculum Coordinator 
(10) Other: _________________ 
(11) Administrative Assistant 
(12) Food Service Supervisor 
 
55) In your position, can you influence changes in 
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Yes No 
Foodservice department policy regarding building security? (1)  (2)  
District policy (board level) regarding building security? (1)  (2)  
Foodservice department policy regarding utility security? (1)  (2)  
District policy (board level) regarding utility security? (1)  (2)  
 
 
Thank You! 
Thank you for your participation in this study. Your name will be entered into a drawing for a $50 gift certificate 
from the School Nutrition Association. This survey was sent to school food authorities in seven states; 
one gift card will be awarded per state.  
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Appendix K 
Permission to Adapt Work from Other Studies 
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Appendix L 
 
Survey Feedback Sheet 
 
Thank you for agreeing to pilot-test my survey!  This survey is intended for the population of 
School Food Authorities in seven Northern states (IA, MN, WI, ND, SD, MT, and WY).  The 
final electronic survey will be administered via email; therefore the final format will be different 
from what is presented here. Your input is needed to be sure content is appropriate for the 
audience. Your feedback will be used to improve my survey, but your response will not be 
included in the study results. 
 
Directions 
Please complete the survey and keep a record of how much time is required to complete it. 
You may write or type comments directly onto any part of the survey. 
Please respond to the feedback questions listed below. 
Please return this sheet and your completed survey to me via email, fax, or snail mail by 
November 1 
 
Carol Klitzke, MS, RD, SNS 
900 Viterbo Drive 
La Crosse WI 54601 
FAX: 608-796-3668 
cjklitzke@viterbo.edu 
 
1    . Were any of the survey items difficult to understand? 
2.     Was the terminology used correct and up-to-date? 
3.     Were there any items on the survey that would cause you to stop and leave it unfinished? 
4.     How long did it take you to complete the survey? 
5.     What is your opinion about the length of the survey? 
6.     What would compel you to complete this survey if it were to arrive in your email Inbox? 
 
Thank you very much! 
Carol Klitzke 
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Appendix M 
Survey Cover Letter 
 
 
Email subject line:  Iowa State University food defense survey 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear (School Foodservice Director/School Food Authority): 
 
Recent events have underscored the fact that schools, even elementary schools, are targets for violent acts. A threat 
not often recognized is the harm that could result from attacks on school meals through intentional contamination 
with harmful substances.  The protection of food from such attacks is called food defense. 
 
I am writing to ask your help in a study about food defense in schools. This study will describe what schools are 
doing to protect children from food tampering.  The survey will also ask you questions about your attitudes 
regarding the risk of terrorism. It can be completed in less than 20 minutes. As a token of appreciation for your 
participation, you may enter your name in a drawing for a $50 gift certificate to Target.com, amazon.com or the 
School Nutrition Association Emporium.  One drawing will be held for respondents from each of the states included 
in the survey. 
 
Only public school districts in Wyoming, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa were chosen 
for this survey, making your response very important.  
 
If you are not the person with day to day oversight of the school meals program, please forward this message 
to that person and ask them to respond, or reply to me with the correct contact information.   
 
Results from this study will be used by those who plan training for school foodservice personnel.  This study will 
help target development of training materials. 
 
Your answers are completely confidential.  I will have no way to find out who has responded and who has not, so 
you may receive future emails from me, even if you have already responded.  Your name or school district cannot be 
connected to your answers in any way.  Your participation is voluntary.  You may refuse to answer some or all of 
the questions on the survey, but it will be helpful if you answer as many as you can. 
 
If you have questions or comments about this study, please feel free to contact me at 608-796-3661 or 
cklitzke@iastate.edu.  You may also contact my faculty advisor, Dr. Catherine Strohbehn at 515-294-3527 or 
cstrohbe@iastate.edu 
Here is the link that will take you to the survey.  By clicking this link you consent to 
participate:  http://humansciences.fooddefense.sgizmo.com/s3/  
 Thank you in advance for your help with this important study. Protecting children from harm is a charge we all take 
seriously.  
Sincerely, 
Carol Klitzke, RD, SNS 
Doctoral Candidate in Hospitality Management 
College of Human Sciences 
Iowa State University  
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Appendix M 
Reminder Email 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recently you received a message with a link to a survey about food defense practices for those in 
charge of school meal programs in northern states of the U.S.  If you have already responded to 
the survey, please accept my sincere thanks! 
 
If you have not completed the survey, I hope that you will do so today.  We will best be able to 
prevent food tampering if people in charge of child nutrition programs will share their opinions 
through the survey. 
 
Here is the link that will take you to the survey: 
Sincerely, 
 
Carol Klitzke, SNS 
 
Doctoral Candidate in Hospitality Management 
College of Human Sciences 
Iowa State University  
608-796-3661  
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APPENDIX N 
Table N1 Units of Meaning and Their Sources as Assigned to Subthemes 
a
Number of units of meaning within each subtheme.
  b
 Number of sites from which units of 
meaning were drawn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subtheme 
 
 
 
 
 
Units
a
 
 
 
 
 
Sites
b 
(n =
 
5)  
Interview sources 
Principals 
(n = 5) 
Foodservice 
Directors 
(n = 5) 
Emergency 
Responders 
(n = 5) 
Production 
Workers 
(n = 10) 
 
Units 
Unique 
sources 
 
Units 
Unique 
sources 
 
Units 
Unique 
sources 
 
Units 
Unique 
sources 
Food defense is an 
unfamiliar term, but the 
concept is not. 
 
43 100 14 5 5 3 8 5 18 9 
Experience with food 
tampering was 
uncommon but not 
unheard of. 
 
10 100 0 0 5 4 5 4 0 0 
Different stakeholders 
perceive different areas 
of vulnerability. 
 
47 100 15 5 9 5 2 2 20 7 
Food is most vulnerable 
before it arrives to the 
site. 
 
8 80 2 2 2 2 1 1 4 1 
Food is safe because co-
workers are trustworthy. 
 
15 100 2 2 3 2 3 3 8 6 
No one would want to 
attack our school. 
15 80 3 3 4 3 3 2 5 4 
The foodservice 
operation is perceived 
as separate from school 
operations. 
 
16 100 9 3 2 2 4 3 0 0 
The foodservice 
operation is responsible 
for food defense and the 
administration is 
responsible for security. 
 
34 5 17 4 13 4 2 2 5 4 
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a
Number of units of meaning within each subtheme.
  b
 Number of sites from which units of 
meaning were drawn. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table N1, cont.      
    
Principals 
(n = 5) 
Foodservice 
directors  
(n = 5) 
Emergency 
Responders 
 ( n = 5) 
Production 
Workers  
(n = 10) 
Subtheme  
 
Units
a
 
 
Sites
b 
(n =
 
5)  
 
 
Units, 
 
Unique 
sources 
 
 
Units  
 
Unique 
sources,  
 
 
Units,  
 
Unique 
sources,  
 
 
Units,  
 
Unique 
sources,  
Crisis management 
planning does not 
address food 
hazards. 
 
28 5 17 5 4 3 10 3 0 0 
Security is designed 
to protect children, 
not food. 
 
25 5 10 5 5 2 4 2 7 5 
Community 
expectations can 
impede food 
defense. 
 
6 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Column totals 
(percent of total) 
247  90 (36.4) 52 (21.1) 42 (17.0) 67 (27.1) 
